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Abstract
In this thesis I defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against the Theory
Theory of Mind. I do this in two major ways. Firstly, I set out the logi-
cal space available to accounts of Theory of Mind and suggest that there are
many valuable options available to simulational accounts. I also canvas serious
objections to Theory Theory which have not I contend been resolved. I will
argue that hybrid theoretical accounts do not resolve all of these objections.
Further types of hybrid accounts which add in some simulational capacities,
some of which involve both theory and simulation, are complex and unpar-
simonious and so a different approach is needed. I argue for a specific weak
hybrid approach which is very close to pure Simulation Theory. This avoids all
of the objections. Secondly, I provide an answer to a challenge to Simulation
Theory which is widely considered to be its single most significant problem.
That challenge, termed the ‘argument from error,’ is that while Simulation
Theory can account for frequent error in Theory of Mind, it cannot account
for the systematic nature of those errors. My response is a novel Bias Mis-
match Defence. This suggests that the systematic errors can arise because
cognitive biases, such as Confirmation Bias, can have differential effects in the
person simulating and the person being simulated.
Word count: 79444 (from LATEX statistics; excluding bibliographical appen-
dices as is permitted by UCL regulations)
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6“I want you to be able to tell your noble friends that Zeus has given us
too a certain measure of success, which has held good from our forefathers’
time to the present day. Though our boxing and wrestling are not beyond
criticism, we can run fast . . . ”
Homer: The Odyssey, Book VIII1
1Since this text appeared at Short (1992, p. 3), it appears here also.
Contents
Declaration 3
Abstract 5
Contents 7
List of Tables 13
List of Figures 15
1 Introduction 17
2 ToM Accounts: Overview 29
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.1 Why Consider ST? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 TT(Scientific) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 TT(Innate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 ST(Replication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 ST(Transformation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.6 Further Possible Types Of ST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6.1 On-line Vs Off-line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7 Avoiding Collapse Between ST And TT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.7.1 Distinctions Between ST And TT . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.7.2 Theory Driven Vs Process Driven . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7
8 CONTENTS
2.8 Setting The Bar Too Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3 Objections To Pure TT Accounts 69
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2 Objections To TT(Scientific) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.1 Too Complex And Too Difficult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.2 Requires Solving The Frame Problem . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.3 Cannot Explain Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Objections To TT(Innate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3.1 Cannot Explain Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3.2 Cannot Explain Default Belief Attribution . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.3 Cannot Parsimoniously Explain Autism . . . . . . . . . 106
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4 Objections To Hybrid Accounts 113
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2 Objections To Theoretical Hybrids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2.1 Objections Avoided By Theoretical Hybrids . . . . . . . 118
4.2.2 Objections Not Avoided By Theoretical Hybrids . . . . 119
4.2.3 Interim Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3 Objections To Strong S/T Hybrid Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3.1 Which Tool When? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.3.2 Perspective Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5 The Systematic Error Challenge 141
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2 The ‘Too Rosy’ Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3 The ‘Too Cynical’ Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
CONTENTS 9
6 Bias Mismatch Defence: Background 153
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 Why We Need A New Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.2.1 Wrong Inputs Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.2.2 Translation Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.3 Bias Mismatch Defence: Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.4 Bias Mismatch Defence: Biases Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.4.1 Representativeness Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.4.2 Availability Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.4.3 Conjunction Fallacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.4 Fundamental Attribution Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.4.5 Conformity Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.4.6 False Consensus Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.4.7 Self-Presentation Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.4.8 Clustering Illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.4.9 Confirmation Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.4.10 Belief Perseverance Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.4.11 Endowment Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.4.12 Position Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7 Bias Mismatch Defence: Motivation 185
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.2 Affect Mismatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.3 System Mismatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.4 Mismatch Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8 ‘Too Rosy’ Evidence 201
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.2 ‘Too Rosy’ Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
10 CONTENTS
8.2.1 Shock Appliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8.2.2 Fake Prison Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
8.2.3 ‘Repenters’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
8.2.4 Quiz Gamers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
8.2.5 Suicide Note Assessors Redux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
8.2.6 Lottery Ticket Holders Redux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
8.2.7 Gamblers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
8.2.8 Basketball Fans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
8.2.9 Cancer Cure Assessors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
8.2.10 Puzzle Solvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.2.11 Shoppers Redux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
9 ‘Too Cynical’ Evidence 237
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
9.2 ‘Too Cynical’ Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
9.2.1 Conflict Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
9.2.2 Marriage Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
9.2.3 Video Gamers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
9.2.4 Debaters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
9.2.5 Darts Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
9.2.6 Blood Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
9.2.7 Healthcare Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
9.2.8 Campus Drinkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
9.2.9 Smokers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
9.2.10 Statement Releasers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
10 TT: Inaccurate Generalisation Defence 255
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
10.2 Constructing The Generalisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
CONTENTS 11
10.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
11 Conclusions 279
Index 283
Bibliography 289
12 CONTENTS
List of Tables
2.1 Possible Variants Of ST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Possible Types Of Possessionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Ames’s Four Routes To Mental State Inference . . . . . . . . . 124
7.1 Simulation Error Probability By System Type Of S And O . . 193
8.1 Response Type By Group Studied: Too Rosy . . . . . . . . . . 204
9.1 Response Type By Group Studied: Too Cynical . . . . . . . . . 238
9.2 Actual Versus Estimated Number Of Individuals Volunteering
To Give Blood For Payment Or No Payment . . . . . . . . . . 249
10.1 Inaccurate Generalisation Defence: Data Issues . . . . . . . . . 276
13
14 LIST OF TABLES
List of Figures
4.1 Types Of ToM Hybrids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.1 Systematic Simulation Error Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
10.1 S’s Inside And Outside Of Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
15
16 LIST OF FIGURES
Chapter 1
Introduction
We seem to understand one another. How do we do it? When does it go
wrong? These are the two questions I will explore in this thesis. Humans
seem to be able to predict one another’s behaviour and explain it. Indeed,
we spend much of our time happily engaged in these activities. The label for
this way in which we predict and explain each other is ‘Theory of Mind.’ This
term is perhaps slightly unfortunate; as Dennett (2007, p. 396) comments, it
conjures up too much “theorem-deriving” and “proposition-testing.” I will be
arguing in this thesis for less theoretical and more imaginative answers to the
questions as to how we know each other and ourselves. I will be arguing for
an account whereby we understand others by putting ourselves in their shoes.
The term Theory of Mind is generally agreed to originate in the seminal
Premack and Woodruff (1978) which asked “Does the chimpanzee have a the-
ory of mind?” The question there was whether the chimpanzee has the ability
to predict or explain the actions of others on the basis of beliefs or perhaps
quasi-beliefs about the mental states of those others. It was taken as read
that humans have those abilities: persons can in fact so predict and explain.
Humans do have, then, a Theory of Mind, or at least Theory of Mind abilities.
People know each other because of it, or they think they do.
17
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Theory of Mind abilities have also been known as ‘mind-reading’ or ‘men-
talising,’ because on some views, persons predict behaviour by first ascribing
mental states such as beliefs and desires to others and then working out what
people with those beliefs and desires would do. Accounts of Theory of Mind
that explain how people predict each other’s behaviour have fallen into two
competing types: Simulation Theory and Theory Theory. This thesis will de-
fend Simulation Theory of Mind against Theory Theory of Mind. These terms
are often shortened to ‘Simulation Theory’ and ‘Theory Theory.’ Something
should be said at the outset about these terms, since at least the latter one
looks somewhat odd.
The oddity of the term ‘Theory Theory’ derives from its repeating the
word ‘theory.’ This is intended to drive home the two domains of theory
involved. Firstly there is the theory in Theory of Mind which is just the label
for whatever mechanism I use to predict your behaviour from the theoretical
knowledge that you have a mind which, presumably, means you have beliefs
and desires as well. The second usage of the word ‘theory’ serves to underline
that on the Theory Theory view, how I predict your behaviour —how I can
use my Theory of Mind —is that I employ a theory to do so. The contrast
is with Simulation Theory, which says that I predict your behaviour not by
employing a theory of people, but by simulating you. My Theory of Mind on
the simulationist account would be more like ‘that’s what I would do if that
were me’ and less like ‘as a rule, people in situation X do action Y.’ It would
be more human and less scientific in construction.
The theory or simulation underlying Theory of Mind should not imply
flawless performance. We need to explain the observed performance of Theory
of Mind, which varies from good under some circumstances to poor under
others. For example, I believe that if I see you going into a coffee shop, I have
a good picture of some of your desires and beliefs: viz. you desire coffee and
19
you believe that you will be able to get some in the coffee shop. So I can
explain your behaviour when you go in. On the other hand, you may well be
involved in more complex scenarios that defy my Theory of Mind abilities. I
may be mistaken about your purposes in going in to the coffee shop; perhaps
you do not desire coffee but you believe you will meet a friend. Indeed, errors in
Theory of Mind are legion, and it is consideration of these errors that will form
a major part of this thesis. That is because there is a serious challenge from
Saxe (2005a) as to how one explains the systematic nature of these errors. She
says that the inability of Simulation Theory to explain the systematic errors
combined with the ease with which Theory Theory can explain the errors is a
major reason to prefer the latter over the former. I agree with her that this is
a serious challenge, but I disagree that Simulation Theory cannot explain the
systematic errors. I will argue that not only can Simulation Theory explain the
systematic nature of these errors, but it can do so better than Theory Theory,
because it is more parsimonious and more plausibly ascribed to children who
have a serviceable Theory of Mind by the age of five at the latest, among
other reasons. Simulation Theory alone is clearly more parsimonious than
the current consensus position which is a poorly specified ‘Strong Hybrid’
of simulation and theory. I will explain the differences between Strong and
Weak S/T Hybrid accounts in more detail at the beginning of Ch. 4, but the
basic distinction is that Strong S/T Hybrid accounts allot significant roles to
both simulation and theory while Weak S/T Hybrid accounts do not. Weak
S/T Hybrid accounts could either be mostly theory with a minor amount of
simulation or vice versa: it is this latter ‘pure simulation plus minor theory’
account for which I will argue in this thesis.
Using Theory of Mind is part of ‘folk psychology.’ This is distinct to scien-
tific psychology, which is the sort of activity conducted in university research
laboratories. Both sorts of knowledge aim at understanding people, but the
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first one is conducted by everyone more-or-less all the time, while the second
one is a specialised academic discipline. I will be aiming in this thesis to
make a contribution to the second by providing a new approach to the first.
Or more precisely, to provide a previous approach to understanding the first,
Simulation Theory, with the resources to defeat its most serious challenge.
This will also enable the necessary defence of the position I favour, Weak S/T
Hybridism against the same charge.
I have one task in this thesis; I will engage with this task by pursuing two
major and linked aims. The task is, approximately, to defend simulational
accounts against the more mainstream theoretical accounts of Theory of Mind.
The two major aims intended to provide this defence are as follows. The first
aim is to support simulational accounts against theoretical accounts by noting
the serious objections to the latter that the former can avoid. The second
aim of this thesis is to respond to a systematic error challenge to simulational
accounts.
To begin the pursuit of this first aim, I will be setting out in detail the log-
ical space which defines possible accounts within the simulational/theoretical
domain. This will show that there are more options available in the simulation
space than have currently been explored. I will be clearly setting out the de-
bate between simulation and theory and making more clear what the relevant
variations of these positions are.
I will then establish that the theoretical accounts so far canvassed come in
two major variants. I will be assuming that all theoretical accounts postulate
that there are a set of rules or axioms or generalisations which represent the
body of theoretical knowledge that underpins Theory of Mind. Where the two
sorts of theoretical accounts differ is on the source of these generalisations. For
some proponents of a theoretical account, these generalisations are learned,
while for others, they are innate. I will consider three objections to the first
21
type of account and three further objections to the second type of account. (I
will set out what these objections are in more detail in the chapter outlines
below.) These will show that there are serious problems with both types of
pure theoretical account. I will then show that combining the two theoretical
accounts does not resolve all of the objections.
I will begin the pursuit of the second aim by setting out the systematic
error challenge to simulational accounts as propounded by Saxe (2005a). Al-
though for the sake of specificity, I will generally use Saxe’s position as the
one which I oppose, her view is a mainstream one which is widely defended.
For example, Apperly (2008, p. 268) writes, “many authors now argue for a
hybrid account in which both Simulation and Theory play a role.” Saxe is
within the mainstream as a Strong S/T Hybrid theorist who sees major roles
for both simulation and theory in accounts of Theory of Mind. It is this entire
mainstream consensus that I challenge; including its significant reliance on
theory.1
The central support for this consensus, as Saxe (2005a, p. 175) argues,
derives from the fact that there is “occasional systematic error” in ToM. This
argument is known as the ‘argument from error.’ The sort of case she means
may be exemplified by the notorious experiments in which participants be-
lieved that they were giving severe electric shocks to others. The Theory of
Mind error is that no-one predicts that the subjects will give the shocks. The
errors are also systematic in that they seem to occur repeatedly: every time
a naive subject makes a prediction about how people will behave in the Mil-
gram (1963) experiments, that prediction will be wrong. I will not dispute
that these errors occur, nor that they are systematic in nature. I will instead
seek to provide additional resources to Simulation Theory in a parsimonious
fashion to allow it to explain the systematic nature of the errors. This will
1Though see Wilkinson and Ball (2012, p. 265) for the suggestion that the “hybrid
consensus is perhaps more apparent than real.”
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also constitute a defence of the Weak S/T Hybrid account which I favour since
Weak S/T Hybrid accounts are very close to pure Simulation Theory.
Saxe holds that the systematic nature of these errors is easily explained on
Theory Theory and not at all explicable on a Simulation Theory basis. She
is joined here by a large number of writers including Apperly (2008, p. 268)
again, who goes on to observe that “cases where people make systematic errors
[...] are seen by many as good evidence” for Theory Theory. He gives only
two citations in support of this claim, of which Saxe (2005a) is one. Many
other authors make similar comments about the unique importance of Saxe’s
argument in bolstering support for theory and thereby reducing support for
simulation. For example, “as Rebecca Saxe (2005) argues, there are both
new and old data that speak strongly in favour of a substantial theoretical
component to our folk-psychological capacities” (Godfrey-Smith 2005, p. 8).
Dimaggio et al. (2008, p. 786) set out a simulationist approach to Theory of
Mind, and single out the argument from error as an obstacle, beginning with
the phrase “[o]f note there are limitations to this view.” Saxe (2005a) is the
major anti-simulation argument considered by P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler
(2009b, p. 535). Morin (2007, p. 1069) writes that ST “is largely accepted
in the literature (but see Saxe, 2005).” Grafton (2009, p. 109) describes
Saxe (2005a) as “an important review [that] provided a detailed analysis of
behavioural errors in intentionality decoding experiments [which] is a strong
argument against the conclusion that simulation” is sufficient to explain the
decoding. In sum, as Doherty (2008, p. 47) points out, the “ ‘argument from
error’ (Saxe 2005a) is one of the most powerful arguments against” ST.2
Clearly, responding to this charge that Simulation Theory cannot explain
systematic error is of the first importance. However, as far as I can see, there
2Cf. also Bello and Cassimatis (2006, pp. 1014–1015); Kaplan and Iacoboni (2006, p.
182); Oberman and Ramachandran (2007, p. 316); Nico and Daprati (2009, p. 233); Gallese
and Sinigaglia (2011, p. 512).
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has been no significant response at all to this challenge from the Simulation
Theory side, although Saxe (2005a) is comprehensive, clear and widely cited.
This lack of a response to Saxe (2005a) has driven the consensus in favour of
Strong S/T Hybrid views of Theory of Mind involving both simulation and
theory. The absence of a comprehensive response from the Simulation Theory
side lets the Theory Theory side win by default. In this thesis, I will supply
this lack.
My main response to Saxe (2005a) is going to be that cognitive biases, to
which persons are all subject, explain the systematic errors. As an example
of a cognitive bias, I mean such effects as confirmation bias. This is the
tendency people all have to seek only information confirming what they already
believe. Often, the application of these biases is caused by emotional reasons.
For example, most people want to believe positive things about themselves,
and sometimes people do that by ignoring evidence to the contrary. If the
person doing the simulation has different emotional responses to the person
being simulated, they may well not apply the same biases. For instance,
someone else might be emotionally involved in maintaining their own positive
self-image, but I might not be. If that emotional involvement leads them to
apply any cognitive biases, that bias may not feature in my simulation. Thus
my simulation will exhibit systematic error. I will use this approach to explain
a wide array of experimental data to which Saxe appeals to back her Strong
S/T Hybrid consensus view. I term this defence the Bias Mismatch Defence
because it relies on the simulator and the person being simulated applying
different biases to explain the errors in theory of mind and their systematic
nature.
The arguments for Simulation Theory that rely on the discovery of ‘mirror
neurons,’ put forward for example by Gallese and Goldman (1998), lie outside
the scope of this thesis. While convincing, the results are heavily disputed by
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Theory Theorists. I suspect that a full consideration of the current state of
this evidence and the surrounding arguments could only be adequately done
in a separate book-length treatment.3
I will proceed as follows. In Ch. 2, I will give an overview of the var-
ious accounts of ToM. I will set out very briefly at this stage some initial
motivations for considering simulational as opposed to theoretical accounts. I
will give descriptions of the two main types of each of Simulation Theory and
Theory Theory. I will show how the logical geography of Simulation Theory
results in an array of possible variants of Simulation Theory, for some of which
arguments have been given. This brings out a major risk: that collapse of Sim-
ulation Theory back into Theory Theory. Such collapse would mean that ST
is not a separate defensible position from Theory Theory. I give reasons to
think that this threat can be avoided. I close this chapter by considering the
important problem of ‘setting the bar too low.’ This involves Theory Theory
proponents proposing too easy a test for whether Theory of Mind has involved
theory use.
In Ch. 3, I consider six objections to pure Theory Theory accounts. There
are three objections given to each of the two theoretical accounts of Theory
of Mind: the variant on which the generalisations are learned and the variant
on which they are innate. The three objections to the learned variant of theo-
retical accounts are as follows. Such accounts a) implausibly ascribe mastery
of complex and difficult sets of generalisations to very young children; b) re-
quire that a solution of the intractable frame problem be embodied within the
generalisations and c) entail convergence between the Theory of Mind across
different persons and different cultures which is empirically false. The three
objections to the innate variant of theoretical accounts are as follows. Such
accounts a) cannot explain the observed development in Theory of Mind ca-
3P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler (2009b) survey the mirror neuron evidence for Simulation
Theory.
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pacities; b) cannot explain how persons usually start Theory of Mind tasks by
assuming that other persons share most of their beliefs and c) lack a parsimo-
nious explanation of certain features of autistic subjects. I conclude that none
of these pure accounts can overcome the objections to them. This leads on
to the project of the next chapter, which is to consider whether hybrid views
involving mixtures of various types of account can avoid these objections.
In Ch. 4, I begin by examining whether the six objections noted in the
chapter above can be avoided by the combination of learned and innate theo-
retical accounts. This move obviously has some costs in terms of the explana-
tory power versus simplicity value metric of accounts generally, but does pay
some dividends in terms of the six objections. I will conclude however that the
combination leaves some serious objections unresolved. I then go on to note
that the consensus nowadays is for a Strong S/T Hybrid position, which holds
that both simulation and theory play a major part in Theory of Mind. There
are two sets of problems for this view. One set relates to its inheritance of all
of the problems set out in the previous chapter for pure theoretical accounts.
The second set of problems derives from the Strong S/T Hybrid nature of the
consensus, which means an account of interaction between theory and sim-
ulation is required. Will they answer separate questions, or somehow work
together? I contend that all of these problems taken together mean that The-
ory Theory and strong hybrids are unsuccessful, and weak hybrids which are
very close to pure simulation accounts are the best remaining option. This
means that a major unanswered problem for simulational accounts must be
answered, which will be the project of the next five chapters.
In Ch. 5, I will outline the unanswered problem for Simulation Theory: the
‘argument from error.’ Saxe (2005a) argues that Simulation Theory cannot
account for systematic errors in Theory of Mind in certain circumstances,
because if people use their minds to simulate other minds, the simulators
26 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
should be accurate. This chapter aims to give Saxe her best case in two of
the areas she considers: occasions when Theory of Mind is too cynical, others
when it is too rosy.
In Ch. 6, the question as to why we need a new defence is answered by
agreeing with Saxe that the existing defences do not work. The Bias Mismatch
defence is introduced: ‘simulation may not accurately model bias’ is the central
idea. A list of biases that will be employed, for example Confirmation Bias, is
given and each is outlined.
In Ch. 7, three reasons why biases may not be simulated are given. There
are two main ways: Affect Mismatch and system mismatch. In the first, the
emotional impact on the target is not fully felt by the simulator. In the second,
they use different reasoning systems.
Ch. 8 covers an array of ‘too rosy’ evidence introduced by Saxe (2005a),
which arises in situations where people are systematically over-optimistic in
predictions of the rationality or morality of ourselves and others. For example,
no-one predicts the way participants in the Milgram experiment are prepared
to give out severe electric shocks to strangers for minor infractions. These
data are explained by appealing to Conformity Bias, the tendency to do what
one is told. A set of 12 experiments Saxe cites in support of her challenge is
described and explained using the Bias Mismatch defence in similar fashion
to above.
In Ch. 9, I turn to the opposing sort of data introduced by Saxe (2005a);
it covers occasions when persons are systematically too cynical in Theory of
Mind. For example, persons on different sides of vexed political questions often
form very harsh evaluations of their opponents. They see their opponents as
biased and unwilling to examine the evidence or assess it impartially. This
is explained using the Bias Mismatch defence with the bias in question being
Confirmation Bias. People might be more sympathetic to their opponents if
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they realised that people all fall victim to it. Nine further experiments are
similarly explained.
In Ch. 10, I will examine whether the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence
can allow theory theory to explain the systematic theory of mind errors which
represent the explanatory problem. This defence claims that in every case
where systematic theory of mind errors are observed, this results from an in-
accurate generalisation in ToM. For example, in the case of the Milgram data,
the inaccurate generalisation might be something like ‘people will not gener-
ally harm others without justification.’ While this is successful, I will argue
that in other cases no plausible inaccurate generalisation can be found and
there is no reason to expect adults to possess such an inaccurate generalisa-
tion. I will therefore conclude that the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of
theory theory fails. I will close by offering brief Conclusions in Ch. 11.
Henceforward, I will throughout adopt abbreviations and terminology com-
mon in the literature. Theory of Mind becomes ToM. I will generally use the
abbreviations ST and TT in common with Harris (1992, p. 120), who writes of
the debate “between advocates of the simulation theory (ST) and the theory-
theory (TT).” I will adjust citations where necessary to reflect this usage. I
will also follow Harris (1992, p. 121) when he suggests that we “suppose that
a simulation allows the subject (S) to identify the particular emotion, desire
or belief that another person (O) currently entertains.” What this means is
that a person, the subject or S, is using ToM to predict the behaviour of a
person, the object of ToM or O. S and O could also be Self and Other, but
note that O could really be another person, or equally S at a different time or
in a counterfactual situation. The idea is that persons also use ToM to predict
what they themselves might do in the future, for example. Often in the liter-
ature, authors will refer to the simulator and the simulatee; the subject and
the object; the person who is simulating and the target of the simulation; a
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person considering what they themselves might believe and desire at different
times or under counterfactual circumstances. As said, I will for the benefit of
clarity replace all of these terms with the use of S and O.
I will consider two types of TT in this thesis, which I will term
TT(Scientific) and TT(Innate). The first form of TT holds that ToM
generalisations are learned via processes that are usefully analogous with
the processes involved in making scientific progress. The second form of TT
holds that the generalisations are learned. So both of the forms of TT which
have been widely supported in the literature are based on generalisations.
I will not consider in this thesis the possibility of new types of TT which
do not involve the use of generalisations. One reason for this is that one
might well think that the existence of generalisations is essential to theories;
I am sympathetic to that view. It is also the case that this thesis is in large
measure a response to Saxe (2005a) which is based on TT(Scientific). If a
form of TT can be constructed without generalisations, then it would remain
to be seen how plausibly it could still retain the theoretical characteristics
required to be a form of TT and how well it performed as an account of ToM.
Slaughter and Gopnik (1996, p. 2967) offer a definition when they state
that “[i]ntuitive theories are defined as coherently interrelated systems of
concepts that generate explanations and predictions in a particular domain of
experience.” This looks very much as though generalisations will be central
since the process of generating an explanation or a prediction will proceed
by generalising from the concepts involved. If S generates prediction X in
scenario Y, then presumably S will do so every time scenario Y or similar
occurs: this is a generalisation.
Chapter 2
ToM Accounts: Overview
2.1 Introduction
The question as to whether simulation or theory form the basis of ToM abilities
has been heavily debated the last couple of decades and arguably much longer;
it remains open and important.1 I will begin consideration of that debate in
this chapter by analysing the competing theories. It is essential to consider
TT for its own sake, but by doing so we can also learn about ST, since it was
developed as a skeptical alternative to TT.2
There are several variants of each of TT and ST. Keeping all of the variants
clear and separate is important, since there is a ‘collapse risk’ between the var-
ious theories. By this term is meant the possibility that one of two apparently
separate theories entails elements of another, so that anyone espousing one is
committed to the other even if they do not wish to be. For my project in this
thesis, collapse risk between TT and ST would be a serious problem, while
collapse risk between different sorts of ST would not be serious. The reason
for this is that I am seeking to defend ST (or Weak S/T Hybridism) against
TT, and that project would be complicated if ST and TT were found to be
1Cf. Nagel (2011, p. 14).
2Cf. Apperly (2008, p. 268).
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linked in this problematic way. There would not be a separate position to de-
fend. On the other hand, if there turned out to be a real collapse risk between
two variants of ST, that would still leave some variants of ST as viable and
separate from TT, which is all that is required by a defence of ST.
I will proceed as follows in this chapter. I will first in §2.1.1 complete
these introductory remarks by sketching some initial motivation for consider-
ing ST. After that, in the following four sections, I will examine the two most
important variants of each of our two competing theoretical and simulational
accounts of ToM. First, I will in §2.2 consider the scientific variant of TT,
under which ToM is theoretically based and the theory used is akin to a sci-
entific theory. This account is widely supported in psychology and is the only
one discussed by Saxe (2005a). At points in the past, it has been called just
‘theory-theory,’ but I will not use that term to avoid confusion, since we now
have more than one theoretical account of ToM. Then in §2.3, I will examine
the innate variant of TT, which also claims that ToM is theoretically based,
but denies that the theory is like a scientific theory. On this Modular account,
which is also known as ToMM, humans are born with the theory that underlies
their ToM. Turning to the simulationist views, I will in the subsequent two
sections outline the two major variants of ST. Perhaps the major difference be-
tween them is whether when S simulates, S becomes like O or rather ‘becomes’
O. On the first ‘replication’ variant, discussed in §2.4, what happens is that S
examines the situation of O, places himself in that situation, introspects his
own consequential mental states, ascribes them to O and then predicts what
O will do, if O has those mental states. I will then in §2.5 discuss the rival
‘transformation’ account. Here, S simply places himself in imagination in O’s
situation and ‘acts’ accordingly, with the exception that the acts are to be
ascribed to O rather than actually implemented. The transformation account
denies that humans have introspective access to their own mental states.
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This division into two of the simulationist accounts will involve three
claims, which are either asserted or denied by the two rival theories. This
suggests further possible simulationist accounts, all of which are of interest
and some of which have received support in the literature. I will sketch in
§2.6 what these accounts look like, but will not select a champion. As said, all
that is needed for the project of this thesis is that at least one variant of ST is
plausible and distinct from TT. I will provide some real-life examples of how
simulation works; this task will also indicate further potential types of ST. A
further possible logical space for ST theories is provided by consideration of
whether they are on-line or off-line. I discuss this in §2.6.1. The idea on some
ST accounts is that beliefs in the simulation context must be quarantined from
normal beliefs of S, or ‘held off-line’ in order to prevent them from directly
causing S’s behaviour, which is not a ToM function.
At this point, we will have arrived at a good picture of the various compet-
ing accounts of ToM, and so we can turn in §2.7 to the collapse risk between
ST and TT. Proponents of TT have laid charges at the door of ST which I
will aim to refute. These are of the sort that if simulation employs any theo-
retical concepts, such as beliefs or desires, then it is really TT. I think this is
unreasonable, because no account of human mental lives can get far without
beliefs and desires. I call making this charge ‘setting the bar too low,’ because
it is too easy for TT proponents to insist that part of ToM is theoretical if the
use of beliefs and desires in ToM is enough to be theory use. If that is indeed
theory use, then it is not such in any interesting fashion.3 I will likewise have
little truck with claims of the type that all simulation is theoretical, because
using it involves applying the theory that ‘simulation works’ or ‘S is like O.’
3See also Blackburn (1992) for discussion of overly promiscuous application of the term
‘theory’ in accounts of ToM.
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2.1.1 Why Consider ST?
I will introduce some main motivating factors here; this topic will be covered
in more detail in Ch. 3.
The central claim of ST, as set out by Friedman and Petrashek (2009, p.
115), is that “reasoning about mental states often requires attempting to make
one’s cognitive system mimic or replicate (simulate) another person’s thoughts
and feelings.”4 The motivation for pursuing the ST approach, as Stone and
Davies (1996, p. 127) put it, is the fact that “when we try to understand other
people, we are trying to understand objects of the same kind as ourselves.” So
why not assume that people use their access to their own minds to understand
other minds? We do not need to introduce extra machinery here. By contrast,
Saxe (2005a, p. 174) sets out the opposing TT position as the contention that
“when asked to predict or explain an inference, decision or action, children and
adults do not simulate the other person’s beliefs in their own mind, but instead
deploy an intuitive theory of how the mind works.” An important motivation
for ST then is one of parsimony or explanatory power with minimal ‘working
parts.’ This will be my working definition of parsimony: lack of complexity
or few moving parts combined with significant explanatory power. We can
explain ToM by postulating that persons exploit the fact that they all have
similar minds so we need not introduce additional theoretical machinery to
explain ToM.
A second advantage for ST over TT derives from the fact that we are
trying to explain ToM, which is quite advanced in five-year-old children. The
claim that children have developed scientifically a more or less complete body
of psychological knowledge by the age of five is already difficult to accept.
That difficulty is increased if various experimenters (Onishi and Baillargeon
4Strictly speaking, the inclusion of ‘often’ means their view is technically a Hybrid, but
their statement is still a good exposition of ST.
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2005), (Helming, Strickland, and Jacob 2014) are correct when they report
that 15-month old infants have sufficient ToM to appear to be surprised by
behaviour that is not consonant with false beliefs of others. The implausibility
of this scientific approach, with children or infants selecting, confirming and
disconfirming hypotheses, was one motivation for TT adherents to propose the
alternative innate TT account, but there are problems with that as well, as I
will outline below.
ST has received significant empirical support. For example, one study
looked at children with SLI —Specific Language Impairment. Farrant,
Fletcher, and Maybery (2006) investigated Visual Perspective Taking or
VPT, which refers to such tasks for S as stating whether O can see something
from O’s position, irrespective of whether S can. They note that Harris’s
version of ST “predicts that the development of VPT will be delayed” in
subjects with SLI. Farrant, Fletcher, and Maybery (2006, p. 1844) point out
that Harris “argued that language facilitates the development of the ability
to simulate another’s perspective because conversation involves a constant
exchange of differing points of view.” Thus, SLI subjects should exhibit
developmental delay on both VPT and ToM tasks. This is what is indeed
found: Farrant, Fletcher, and Maybery (2006, p. 1842) report that their
“results supported Harris’s theory and a role for language in ToM and VPT
development.”5
A further empirical argument for ST explains emotional empathy6 in in-
fants. Gordon (1995b) notes an observation that a six-month old exhibited
5Simulationists such as Gallese and Goldman (1998) and Goldman and Sebanz (2005)
have also appealed to the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ to support their claims. These neurons
are activated when an action is performed or observed, which lends itself to simulationist
accounts. This type of evidence is outside the scope of this thesis.
6Preston and De Waal (2002, p. 9) give an account of empathy which is “not in conflict”
with ST; I would go further and say that their account is in fact highly supportive of ST
since it matches perception and production of an emotion.
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facial signs of sadness on seeing his nurse pretend to cry. Gordon explains this
by suggesting that even from a young age, people can experience the same
emotion as someone else due to a motor mimicry process. When persons ob-
serve the facial movements of someone else, this will produce similar motor
activity in them. They may not know that fact directly because the motor
activity can be sub-threshold i.e. insufficient to cause actual facial movement.
Gordon (1995b, p. 729) notes that “motor activity, especially the movement
of facial muscles, can drive the emotions.” This is then a mechanism whereby
people can ‘catch’ the emotions of others even when they could not say what
those emotions were, even when they are unaware that they have done so,
and even when they are six months old. All of these empirical claims are
hard to explain on a TT basis but consistent with ST. It would not be the
only scenario in which sub-threshold motor activation is held to explain peo-
ple’s understanding of others. On the Motor Theory of Speech Perception,7
people perceive the speech of others by micro-activation of their own speech
production musculature.8
Goldman (2006, Ch. 6) discusses several further forms of empirical support
for ST, including studies of some subjects who have deficits in both experi-
encing and recognising certain emotions, suggesting that they have damage in
a single area responsible for both.
7See for example Liberman (1985), Ivry and Justus (2001), Fadiga et al. (2002) and
D’Ausilio et al. (2009) for the Motor Theory of Speech Perception including the sub-threshold
activation elements thereof.
8Rochat (2002, p. 45) cites speech perception as one example among many of “common
code between perception and action systems,” suggesting that there are several domains in
which perception and production and linked.
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2.2 TT(Scientific)
I have chosen the term TT(Scientific) to refer to the scientific version of TT
because the authors tend to use the term ‘theory-theory’ alone. Using that
would be confusing since there now are multiple types of TT. As mentioned
above, there are two major variants of TT. The two variants of TT are the
‘scientific’ view —TT(Scientific) —and the ‘innate view’ —TT(Innate). Both
variants of TT hold that there is a body of theoretical knowledge underpinning
the abilities of S to predict and explain the behaviour of O which could be
expressed as a set of rules or generalisations —even though S himself need
not necessarily be able to do that. Similarly, more people can apply the
rules of grammar correctly than can state them. On TT(Scientific), the body
of knowledge that underlies ToM is learned while on TT(Innate) it is not
learned. TT(Scientific) holds that the body of knowledge is akin to scientific
knowledge, with children developing by improving the body of knowledge in
a quasi-scientific way. They would form and test hypotheses, discarding those
disconfirmed by data. The data in question would come from observing the
behaviour of other individuals.
Below I set out the claims that define TT(Scientific), as set out by Davies
and Stone (1995, p. 4).9 They begin their discussion by stipulating the def-
inition of the thought T as follows: T = ‘[O] believes that P.’ With that in
hand, TT(Scientific) is defined by the following set of claims.
• TTa: In order to predict and explain the behaviour of O, S must be able
to entertain thoughts of the form (T)
• TTb: To entertain those thoughts, S must have the concept of belief
9Davies and Stone (1995) discuss the TT(Scientific) definitional claims in terms of the
False Belief Task. I will discuss this task later, but for now we need not restrict ourselves to
one form of ToM test.
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• TTc: To have the concept of belief, S must have a body of psychological
knowledge
• TTd: Development of folk psychological ability is expansion of this body
of knowledge
• TTe: This development may be understood as analogous to “develop-
ment [...] of bodies of professional scientific knowledge” (Davies and
Stone 1995, p. 4)
• TTf: “Information processing mechanisms” (Davies and Stone 1995, p.
4) are needed to use the body of knowledge
It might be questioned whether all of these claims are essential either to
TT(Scientific) or other possible forms of TT. TTa to TTc appear to be neces-
sary to TT(Scientific). TTc also appears to entail that all forms of TT which
assert it mean that use of generalisations will be how ToM works, since it
seems that this is how the body of knowledge will actually be constructed and
used. TTd appears to be optional for TT(Scientific), though it is certainly
asserted by TT(Scientific) proponents in the literature. It would be possible
to construct a version of TT(Scientific) which made a claim approximately
along the lines of ‘development of folk psychological ability is improvement in
the ability to use this body of knowledge.’ It would be important to avoid col-
lapsing into TT(Innate) of course, if the task were to improve TT(Scientific).
Avoiding such collapse might be difficult if the expansion of the body of knowl-
edge claim were replaced by an improved ability to access a body of knowledge
that would be static because it would be innately specified. TTe is essential
to TT(Scientific) as set out by its proponents, since it is definitional of their
project that there is a useful analogy between scientific progress and ToM
development. As I mentioned in the Introduction, I will not consider at any
length in this thesis other possible types of TT, including types which do not
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assert TTe. TTf appears to be an optional extra which in any case does not
add much to the body of knowledge other than insisting that it be accessible
via some mechanism.
A major proponent of TT(Scientific) is Gopnik. Gopnik and Wellman
(1992, p. 145) summarise TT(Scientific) well when they write that it is: “the
view that the child’s early understanding of mind is an implicit theory anal-
ogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be un-
derstood as theory changes.” We have here then the claim that even young
children are using a theory that they have developed themselves. Any explana-
tion of ToM must apply to young children because they have ToM capacities
by the age of five. It is important that the theory postulated not be one
requiring explicit reasoning, since there seems to be little phenomenology in
either children or adults that is consistent with explicit theory use. That is, it
seems rare for anyone to explicitly consider pedestrian sequences of deductions
like ‘Peter believes the ball is in the yard, Peter desires the ball, I conclude
that Peter will go into the yard in order to find the ball.’10 We also have the
explicit claim that theory is analogous to scientific ones, meaning that there
is hypothesis selection and confirmation. Gopnik and Wellman (1992) explain
development in children’s ToM abilities on the basis of changes to the theory:
viz., improvements in that theory.
TT(Scientific) also looks analogous to science in what it understand a the-
ory to be. Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 146) explain that TT(Scientific)
involves theoretical constructs which “are abstract entities postulated, or re-
cruited from elsewhere, to provide a separate causal-explanatory level of anal-
ysis that accounts for evidential phenomena.” The abstract entities involved
are the mental states of others. They must be abstract, because they cannot
be observed directly. Postulating them though allows S to explain evidential
10I will later posit a carve-out for such explicit reasoning; this carve-out will distinguish
Weak S/T Hybridism from pure ST.
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phenomena of the sort generated by the behaviour of others.
The way these theoretical entities should interact with each other and the
items to be explained should be ‘law-like.’ As Gopnik and Wellman (1992,
p. 148) put it, theories “should invoke characteristic explanations phrased in
terms of these abstract entities and laws.” This means that there ought to
be a law-like relation between a postulated mental state and the behaviour
that it always or sometimes results in, because it is behaviour that ToM aims
to explain. Like scientific theories, under TT(Scientific), the child’s ToM al-
lows “extensions to new types of evidence and false predictions” (Gopnik and
Wellman 1992, p. 148). The extension to new evidence is analogous to the
way that Kepler’s laws of planetary gravitation predicted moons before they
were observed. The reference to ‘false predictions’ means that an incorrect
theoretical law will result in ToM errors, a topic that will loom large in this
thesis.
TT(Scientific) is naturally developmental, in that theories in science and
in children may be expected to change as they are confronted with new data.
The development of children’s ToM is naturally explained on TT(Scientific) as
reflecting improvements in the specification of the abstract entities postulated
in the theory or calibration of the psychological laws that ToM assumes are
true. As an example of the former improvement, Gopnik and Wellman (1992,
p. 150) suggest that two-year-olds “have an early theory that is incorrect in
that it does not posit the existence of mental representational states, proto-
typically beliefs.” There will be stages of development as the child matures.
Later on, the child will be working with a mature adult concept of belief.
Theories must have laws or generalisations. The starting point for suggest-
ing some folk psychological laws ought to be those that the ordinary person
would recognise, since we are seeking to axiomatise or provide generalisations
for folk psychology. Such a type of ’common sense belief/desire psychology’
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is sketched by Fodor (1987, p. 13) in a form which allows the generation of
laws. S relies, he writes, on “causal generalisations” of the form “If [O] wants
that P, and [O] believes that not P unless Q, and [O] believes that it is within
his power to bring it about that Q, then ceteris paribus [O] tries to bring it
about that Q.” Fodor’s primary argument for this claim is that it explains
the widespread success of ToM abilities. The picture here of how reasons for
action lead to action is the ‘standard’ account due to Davidson (1963) in which
a reason for action is a combination of a desire and a belief. The belief is that
the action will satisfy the desire. This is generally how ordinary people think
actions are caused; so a generalisation of Davidsonianism seems to be among
the laws of folk psychology.
The power of belief/desire psychology is demonstrated by Fodor by show-
ing how it can correctly track through various complexities and background
assumptions in the case of the Shakespearean character Hermia. Hermia sees
that her lover Lysander is missing while Lysander’s rival Demetrius is present
and grim-visaged. Hermia uses the generalisation above with Demetrius as
O. P is Demetrius’s desire to woo Hermia. Demetrius’s belief “that a live
Lysander is an impediment to the success of his (Demetrius’s) wooing” (Fodor
1987, p. 2) gives Hermia Q to the effect that Demetrius has killed Lysander.
The generalisation is indeed powerful here because it explains all of Hermia’s
mental states together with the facts that Lysander is uncharacteristically
absent and Demetrius is grim-visaged.
Gopnik (1993, p. 99) confirms that one of the “structural characteristics of
theories [is] the fact that they involve coherent law-like generalisations.” Gop-
nik and Wellman (1992, pp. 150-151) propose a couple of such generalisations
of ToM: “[g]iven that an agent desires an object, an agent will act to obtain
it. Given that an object is within an viewer’s line of sight, the viewer will see
it.” Another typical statement of the central thrust of TT is given by Apperly
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(2008, p. 268), who writes that TT accounts: “propose that theory of mind
abilities are constituted by a set of concepts (belief, desire, etc.) and governing
principles about how these concepts interact (e.g., people act to satisfy their
desires according to their beliefs).” Other examples are given by Baron-Cohen
(1993, p. 30) who writes that four-year-olds “make clear, theory-like assertions
(‘[i]f you haven’t seen what it is, then you won’t know what it is;’ or, ‘[i]f you
want an x, and you think what you’re getting is an x, then you’ll feel happy,’
etc.).” It is clear then that the laws or theoretical generalisations connecting
mental states to behaviour are central to ToM capacities on the TT(Scientific)
account.
Saxe’s TT account also constructs ToM on the basis of laws or rules. On
the topics of folk physics and folk psychology, Saxe (2005a, p. 174) writes:
“[i]n each case, we could construct a theory (or a body of beliefs) about the
entities involved, and the rules governing their interactions.” Although this is
somewhat tentative, it is clear from an overall consideration of Saxe (2005a),
including indicatively her citation solely of Gopnik and Wellman (1992) com-
bined with the absence of any citations of TT(Innate) proponents, that her
preferred account of ToM is TT(Scientific).
2.3 TT(Innate)
I will use the term TT(Innate) for the non-scientific variant of TT. The term
used by many authors promoting such an account of TT is ‘ToMM,’ standing
for Theory of Mind Mechanism. The major proponents of TT(Innate), Scholl
and Leslie (1999, p. 133), set out TT(Innate) or ToMM as holding that
“the capacity to acquire ToM has a specific innate basis [. . . and . . . ] the
specific innate capacity takes the form of an architectural module.” It is worth
emphasising at the outset that their starting position is a single module. So
the modularity aspect of the proposal is one way of explaining the innate
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capacity but a TT proponent could presumably be nativist without being
Modularist. As Scholl and Leslie (1999, p. 134) admit, their “claim is not that
the entirety of ToM is modular, but only that ToM has a specific innate basis.”
Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 117) set out the distinction between TT(Scientific)
and TT(Innate) when they write “In contrast with scientific-theory theorists,
who think that the information used in mindreading is acquired, modified,
and stored in much the same way that scientific and common-sense theories
are, modularity theorists maintain that crucial parts of the information that
guides mindreading is stored in one or more modules.” The idea is that the
modularity view of TT(Innate) allows for the body of knowledge employed in
ToM to be ‘located’ in an innate module. One claim of TT(Innate) is that
“certain core concepts used in mindreading, including ‘BELIEF, PRETENCE
and DESIRE’ ” (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 125)11 are contained within the
innate module for ToM.
Many elements of TT(Innate) will be shared with TT(Scientific), beyond
the obvious one that both postulate theories and bodies of knowledge that un-
derly ToM capacities. Both will have ToM espouse the Fodorian belief/desire
psychology.12 Both will allow that ToM includes laws or generalisations of the
type proposed above. Both accounts will see S’s postulate abstract theoretical
entities —mental states. In sum however, our discussion of TT(Innate) can
be more brief than that of TT(Scientific) since there is much common ground.
It might be asked in relation to the last point above whether the entities
postulated by naive physics (e.g. momentum) are abstract or theoretical.
The point of the question is that one might take the line that the folk do
11I will employ the standard practice of capitalising the names of concepts.
12One might in principle construct a new form of TT while having a view quite different
from Fodor and Davidson about the folk mental states and their explanatory role. For
example, one could combine TT with the view that facts rather than beliefs typically explain
actions. As I have mentioned previously, I will not consider in this thesis such putative further
types of TT.
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not really have any theories. This would be a ‘thin’ or ‘hard’ definition of
theory such that only scientists or other professionals are, strictly speaking, in
possession of theories. On such a line, folk physics and folk psychology would
not involve theories while academic physics and psychology would. Similarly,
the folk versions of both disciplines would not, strictly speaking, be postulating
abstract theoretical entities. I will not take this line. One question which is ‘in
the wings’ throughout this thesis is ‘what is a theory?’ The line above will be
very strict; indeed, it could be interpreted as falsifying all forms of TT because
nothing the folk have counts as a theory. That is one reason not to take the line.
Another is that the thin account of theories will involve one in a difficult type of
line-drawing exercise of the type used to great effect by Chalmers (1997). Most
people learn some physics and perhaps some philosophy at school. Accounts
of physical or theoretical phenomena held by the folk which were adjacent in
terms of complexity, sophistication, predictive power and accuracy would lie
either side of a theory/not theory boundary. So a better response is to say
that the folk possess theories to some extent. One might then be tempted to
say that they also postulate abstract theoretical entities to some extent, but
postulation seems less liable to admit of degrees than theory possession. If
it does, so be it. If it does not, then being in partial possession of a theory
means making (complete) postulations which may be partly inaccurate about
a proper subset of the full conceptual contents of the total theory. All of these
postulations will involve making generalisations. If ToM includes a postulate
including DESIRE along the lines of ‘if A DESIRES X and BELIEVES that
action φ will obtain X for A, then ceteris paribus A will do φ,’ it ipso facto
includes a generalisation. The fact that the postulate is expressed in general
terms about person A suffices to make it a generalisation; it generally applies
to all people with desire X and not just to some single person A.
The differences between TT(Innate) and TT(Scientific) lie most promi-
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nently in differences in the description of how the body of theoretical knowl-
edge is obtained. TT(Innate), in contrast to TT(Scientific), holds that the
body of knowledge underlying ToM is more like the knowledge that underpins
the ability to speak and read a language. This is distinct to scientific knowl-
edge for several reasons including that the development of language knowledge
does not seem to proceed via the formation and confirmation of hypothesis.
The idea is more along the lines that would be termed Chomskian in theoret-
ical linguistics. The languages themselves are not innate, but the ability to
learn them may be. This approach has the advantages in linguistics that it
explains the fact that children are able to learn languages but also that the
one they learn is the one they hear. Similarly, on the TT(Innate) view, ToM
abilities develop quickly not because the abilities themselves are innate, but
because the ability to acquire the abilities is innate. This account has the
same advantages as the linguistic one in terms of explaining the speed with
which children acquire ToM abilities and also that they do so in such a way
that their ToM predictions will be similar to those of the adults around them.
Only one of the TT(Scientific) claims set out above needs to be changed
to arrive at TT(Innate): TTe. This is the one that encapsulates the ‘scientific
analogy’ nature which is characteristic of TT(Scientific). If we change TTe to
read as below, we have arrived at a set of claims outlining TT(Innate).
TTeI: This development may be understood as analogous to development
of bodies of linguistic knowledge
Scholl and Leslie note that the fact that development occurs in ToM capac-
ities has been taken to favour TT(Scientific) over their preferred TT(Innate)
account, because modules are taken to be static. They oppose this argument
by noting that modules may ‘come online’ at various times. Scholl and Leslie
(1999, p. 132) employ a distinction due to Segal, noting that “Segal dis-
tinguishes between synchronic modules (which reflect a static capacity), and
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diachronic modules (which attain their character from the environment via
parameters, as in the case of ‘Universal Grammar’).” The reference to Uni-
versal Grammar here means that the TT(Innate) picture is Chomskian in that
innate capacities to develop capacities are postulated. The capacities that de-
velop are not themselves innate. In Universal Grammar, the capacities that
develop are the ability to use languages. In ToM, the capacities that develop
are the abilities to predict and explain the behaviour of others.
The parameters are an adaptation of another Chomskian idea. The idea
is that while there is a very large number of logically possible languages, only
a small subset of them are actually used by people. It is logically possible
but in practice extremely unhelpful to have a language in which the words
for common items change on a daily basis, or in which the surface grammar
were not constant. Actually used languages are more sensibly constructed,
and might be so because of the way their parameters are set. For example,
in the German language, verbs come at the end of sentences. This location
could be set by a parameter: a child that learned German would be one that
had switched its ‘verb location at end of sentence’ parameter to TRUE. Other
values of that parameter would be possible, but no useful human language
would have a parameter like ‘nouns change their referent daily’ set to TRUE.
Mapping these ideas across to ToM, we might find that TT(Innate) postulates
a similar set of parameters which define which of several innate capacities to
form capacities become operative.13 Observation by children of the behaviour
of others around them would set the parameters in appropriate ways. They
might set their parameter ‘people who say X believe X’ to TRUE. Or, to
employ Segal’s example, they might have a switch “labelled prelief/belief,”
(Segal 1996, p. 151) with the improvement in the child’s ToM reflected by
13Scholl and Leslie (1999) in fact oppose Segal’s use of parameters to set children’s ToM for
their ToMM conception of TT(Innate), which is another reason to prefer the label TT(Innate)
to their ToMM in the context of this discussion.
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the switch changing its value. This particular improvement is the change
from a deficient PRELIEF concept that does not distinguish PRETENCE and
BELIEF to a mature concept of BELIEF shared with adults. This would go
some way towards explaining how children quickly generate ToM capacities,
and how they tend to make similar ToM predictions as do adults in their
culture.
2.4 ST(Replication)
The definitional ST claims are set out below; it can be seen that they largely
oppose the matching TT claims.
• STa: In order to predict and explain the behaviour of O, S “does not
need to entertain thoughts of the form (T), but only thoughts of the
form ‘I believe that P’ ” (Davies and Stone 1995, p. 6)
• STb: “To entertain thoughts of just that first-person form, [S] does not
need to have the full-blown concept of belief. In fact, the ‘I believe that
P’ could just as well be deleted” (Davies and Stone 1995, p. 6)
• STc: S does not need the concept BELIEF to have beliefs
• STd: Development of folk psychological ability is a case of “the child
gradually becoming more adept at imaginatively identifying with other
people” (Davies and Stone 1995, p. 6)
• STe: This development is a gain in skill not knowledge
• STf: Information processing mechanisms are needed “to engage in these
imaginative tasks” (Davies and Stone 1995, p. 6)
The central thrust of the ST approach can thus be seen to be anti-
theoretical, as would be expected. S does not need the concept BELIEF, but
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just to be able to believe things. S need not be able to think representational
thoughts like ‘O believes P’ but merely note his beliefs.
STe provides a distinction between ST and TT. Recall that TTe insisted
that there is a body of knowledge and increases in the scope and quality of
that knowledge is what explains children’s improvement in ToM abilities. ST
denies that there is a body of knowledge and explains the improvement by
appealing to improved skill at ‘imaginatively identifying’ with other people.
Provided that we can maintain a clean distinction between skill and knowledge,
it can be seen that STe denies both TTe and TTeI, so that on this view, ST
is distinct from TT.
Each ST claim is not the exact negation of the corresponding TT claim,
though the ST claims are in each case generally opposed to the corresponding
TT one. The way Davies and Stone couch STa and STb is initially perhaps a
little confusing. They seem to start in STa by insisting that S needs the concept
of belief, because while we can accept that S can have a belief without having
the concept BELIEF, that does not entail that S has the meta-ability to form
the belief ‘I believe that P’ even when S does in fact believe that P. To see this
distinction, observe that we may be prepared to allow that non-human animals
believe that P —although this is controversial —but the ascription of ‘I believe
that P’ to non-human animals is absurd. However, in STb we learn that the
concept of belief is not needed by S and in a slightly throwaway fashion, Davies
and Stone concede that the ‘I believe that P’ can be dispensed with. I submit
that the two approaches are significantly different and the version without ‘I
believe that P’ is both more plausible and expresses the main idea promulgated
by ST proponents viz. mind-reading can be performed by those who can form
beliefs and no mental state concepts including BELIEF are required.
The major proponent of ST(Replication) is Heal. Replication is set out as
follows. Heal (2003, pp. 13—14) asserts that if S wishes to predict the action
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of O, then S will “endeavour to [...] replicate or re-create [O’s] thinking. [S
will] place [himself] in what [S] takes to be [O’s] initial state by imagining the
world as it would appear from [O’s] point of view and [S will] then deliber-
ate, reason and reflect to see what decision emerges.” This gives us success
conditions for replication. If the function of a thought in S’s simulated and
contained Replication is the same as the function played in O’s un-simulated
and unconfined cognition, then pro tanto, the simulation has been successful.
We can obtain more insight into ST(Replication) by considering Heal’s
responses to three objections that have been raised to it. To my mind, she is
successful in all three cases in defusing the objections, and in the third case,
she raises an important issue which I will be discussing further.
The first objection aims to disarm the argument in favour of ST that
claims it is less complex and demanding than TT. The objection does this
by considering the need on ST for S’s to perform ‘initial state matching.’
This means that for replication to be successful, S must be able to do two
things: “know what psychological state [O] is in” from external observation
and “put [himself] in the same state” (Heal 2003, p. 14). If this is difficult, we
will struggle to understand how replication could often be successful. Heal’s
response is to claim that the objection misdescribes the target of replication.
S is not examining O but rather the situation around O as seen from O’s
perspective. As Heal (2003, p. 15) notes, “[i[t is what the world makes [S] think
which is the basis for the beliefs [S] attributes to [O].” The objector cannot
here continue to urge that it is difficult for S to contemplate the world around
O, because S contemplates the world all the time. Moreover, any common
errors that S makes in contemplating the world around O will presumably
also be made by O, and thus not impede simulation.
The second objection, ascribed by Heal (2003, p. 15) to Dennett, is that
ST(Replication) lacks parsimony. The objection urges that replication must
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involve special beliefs about beliefs and those require more complex mental
machinery than merely having beliefs. This objection is met by noting that
nothing is required here for simulation purposes that is not already required
in S’s own case, to enable S to chart actions now, allowing for the fact that
S’s own beliefs and desires may change in the future. Heal (2003, p. 16) also
argues that “[m]ake-believe belief is imagining,” and that people already have
the capacity to imagine. Heal (2003, p. 16) agrees that it would be absurd to
claim that replication can only be successful if S “believes what [O] believes,”
so there must be some way of preventing O’s beliefs becoming S’s beliefs in
a way that causes S to act on the beliefs as opposed to ascribing them to O.
This leads a further distinction known as the on-line vs off-line ST distinction
which I will discuss below. If S ascribes a belief to O, that belief must be
off-line for S and not cause behaviour of S in the normal way.
The ‘make-believe beliefs’ or off-line beliefs approach could also work in
another way. We could adopt the view on which beliefs are seen as items
in the ‘belief box.’ Firstly, there could be multiple subscripts in the belief
box, to speak metaphorically, which tag various beliefs as those of S or those
of O.14 As long as the beliefs tagged ‘O’ are kept off-line, we would have a
mechanism that performed as needed. Secondly, there could be a contained
simulation environment in which beliefs are as effective as they are outside
that environment in fecundating other consonant beliefs, but the outputs of
which are translated into contained or simulated desires rather than actual
desires. The outputs do not leave the contained simulation environment in
the form of action proposals. In either case, the simulated beliefs of O stay
off-line and do not directly issue in desires or actions of S, as required. The
simulated beliefs of O do have effects in S: they are ascribed to O and used to
predict his behaviour.
14Such a subscript approach is proposed by Pratt (1993, p. 72).
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The third objection holds that ST(Replication) requires theoretical el-
ements and thus collapses back into TT. The objection holds that under
ST(Replication) there is in S a sequence of thoughts and mental state transi-
tions that replicate those of O in order to explain O’s behaviour. The objection
suggests that S can only do this by using some theory of how mental state
transitions in O are likely to follow from S’s view of what O believes. This
would mean that replication was less analogous to becoming like O and more
like S applying a theory of O to supply the links in a chain of simulation of O.
Such an account would have allowed a theoretical element to corrupt the pure
simulationist ST(Replication) account, if the objection is successful. Heal’s
response involves questioning the nature of the links in a chain of simulation.
One does not use a theory to get from ‘I see p’ to ‘p’ —it is merely a rational
transition. This objection is a version of the ‘setting the bar too low’ error
which I will outline below.
2.5 ST(Transformation)
The major proponent of ST(Transformation) is Gordon. Intuitively, the dis-
tinction between ST(Transformation) and ST(Replication) is that on the for-
mer transformation variant of ST, S simulates O by becoming O, while on
the latter replication view of simulation, S simulates O by becoming like O.
The first idea is clearly only metaphorical, since no-one can in reality become
someone else. Gordon (1995a, p. 53) sets out three claims, all of which are
asserted by ST(Replication) and denied by ST(Transformation). The three
claims are that simulation involves:
1. “an analogical inference from oneself to others
2. premised on introspectively based ascriptions of mental states to oneself,
3. requiring prior possession of the mental states ascribed.”
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ST(Transformation) then is anti-Inferentialist, anti-Introspectionist and to
coin a phrase, anti-Possessionist. ST(Replication) is Inferentialist, Introspec-
tionist and Possessionist. By the term Possessionist, I mean views claiming
that S must possess a mental state before being able to ascribe it to O. Gor-
don (1992, p. 32) confirms that on his account, S “is not using one individual,
himself, as a model of [O], and there is no implicit inference of any sort from
[S] to [O].” Instead, the idea is much more to make action predictions without
an intervening ascription of mental states. This is done by ‘becoming’ the
other person, or putting oneself in their position, and seeing what one will do.
That of course is again somewhat metaphoric, since one rarely finds out what
one is going to do by external observation: one merely acts. As Gordon (1992,
pp. 31—32) puts it, “[w]hat is relevant is to ask, within a pretend context in
which I simulate being [O], [is] ‘What shall I do now?’ [. . . ] Thus, within the
context of the simulation, the realisation that now is the time to φ spurs me
to action.” Here I employ φ to stand in for the action proposed in the sim-
ulation context. Under normal non-simulation circumstances, the realisation
that ‘now is the time to φ’ will cause S to φ. Within the simulation context
however, the realisation that ‘now is the time to φ’ will cause S to predict that
O will φ. Gordon’s view does not involve any ascription of mental states to S
or to O. As Gordon (1995a, p. 53) writes, “people often predict what another
will do in a given situation by imagining being in such a situation and then
deciding what to do.” The idea that the ability to pretend is related to the
ability to predict behaviour is supported by many studies of autism. As one
example, Baron-Cohen (2001, p. 7) notes the well-known finding that autis-
tic subjects have impaired ToM and also that “[m]any studies have reported
a lower frequency of pretend play in the spontaneous play of children with
autism.”
On the ST(Transformation) view set out by Gordon (1995a, p. 57), per-
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sons “transform [themselves] in imagination” whereby they “modify [their]
regular stock of mental states with a complement of artificially induced pre-
tend states, keeping the resulting adjusted stock of mental states off-line.” On
the ST(Transformation) account, there is no need for an inference from S to O
by O because S has become O —or successfully placed himself in O’s position
—and thus now can decide directly what O is likely to do because it can be
read off from what S would do. S now knows what O would do because S is
in the same situation, except ‘off-line.’
As noted, Gordon’s ST(Transformation) view is anti-Introspectionist,
while on the alternative ST(Replication) account, the way S predicts the
mental states of O is by introspecting S’s own mental states within the
pretend off-line environment within which the simulation of O takes place.
S then would have direct introspective access to the mental states of O, or
rather the mental states that S ascribes to O as a result of the simulation. So
one potential advantage of ST(Transformation) is that it sidesteps questions
about mental states and whether they can be introspected. People act; they
do not form a mental state which has action as a consequence. ST can still
be true even if Introspectionism is false.15
It is not an objection here to allow that Gordon (1995a) does not need In-
trospectionism when predicting action, but does need it when ascribing mental
states, because such ‘ascription’ in effect comes for free. The output of simu-
lation on the account of Gordon (1995a) is an action φ, and the mental states
are as it were set on one side. They are whatever they need to be to pro-
duce the action φ. Observers might be led to make this mistake by thinking
that Gordon (1995a) structures his argument about facts rather than mental
states explaining behaviour precisely because it is difficult to understand men-
15In any case, phenomenology suggests and it has been argued, (Rey 2013) that Introspec-
tionism is true. The truth of ST is consistent with either the truth or falsity of Introspec-
tionism.
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tal state ascription on his account; rather he is concerned to avoid ST being
committed to Introspectionism which he sees as controversial.
2.6 Further Possible Types Of ST
As we have seen, ST(Replication) and ST(Transformation) differ from one
another in that they assert or deny all of three claims. Yet other positions
are possible, and may also be defined in terms of assertion or denial of those
three claims. In other words, since the three claims may be asserted or denied
independently from one another, there are other possible positions within the
logical space available to ST proponents. Some of these positions may even be
interesting. I show in Table 2.1 the possibilities in terms of the three claims
(Inferentialist, Introspectionist, Possessionist) listed above. Since we have two
options (assert or deny) across three options, there are eight possible positions
in this logical space as so far analysed.
One such independent position is outlined by Goldman who examines Gor-
don’s motivations for denying each of the three claims. Goldman (2006, p. 186)
notes that Gordon thinks that “[t]he analogical inference element [. . . ] threat-
ens to make ST collapse into TT.” This is the collapse risk already noted,
which will be examined further below. Goldman also observes that Gordon
wishes to avoid Introspectionism because that doctrine is “philosophically con-
troversial” (Goldman 2006, p. 186). However, it is unclear, as Goldman (2006,
p. 186) points out, why Gordon denies Possessionism, observing that Gordon’s
“rationale for denying the concept-possession element is elusive.” So we can
see that Goldman’s account, ST(5), is a position of interest which is viable,
distinct from ST(Replication) and ST(Transformation) and ably defended at
length by Goldman.16
16The charge of collapse risk is brought against Goldman’s position. For a persuasive
riposte, see Goldman (2009), which also responds convincingly to the anti-Introspectionist
critique of Carruthers (2009).
2.6. FURTHER POSSIBLE TYPES OF ST 53
Position Inferentialist Introspectionist Possessionist
ST(Replication) ! ! !
ST(Transformation) # # #
ST(3) ! # #
ST(4) # ! #
ST(5) # # !
ST(6) ! ! #
ST(7) ! # !
ST(8) # ! !
Table 2.1: Possible Variants Of ST
There are also at least two possible types of Possessionism. Recall
that the original definition with which we were working was that under
ST(Transformation), ToM use required “prior possession of the mental states
ascribed” (Gordon 1995a, p. 53). Contrast this with the following claim
that using ToM under ST(Transformation) means “requiring prior possession
of the concepts of the mental states ascribed” (Goldman 2006, p. 186).
There seems to be scope then to distinguish between two positions here, one
requiring possession of mental states and one requiring possession of the
concepts of mental states. This distinction is picked up by Gordon (2009,
§2) who notes that “[f]or Goldman, but not Gordon, it is essential that the
simulating system recognise its own mental states. This recognition generally
requires, according to Goldman, that [S] possess the relevant mental state
concept [while] Gordon takes the position [. . . ] that simulation does not
require the application of mental concepts.”
Moreover, one might insist that S needs to possess the mental states or the
mental state concepts in order to ascribe them to O. One might in addition
insist that S needs to possess the mental states or the mental state concepts in
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Position Mental State
Required
Mental State
Concept Re-
quired
For Recog-
nition
For Ascrip-
tion
Possessionism1 ! # ! #
Possessionism2 ! ! ! #
Possessionism3 ! # ! !
Possessionism4 ! ! ! !
Table 2.2: Possible Types Of Possessionism
order first to recognise them in S before ascribing them to O. We can see that
at an early stage, Gordon (1995a, p. 53) denies the latter duplex view when
he opposes claims that “to recognise and ascribe one’s own mental states and
to mentally transfer these states over to [O], [S] would need to be equipped
with the concepts of the various mental states.” It is worth noting that Gor-
don discusses Introspectionism and Inferentialism in his canonical statement
of his position —“Simulation Without Introspection Or Inference From Me To
You” (Gordon 1995a) —but says very little about Possessionism, consistent
with Goldman’s claim that Gordon’s reasons for denying Possessionism re-
main opaque. Gordon (2009) provides a fuller discussion of this precise point,
probably in response.
I show in Table 2.2 the possible options for Possessionism as described
above. I assume that one can possess a mental state without possessing the
concept of that mental state but not vice versa. I also assume that one can
be required to possess a mental state or concept for recognition but not for
ascription, but that one cannot be required to possess it for ascription but not
for recognition. Relaxation of these assumptions would create further options.
If we agree that these four types of Possessionism are distinct and that all
can be held independently of the eight positions specified in table 2.1, then
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we now have 32 possible variants of ST. As said at the outset, I will remain
neutral in this thesis between these many possible variants of ST. While they
are interesting, which one of them exactly is the best variant and whether it is
certain that they do not collapse into each other is not critical to my project.
By contrast, collapse of ST into TT would be serious for my project since
there would then not be a separate theory from TT to defend. If it transpires
that my claims elsewhere commit me to one or other version of ST so be it;
all my project requires is that there be at least one viable variant of ST which
is distinct from TT.
2.6.1 On-line Vs Off-line
Stich and Nichols name the ST account the ‘off-line ST,’ but they also note
that for Gordon, the “off-line picture” is “only an ‘ancillary hypothesis’ [...]
albeit a very plausible one” (Stich and Nichols 1995a, p. 91). Heal tells us
the off-line hypothesis is widely-held by supporters of ST, but not by herself.
The ‘off-line’ claim holds that when S simulates O’s decision making, S does
something similar but not identical to what S does when S makes a similar
decision on his own behalf. S knows for example, that if S desires coffee, and S
is outside a coffee shop with available sufficient resources of time and finance, S
may well go in. S can extrapolate from this. If S sees O behave in a particular
way —viz. entering the coffee shop —S may by analogy with himself as a
model use simulation to decide that O has entered the coffee shop because O
desired coffee.
Note that we need to be careful with the use of the verb ‘to know’ here.
If knowing that people who want coffee and are outside a coffee shop may go
in and buy coffee constitutes a law or generalisation or element of a body of
knowledge, then ST may have collapsed back into TT. So we need to think
of talk of ‘knowing’ here as meaning ‘able to simulate beliefs and desires such
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that we can find a combination of the key ones which result in the prediction
‘enter the coffee shop.’ This does not appear to be much more difficult than
the following sequence: ‘O wants coffee, O is outside the coffee shop, S(off-
line) wants coffee, S(off-line) is outside the coffee shop, S(off-line) action: enter
coffee shop, predict: O enters coffee shop.
When S runs the simulation, S does not want to be prompted actually to
enter the coffee shop himself. This is what is meant by the simulation or the
beliefs simulated being off-line. The behaviour of entering the shop should be
prompted only by S’s own desire for coffee, unless we begin constructing some
more complex story in which perhaps S enters because O has and S wants to
talk to O. Thus, S’s decision-making system is off-line in that S arranges for
it to output a specified behaviour, but not actually to execute that behaviour,
because S is interested in simulation and not performing that action at this
point. The on-line version of ST then sees S as having his practical reasoning
system working on actual occurrent beliefs of S. So the postulation is that the
system runs as normal but there is no translation into action of the output.
We would also need a mechanism whereby the beliefs S has for standard
reasons —e.g. perceptual input —are not contaminated with beliefs S has
merely because S needs to have them because O does and S wants to simulate
O. This is specially relevant if S needs to predict O’s behaviour based on a
belief of O’s that S knows is a false belief —we must avoid any account where
S is required knowingly to have a false belief because that seems impossible.
Where on-line simulation does look plausible would be in the grammar-type
question discussed by Harris (1992, p. 124). The task is for S to decide which
of a set of sentences O will think are grammatical in the common language
of S and O. It is very likely that S decides what O will say by forming true
beliefs about the grammaticality of the sentences and ascribing them to O as
well. Similarly, to adapt Gordon’s example, if S and O both form the belief
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that a tiger is confronting them, S will have no difficulty deciding to run and
predicting that O will do so also. Harris (1992, p. 124) concludes his argument
by noting plausibly that the TT proposal to explain this, on which the subject
has a first order representation of grammar for his own use and a second order
meta-representation of other people’s grammar, “strains both credulity and
parsimony.” It is simpler to postulate that S forms on-line beliefs about the
grammaticality of the sentences —i.e. S actually has those beliefs —and then
ascribes those beliefs to O, together with the corresponding behaviour.
The point where it is critical for the system to be off-line is immediately
before behaviour. S must be able to infer what desire it was that caused O
to enter the coffee shop —or alternatively predict that O will enter the coffee
shop if S knows that O has the desire for coffee —without either circumstance
causing S to enter the coffee shop or want to do so, unless we again add
extraneous factors such as that now S sees O enjoying all the coffee, S wants
one as well. But that leaves open all of the stages where S could inhibit
behaviour by applying an off-line status. S could inhibit behaviour by any
of the following. Firstly, S might have a pretend belief that does not issue
in behaviour because it is not S’s actual belief.17 Secondly, S might in some
subsystem allow for a real belief that S desires coffee to operate, but prevent
it from having the usual effects of a belief. S would need to restrain it from
exiting the subsystem to the extent that it causes other propositions such as ‘S
desires fluid’ or ‘S should enter the coffee shop’ to become assertible. Thirdly,
S might have a real belief, which has real effects in the inference mechanism
or a special contained subset of it, but intervene at the last moment before
behaviour with an inhibition of action.
17One might see this as not inhibition because one might hold that strictly speaking, a
pretend belief does not require inhibition to avoid being acted upon. It essentially ‘comes
with’ its own inhibition since it is a pretend belief and not a belief. On this line, one would
need to take account of this when discussing ToM mechanisms.
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Stich and Nichols (1992, p. 247) suggest that off-line ST is unparsimonious.
They assert that under off-line ST, we would need to postulate a control mech-
anism to “take that system ‘off-line,’ feed it ‘pretend’ inputs and interpret its
outputs as predictions.” They claim that this task would be “very non-trivial”
(Stich and Nichols 1992, p. 247) but do not provide any evidence for this claim.
We also have an everyday example of the decision-making system being taken
at least partially off-line: sleep. As O’Shaughnessy (1991, p. 160) observes:
“[t]ypically in sleep either simple bodily act-inclinations or sensation-caused
act-inclinations [immediately] generate basic bodily willings; and these prim-
itive transactions make no demand upon belief or concept system.” What
this means is that when dreaming, we seem to perceive the external world;
these apparent percepts sometimes cause us to wish to move in response, but
such desires to move do not result in the usual changes in beliefs. If I dream
that I walk into the sea, I nevertheless do not believe that I am wet, at least
not in the same way as I do if I actually walk into the sea. Thus we have
an example of some control mechanism existing or taking effect in that the
decision making system caused me to ‘want to walk into the sea;’ this then
uses ‘I am in the sea’ as a ‘pretend input’ and generates the output ‘I am wet’
as a prediction for my dreaming self in the dream case. There seems to be
no special difficulty about doing the same when awake in respect of another
person.
In the same vein, as Heal (1998, p. 89) notes, “we can reason with represen-
tations which we do not believe” because otherwise we could not, for example,
“explain what we are doing in arguing by reductio ad absurdum or reason-
ing hypothetically.” Reductio ad absurdum means to reason by assuming a
proposition that is probably false for the sake of argument, and finding that it
has absurd consequences. That is taken as proof that the proposition initially
assumed is indeed false. On such occasions, it is indeed the case that persons
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have reasoned using propositions that they do not believe and so there must
be some mechanism whereby they can hold such propositions off-line. Thus,
nothing extra need be postulated for simulation and ST continues to be a
parsimonious and elegant explanation of ToM.
My position on the on-line vs off-line debate will be similar to the one I
took on the other different types of ST. What is required for my project in
this thesis to succeed is that one of the options be correct; I do not need at
this stage to select a champion. Both options look viable; it is fair to suggest
that the off-line version has received more support in the literature.
2.7 Avoiding Collapse Between ST And TT
As mentioned, collapse between simulationist and theoretical accounts would
be a problem for my project, because I cannot defend ST against TT if they are
not separate. TT proponents have sometimes tried to collapse ST back into
TT. In this section, I will argue in three ways that ST and TT are separate.
These three ways are as follows. I will first note some plausible distinctions
that have been drawn in the literature between ST and TT. Then, I will argue
that TT proponents have often been guilty of ‘setting the bar too low’ in their
claims that ST collapses back into TT. They have done this, I suggest, by
regarding the employment in any way of any theoretical items like beliefs as
sufficient to render an account of ToM theoretical. Since the main challenge to
ST nowadays is the denial that it can handle systematic ToM error rather than
that it is not distinct from TT, I will treat the collapse challenge only briefly
here. Responding to the systematic error challenge is my main project in this
thesis. We will nevertheless learn more about our two competing theories by
seeing how obvious or not it is that they are distinct.18
18Davies and Stone (2001) provide an extended discussion of collapse risk between ST and
TT.
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2.7.1 Distinctions Between ST And TT
I will here briefly outline some plausible distinctions that have been observed
between ST and TT. I will suggest in turn that ST and TT employ different
data sources; that the Rylean distinction between knowing-how and knowing
that will also divide them; that they predict different answers as to whether
folk psychology and scientific psychology are continuous and that they differ
in the way they handle some real-life examples. In the latter case, I will also
be responding to an objection to ST raised by TT proponents.
Different Data And Processes
One broad-brush and intuitive but clear way of distinguishing ST and TT is
given by Arkway when she discusses Heal’s position. Arkway (2000, p. 128)
writes that “[S] looks not at the [O] to be understood but at the world around
[O].” This provides a clear contrast with the process under TT accounts in
which S will look at O as well as at O’s environment, and where we might
expect the bulk of the theory to be about people, albeit perhaps people in
situations.
Arkway also sees the importance of the off-line nature of some ST accounts,
whereby beliefs held by S for simulation purposes of O must be held in quaran-
tine and not result in decisions or behaviour of S. Arkway (2000, p. 128) notes
the view of Stich and Nichols that all accounts which posit the off-line use of
the decision-making system count as versions of ST. While ST accounts may
be on-line as well, there do not seem to be any off-line TT accounts for the
simple reason that none are needed. Theoretical reasoning processes normally
culminate in some new theoretical beliefs which may become candidates for
motivating behaviour, but will not automatically do so.
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Knowing How Vs Knowing That
Freeman (1995, p. 68) writes: “[TT] is intellectualist in that emphasis is put
on the child’s own [ToM], a theory through which children are held to filter
psychological evidence. [ST] is grounded in a consideration of pre-theoretical
practical intelligence plus a competence at imagining.” There is a clear division
here between the activity postulated in ToM use. Children are either filtering
evidence through a theory, or using their imagination. These activities are
very different.
Also, since the divide here is between ‘pre-theoretical’ and ‘theoretical;’
we may see it as closely analogous to the distinction due to Ryle (2009, p.
68 et seq.) between knowing-how and knowing-that. TT would involve theo-
retical knowledge, which would be knowing-that —the possession of proposi-
tional knowledge, expressed in the readiness to affirm propositions. The pre-
theoretical knowing-how of ST would not involve any propositional knowledge:
children can therefore be deemed to be able to perform simulation successfully
without thereby necessarily being able to affirm any propositions.19
Continuity Of Folk And Scientific Psychology
It has been claimed that folk psychology will be superseded by scientific psy-
chology. This would involve ordinary people learning more psychology over
perhaps many decades and eventually abandoning their current inaccurate
theories of how people think.
The prevalence of error seen in ToM capacities has implications for the
accuracy of folk psychology and scientific psychology and whether there is
some form of continuity between the two. Gopnik seeks to distinguish TT
19Note though an extended argument (Stanley 2011) to the effect that knowing how to φ
is the same as knowing the fact that ‘w is a way to φ.’ This would collapse Ryle’s distinction,
and mean that simulating children know some propositions like ‘w is a way to simulate φ.’
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views from ST views based on these accuracy and continuity points. Gopnik
(1996, p. 180) writes that both modular and innate TT views suggest “folk
psychology could be, indeed is likely to be, wrong in important ways.” Also,
the “theory-formation view [. . . ] proposes a deep continuity between folk
psychology and scientific psychology” (Gopnik 1996, p. 180) since the latter
is a formalisation of the former. Since, as Gopnik (1996, p. 180) states, her
views “stand in contrast to other accounts, such as simulation theory,” we can
see that she claims there are two additional distinctions between TT and ST
as set out below.
• TTg: folk psychology is wrong in important ways
• STg: not TTg: it is not the case that folk psychology is wrong in im-
portant ways
• TTh: there is a continuity between folk psychology and scientific psy-
chology
• STh: not TTh: it is not the case that there is a continuity between folk
psychology and scientific psychology
Thus, ST and TT make different predictions as to whether folk psychology
will eventually be superseded by scientific psychology or not. This already
distinguishes them, and will do so more clearly to the extent that data or
argument makes it look more or less plausible that scientific psychology is
superseding folk psychology.
2.7.2 Theory Driven Vs Process Driven
This useful distinction arises from an objection to ST which claims that simula-
tion cannot be done without the surreptitious importation of some theoretical
elements. If this is true, then ST requires TT and the distinction collapses.
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This particular objection is ascribed to Dennett by Davies and Stone (1995, p.
18), who also ascribe the response to Goldman. Dennett asks how simulation
can work “without being a kind of theorising in the end” since there is no
difference in principle between when S “makes believe [S] has [O’s] beliefs”
and when “[S] makes believes [S] is a suspension bridge.” There can be no
simulation by humans of what it is like to be a suspension bridge; the only
knowledge available of how suspension bridges behave is theoretical. This is
true, but S may not need to have O’s beliefs in the same way that O does.
Responding to the objection, Goldman appeals to standard belief/desire
folk psychology, where if S simulates O as having a desire for coffee and a
belief that there is coffee in the cup, S will predict that O will drink from the
cup. Employing such a form of belief/desire psychology does not commit a
position to either ST or TT. As Strijbos and De Bruin (2013, p. 760) show
with copious references, the “assumption that folk psychology is rooted in
belief-desire psychology is taken for granted by almost all participants in the
debate” whether those participants favour TT, ST or hybrid views. Goldman
outlines a ‘process-driven’ simulation where S “simulates a sequence of mental
states” of O so that S “wind[s] up in the same (or isomorphic) final states”
as long as S and O had i) the same initial states and ii) “both sequences
are driven by the same cognitive process” (Davies and Stone 1995, p. 18).
‘Isomorphism’ means that S must pass through similar states as O does in
reaching his conclusions if S is to simulate O successfully. S need not make
believe S has O’s beliefs in order to go through an isomorphic process.
2.8 Setting The Bar Too Low
There are many examples in the literature of TT proponents making their
task too easy by making almost anything count as use of theory. I will set out
some examples below, and then consider some useful remarks by P. Mitchell,
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Currie, and Ziegler (2009b). This is an important topic for the argument of
this thesis since failure to appreciate it fully allows TT proponents to claim
that more ToM activity is theoretical than is entailed by observations. The
philosophical underpinning of this point is the distinction between conforming
to a rule and following it (Wittgenstein 2001, §201 et seq.). TT proponents
may show regularities in ToM but this does not show theory-use in ToM. The
general idea is that the bar for the truth of TT is set too low if it suffices for
TT to be the true account of ToM that ToM propositions can be expressed
as generalisations. It might just be that the simulations always produce the
same outputs when they have the same inputs.20
Daniel (1993, p. 39) writes that “simply [...] resorting to a simulation
presupposes that some theory or other is in place,” by which he means that
people cannot run a simulation without a theory to explain why the simulation
has performed as it has. I deny the force of this objection on the grounds that
everything is a theory if it counts as being a theory to say ‘my simulation will
work’ or ‘this theory tells me how my simulation works.’
Riggs and D. M. Peterson (2000) set the bar too low twice when they
discuss the False Belief Task. Since this is the first of several mentions in
this thesis of the important False Belief Task, I will outline it here. The
canonical example of the False Belief Task is given by Wimmer and Perner
(1983, p. 106) thus: “[a] story character, Maxi, puts chocolate into a cupboard
x. In his absence his mother displaces the chocolate from x into cupboard
y. Subjects have to indicate the box where Maxi will look for the chocolate
when he returns.” The point is that subjects must avoid being ‘seduced by
20There is a reluctance to assent to the assimilation of potentially imprecise simulation
to precise generalisations. The reluctance is paralleled by the reluctance Soteriou (2013, p.
174) discusses to accepting the above-mentioned Stanley (2011) assimilation of possession
of rather precise propositional knowledge to the less precise notion of knowing how to do
something.
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reality’: younger children tend to be impressed by their own knowledge of
where the chocolate is actually located —in cupboard y —and thereby fail to
take account of the fact that Maxi was not present when the chocolate was
moved and therefore fail to predict that Maxi will have a false belief that the
chocolate is still in cupboard x. These errors are known as ‘realist errors’ in
ToM. Roughly, it was found that most normal children under four years old
would fail the False Belief Task while most would pass at five.
Riggs and D. M. Peterson (2000, p. 91) claim that identifying what Maxi
is ignorant of “ requires the theoretical understanding that people can be
ignorant of things that we are aware of, and also, that if a person is absent
when a change takes place, that person may be unaware of that change.”
However, such understanding need not be theoretical. Consider the following
simulation alternative. Imagine that you are in a room without windows. It
was sunny when you entered the room, but now it is raining. Do you know
that it is raining? You can answer this question in the negative very easily by
simulating your position in the room not knowing anything about the change
in the weather. In addition, you can know by the same simulation that you will
continue to remain ignorant about the rain while in the room. This provides
you with both of the points listed above.
Similarly, Perner makes the ‘setting the bar too low’ error when he argues
that the Maxi results favour TT over ST. Success on the False Belief Task re-
quires omitting the information that Maxi’s mother moves the chocolate while
Maxi is out playing when assessing what Maxi knows. Perner (2000, p. 396)
states that this is because “it is far from clear that the critical [information
about the movement of the chocolate] is omitted just because one is imagin-
ing to be Maxi;” rather what is needed is “some theoretical knowledge that
events that are not perceived are to be omitted.” It is clear though. Simulate
being Maxi playing in the field. Can you see the kitchen? Can you see the
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chocolate being moved remotely? No, and so you know that Maxi cannot
see the chocolate being moved. A rule about knowledge of remote events can
be derived from the above simulation. Every time a decision about whether
someone knows about a remote event is required, the simulation can be run
and the result will always be that people do not know about remote events,
at least if perception is their mode of access to the remote event in question.
Davies and Stone (2001, p. 146) claim that there is a “minimal theoretical
background for mental simulation” which is the adoption of an assumption that
O is like S. They give several examples of such an assumption, but they all
suggest that S must assume that O is relevantly similar to S, or O’s processes
are relevantly similar to those of S, if S is to simulate O. This is false. While
it must in fact be the case that the claims made in these assumptions are true
for simulation to be successful, S need make no assumptions at all. S merely
needs to simulate. There is no such minimal theoretical background.
Wilkinson, Ball, and Cooper (2010) set the bar too low in an experiment
purporting to examine whether simulation or theory use was involved in par-
ticular cases of ToM use. They have observers making the decision, which
illustrates one problem: if we do not already know the answer as to whether
theory or simulation was involved, asking someone else will not help. In any
case, the authors give an example of what counted for them as theory use.
Their example is of an occasion when S comments as follows: “I think Mike’s
gonna feel the more regret in the short term coz he’s actually chan- he actually
made a bad decision whereas Timmy” chose not to make a decision (Wilkin-
son, Ball, and Cooper 2010, p. 1011). The claim is that S has applied the
rule that O’s who make a decision will feel more regret about a consequent
negative outcome than O’s who do not make a decision. This is setting the
bar too low because such an outcome can be obtained from simulation.
Similarly, Jackson (1999) claims that any method which allows us to make
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predictions about an object or person K is in virtue of that fact a theory of K.
Jackson employs the question from the literature about two travellers who are
late arriving at the airport. Which is more annoyed, the one who misses his
flight by an hour or the one who misses it by five minutes? Jackson (1999, p.
88) believes people need to apply a theoretical generalisation to the effect that
a mental exercise can “reveal how you would feel in some given situation.” In
fact, S just needs to perform the mental exercise and have it be right without
S needing to know that it is right.21
Consideration of the useful commentary of P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler
(2009b) also throws light on the issue of setting the bar too low. They are
Strong S/T Hybrid theorists with a simulationist bent; P. Mitchell, Currie, and
Ziegler (2009b, p. 513) propose that “although simulation is primary, rule-
based approaches develop as a shortcut.”22 Within their Strong S/T Hybrid
approach, the authors present a candidate rule to be used in situations where
they believe theory is more likely to be used than simulation.23
The allegedly rule-based scenario involves chocolate in the displaced item
test. Subjects are asked the standard False Belief Task question as to where
Maxi will look for his chocolate when it has been moved in his absence. P.
21Further, Garson (2003, p. 511) describes a further example. TT proponents set the bar
too low when they claim that any use of general knowledge about people constitutes theory
use.
22The primary argument of P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler (2009b) that favours ST over
TT is also valuable. They note that children gradually develop ToM competence. ST
predicts this as perspective-taking capacities develop while TT predicts sharp transitions in
competence as better rules are acquired.
23For a useful commentary on P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler (2009b) and also the crit-
icism that it is empirically unclear whether children develop ToM gradually or with sharp
transitions, see Apperly (2009). See also Harris (2009) for further valuable commentary. For
an enlightening response from the original authors to these two commentaries, which includes
pressing the important claim that TT proponents ought to specify their generalisations, see
P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler (2009a).
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Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler (2009b, p. 513) suggest that this is done by
those who provide the correct answer by use of a rule to the effect that O
will believe that items are where they were when O last saw them. This may
be true, but it is of course equally possible to obtain the correct answer by
simulation. S can run through an imaginary scenario in which S’s chocolate is
moved from location A to location B in his absence and predict that S will not
have any reason to update his belief set in relation to the chocolate: S predicts
that S or O in this scenario continues to believe the chocolate is where it was
before he left the scene. The suggestion of P. Mitchell, Currie, and Ziegler
(2009b, p. 513) is that rule use in this scenario might be the “best method for
mentalising” because it is “quick, relatively effortless and tolerably accurate.”
Indeed, but this assumes that ToM invariably proceeds on the most efficient
basis, which would make it an unusual element of human cognition.
More importantly, running a simulation in these circumstances would al-
ways produce the same result: viz., O does not know to where the chocolate
was moved in his absence because S in the simulation also does not know for
the same reason. This would mimic rule-based ToM. Perhaps S remembers in
some sense the output of previous relevant simulations to answer this question.
There seem to be two potential lines to take here. The first one would allow
that ToM sometimes relies on generalisations, but would note that these are
derived from simulations so are derivative. I would not take this line, because
I do not think it gives an appropriate definition to the term ‘generalisation.’
When we say that ToM use has involved using a generalisation, we should
mean just that, and not that it has appeared to do so. So I would prefer the
second line to take, which holds that ToM does not rely on generalisations, but
it can appear to do so (‘mimic’) because simulations reliably produce the same
results. My line here assumes that memory use does not constitute theory use,
as seems plausible; nor does memory use constitute use of a generalisation.
Chapter 3
Objections To Pure TT
Accounts
3.1 Introduction
Broadly, there are three sorts of accounts of ToM which can be constructed
from TT and ST. I will not consider other putative alternatives such as the
intentional stance (Dennett 1981) or the intersubjectivity account (Gallagher
and Hutto 2008). These accounts are not mainstream and it is unclear to what
extent they involve theory and simulation. The target of the objections to TT
presented in this chapter is a particular class of TT theories on which the
theories of the mental consist in more-or-less precise generalisations yielding
insight into how processes such as abduction work. Both of the two major
types of TT so far proposed in the literature fall into this category. As I
mentioned in the Introduction, I will not be considering in this thesis any
putative further types of TT which do not involve such generalisations.
Setting this aside then, the three sorts of accounts of ToM are: pure ST,
pure TT and S/T hybrid accounts involving both simulation and theory. I
will further divide the S/T hybrid accounts into Strong S/T Hybridism and
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Weak S/T Hybridism – to be defined below. Since as we saw earlier there
are also multiple accounts of TT and of ST, we can also have hybrids within
each of those accounts. For example, there could be a hybrid of TT(S) and
TT(I). I will term these accounts ‘Theoretical Hybrids.’ There could also
be Simulational Hybrids involving ST(R) and ST(T) or combinations of any
of the possible ST accounts listed in table 2.1. We will not need to discuss
Simulational Hybrids further here since, also as mentioned earlier, I do not
select a preferred variant of ST in this thesis.
I will in this chapter and the next consider all of these possibilities and
conclude that all of them except Weak S/T Hybridism succumb to severe
objections. I will show this by outlining objections to each type of account in
turn.
I will cover three objections to TT(Scientific) in §3.2. The first objection,
which I think is the most important one, is that an excess of complexity leads
to a lack of parsimony. The account requires additional machinery which
represents a substantial theoretical cost, and it is implausible that children
could develop such complex machinery at young ages. The second objection
to TT(Scientific) suggests that under it, S’s must solve the Frame Problem and
that finding such a solution is impossible. The third objection asks how it can
be that all children converge on the same ToM even though their evidential
bases are different.1
I will cover three objections to TT(Innate) in §3.3. The first objection
claims that ToM development cannot be accounted for by TT(Innate). This
arises because the TT(Innate) account, as so far proposed, has been essentially
modular (and it does not appear as though the rather ad hoc non-modular
add-on Scholl and Leslie (1999) employ can be coherent or solve the develop-
mental objection). It is hard to see how innate, informationally encapsulated
1For further objections see Stich and Nichols (1998), Stich and Nichols (2002), Scholl and
Leslie (2001), Bishop and Downes (2002), Fuller (2013).
3.2. OBJECTIONS TO TT(SCIENTIFIC) 71
modules could develop. The second objection claims that TT(Innate) cannot
account for default belief attribution. As mentioned above, it is useful for S to
start from the assumption that O has the same beliefs as S. The modular na-
ture of the TT(Innate) account means that it is informationally encapsulated.
Informational encapsulation rules out access to the entire set of beliefs of S.
The third objection claims that TT(Innate) lacks a parsimonious explanation
for ToM deficits in autism. Autistic subjects show deficits in pretend play as
well as ToM; these two deficits ought parsimoniously be explained together.
3.2 Objections To TT(Scientific)
3.2.1 Too Complex And Too Difficult
The most important objection to TT(Scientific) claims that it is too complex.
This complexity makes TT(Scientific) an unappealing account of ToM for two
linked reasons. Firstly, it makes the account unparsimonious. Secondly, it is
implausible to ascribe such complex and difficult abilities to young children.2
The second form of the objection may be set out as below.
• P1: Children can use ToM by around the age of five or earlier
• P2: Children cannot learn to use complex capacities by around the age
of five or earlier
• C: Using ToM cannot require learning to use complex capacities
The problem for TT(Scientific) then is that it postulates just such complex
capacities as are ruled out by the conclusion of this simple argument. The
objection claims that the significant theoretical apparatus that TT(Scientific)
postulates is too theoretically expensive and cumbersome. Admittedly, the
2This variant of the objection is forcefully pressed by Gustafson (1995) in his article aptly
entitled “Eighteen Months On The Planet And Already A Psychological Theorist.”
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ToM capacities that are explained are themselves complex and sophisticated
but that does not mean that a significant theoretical cost need be borne in
explaining those capacities. Such costs are only acceptable when no cheaper
theory is available. ST is exactly such a less theoretically costly theory, since
it explains ToM capacities by using only machinery that is already present:
people’s own minds. No additional significant body of knowledge need be
postulated, since that ‘body of knowledge’ can be generated on the fly by the
mind of S.
It is accepted that children acquire ToM abilities at the latest by four
or five years old, becoming able to pass the False Belief Task (Wimmer and
Perner 1983). The complexity objection urges that there is not enough time
for children to complete an extensive programme of hypothesis formation,
confirmation and disconfirmation and theory building, as is envisaged under
TT(Scientific). Moreover, almost all children must complete the programme
eventually, even if they are cognitively disadvantaged. As Baron-Cohen, Leslie,
and Frith (1985, p. 44) show, “severely retarded Down’s syndrome children
performed close to ceiling” on a ToM task.
Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 167) attempt to respond to this com-
plexity/difficulty objection on behalf of TT. They argue that the objection
requires that we have “some a priori way of measuring the temporal course of
conceptual change, of saying what is slow or fast or easy or difficult.” The key
idea is that saying that a theory is ‘too complex and too difficult’ requires a
measure of complexity and difficulty. Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 167) do
not propose such a measure themselves, but suggest that “the three-year-old
child may be working on the theory of mind virtually all his waking hours”
and ask “who knows what adults could accomplish in three years of similarly
concentrated intellectual labour?” so we can see that they mean something
approximately like “three years of full-time work” as a yardstick for how long
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it takes to complete a complex and difficult process. The problem that they
will continue to insist upon is that one cannot exactly know how complex and
difficult the task was, merely that it took three years.
Gopnik and Wellman (1992) attempt to shore up this response with an
analogy from the history of science. Their response relies on the claim that
we cannot assess the complexity and difficulty of Kepler’s heliocentric the-
ory. The ‘a priori’ element seems to be requiring that the difficulty of theory
change is measured by some mechanism that does not just look at how long
it takes in practice to perform theory change, whether one is Kepler or a
three-year-old. Measured ‘culturally,’ developing the heliocentric theory may
have taken centuries, as the necessary developments in observational technol-
ogy and mathematical underpinnings were put in place. However, Gopnik
and Wellman (1992, p. 167) argue that Kepler did not take a long time to
formulate it and also a modern student learns it in “days, weeks or months.”
If we allow Gopnik and Wellman (1992) the reasonable assumption that easy
tasks can be performed more quickly than harder ones, we would arrive at an
argument suggesting that without an objective measure of the difficulty of a
piece of theory change, we cannot arrive at a prediction of how long it ought to
take to perform such a piece of theory change. And without that, we cannot
deny that children are not doing something similarly easy or difficult or quick
or slow than what Kepler did.
So Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 156) suggest that ToM change in chil-
dren is like theory change in science when they write that: “during the period
from three to four many children are in a state of transition between the two
theories, similar, say to the fifty years between the publication of De Rev-
olutionibus and Kepler’s discovery of elliptical orbits.” Their argument for
this relies on developmental data, with specific focus on whether children have
the idea of misrepresentation, or false belief. Experiments – in fact, one can
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readily replicate this with any young children that are to hand – show that
children first deal with the difficulties involved in passing the False Belief Task
by denying the evidence. If one shows them a smarties tube and asks them
what it contains, they will answer ‘smarties.’ If one then shows them that it
in fact unexpectedly contains pencils, and then asks them what they believed
was in the tube just previously, they answer ‘pencils.’ It is quite striking
that one can obtain the false answer ‘pencils’ even when the gap between first
saying ‘smarties’ and then subsequently responding ‘pencils’ is a matter of
seconds (Cassidy et al. 2005, p. 105). The problem the younger children have
is diagnosed as not having the concept of false belief, or misrepresentation.
They simply cannot ascribe a false belief to anyone – whether themselves at
an earlier juncture or other people. If X is the case, then everyone believes X.
So the theory change, on the Gopnik and Wellman (1992) account, is that the
five-year-old children have acquired the facility to ascribe false belief, and can
now pass the False Belief Task.
This response on behalf of TT is inadequate for four reasons. Firstly, it
seems unmotivated to exclude the underpinnings to Kepler’s work that were
prerequisites to his breakthrough. Even if we exclude work done by others
—which is dramatically different to how science actually makes progress —it
is hard to believe that Kepler started and finished his work on the heliocentric
theory in a short period, even if it culminated in a breakthrough moment.
This weakens the analogy and the evidence that both scientific theory change
and children’s ToM development are similarly quick and easy.
Secondly, the roles of the protagonists seem grossly dissimilar, weakening
the analogy. There are two scenarios between which Gopnik and Wellman
(1992) wish to draw an analogy. In one scenario, we have Kepler using the
entire development of science, observational technology and mathematics de-
veloped by experts that was available to him to develop the heliocentric theory.
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In the second scenario, children are developing ToM using only what is innate
or observable or by the pre-five-year-old, who moreover is not born with ob-
servational or social capacities fully developed. A group of pre-fives and their
mothers may well be highly social, but does not seem highly similar to the
scientific community. In particular, Kepler seems to be a leading agent rather
than a passive recipient.
There is some evidence that ToM development is driven by social inter-
actions; a category I would include under the category of data observable by
pre-fives. I will now discuss several experiments showing this, and will be
suggesting a). that the results are consistent with ST and b). there is nothing
here to support the science analogy.
For example, it has been found that children with a variety of siblings
(but not twins) perform better on ToM tasks at a younger age than otherwise
similar children. Cassidy et al. (2005, p. 103) suggest that “the sibling effect
is associated not with mere exposure to another mind but specifically with
exposure to a mind or minds different from one’s own.” This has been ques-
tioned though: C. Peterson and Slaughter (2003, p. 419) “found no significant
correlation, in either study, between false belief understanding and number of
siblings.” Ruffman et al. (1998) found that having older siblings enhances false
belief understanding, but also noted that their data was consistent with both
TT and ST views; this supports my claim that ToM development through
social interaction can equally well be accommodated on simulational lines. It
is also worth noting that the data are mixed here; Ruffman et al. (1998, p.
170) found no “support at all [for] the idea that older siblings enhance source
understanding.” Source understanding means being able to answer ‘how do
you know?’ questions; it is seen as one of the battery of standard ToM tasks.
Hughes et al. (2006, p. 55) argue that “it is the quality (rather than the sim-
ple presence) of the sibling relationship that matters.” They find that two-
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year-olds with older siblings exhibit a higher frequency of talk about internal
(mental) states; this correlated with ToM performance but the correlation was
entirely explained by differences in verbal ability. So it looks as though general
verbal facility enhances ToM; this result is entirely consistent with ST. There
is little here however which is illuminated by the TT(Scientific) analogy. It
might well be that being a professional scientist requires a high level of verbal
ability, but it seems unlikely that the ability to create new theories in the
subset of scientists who do it will be correlated with verbal ability. Overall,
while theory change in science may be at a stretch called social, reading and
writing journal articles seems to bear little similarity to two-year-olds playing
with five-year-olds. Finally, there may not even be an effect here to explain,
Hughes et al. (2006, p. 55) note that “other researchers working with more
diverse samples have not found any significant association with sib-ship size.”
Likewise, some have claimed that children with mothers who more fre-
quently give explanations involving mental states or more frequently talk about
minds tend to pass the False Belief Task at a younger age. C. Peterson and
Slaughter (2003, p. 419) found that a “mother’s preferences for [elaborate ex-
planations involving mental states] options were predictive of their children’s
false belief understanding, but not of their understanding of the other ToM
concepts tested, namely emotion understanding and gaze-reading.” So the
data are somewhat mixed. TT proponents would not be well served to claim
that there is something similar occurring in the scientific community and in
pre-fives which aids in passing the False Belief Task but not in the other items
of ToM. They might be able to say that something beyond generalisations is
required in gaze-reading; perhaps detecting the focus of the eyes is a difficult
activity which is not based on generalisations. But emotional understanding
seems to be clearly based on generalisations if ToM is, as TT(Scientific) holds.
So why do children pick one type of generalisation up from relevant discus-
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sions and not the other? Admittedly, these data are potentially tricky for
ST to explain also. ST may say that children’s emotional understanding of
others will be correlated with their capacity to identify and indeed produce
their own emotions. If they struggle to do so, perhaps because the process is
introspection and this is hard, then ST would have an explanation but would
of course have made a testable empirical prediction.
It is even possible to get children to pass the False Belief Task earlier than
they would otherwise by giving them training relevant to understanding and
reasoning about mental states. Wellman and C. Peterson (2013, p. 2358)
found though “considerable individual variation,” raising the question as to
why “some children gain but others, exposed to the same conditions, do not.”
While this sits well with the TT(Scientific) line that ToM learning means
conducting a very complex activity, but can something complex be learned by
looking at cartoons for six half-hour sessions over six weeks, or by training
over two weeks (Slaughter and Gopnik 1996)? Slaughter and Gopnik (1996, p.
2977) themselves admit that under TT(Scientific), “knowledge is represented
in a complex, coherent system of concepts that are interrelated.” These data
also further weaken the analogy. To what in the Kepler scenario is this range
of abilities analogous? ST can say that the ‘thought-bubble’ training provided
gives the children practice simulating. It can also say that the complexity of
the task is much reduced; the task is not to build up a body of knowledge by
testing generalisations, but to gain skill in accessing what is already there: the
child’s own mind.
Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) use deceptive objects like a candle that
appears to be an apple. They find that “perspective-shifting discourse us-
ing contentful linguistic symbols (not necessarily mental state language) aids
in developing false belief understanding” (Lohmann and Tomasello 2003, p.
1141). These results are congenial to ST, as is indicated by their initial ci-
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tation of ST proponent Harris as proposing one of four hypotheses relating
language development to ToM development (Lohmann and Tomasello 2003,
pp. 1131–1132). The data show that children exposed to the deceptive apple
and discourse involving questions like ‘what did you think it was?’ improve on
ToM tests. ST will suggest that this is because the children are now brought
face-to-face with their own false belief, and are then invited to apply the new
skill to a third party (a puppet dog). They are in effect being taught to
simulate false belief.
Moeller and Schick (2006) study deaf children, who have been widely found
to exhibit delays of several years in ToM development. Moeller and Schick
(2006, p. 751) found that “[m]aternal sign proficiency was correlated with
child language, false belief, and mothers’ talk about the mind,” suggesting
that the link between language development and ToM development is still ob-
served here. Notably, Moeller and Schick (2006, p. 752) cite the simulationist
argument of Harris (1992) to the effect that “it is not just the mention of
mental states in families that fosters children’s ToM development; instead it
is the back-and-forth shuttling from one viewpoint to another that makes a
difference” in false belief understanding. Moeller and Schick (2006, p. 761)
find that “the presence of siblings in the home who could sign was signifi-
cantly correlated with the deaf children’s false belief understanding, but not
with their language scores” of which one interpretation is “that families where
mothers and siblings are able to sign are providing more exposure to the back-
and-forth shuttling of viewpoints through triadic conversations” postulated by
Harris (1992) as the ToM improvement mechanism under ST.
Similarly, Slaughter and Gopnik (1996, p. 2984) think that TT(Scientific)
is strengthened because the “training in this study not only affected children’s
performance on the false belief posttest, but transferred to other theory of
mind posttest tasks.” This they argue is positive for TT(Scientific) because
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it outlines how concepts therein are coherently interrelated. But it could
equally well be that false belief training enhances simulational capacities which
also cross-over to other ToM tasks. Contrary to the claim of Slaughter and
Gopnik (1996, p. 2986) this it is “not so clear how improvement in the skill
of simulation could influence children’s abilities to distinguish “guess” and
“know,” ” it seems quite clear that making that distinction is already an
improvement in simulation capacity. If S can improve his understanding of
the difference by training involving puppets that use the terms, then S can
pro tanto apply the new understanding within simulation.
If there is indeed a link between social interaction and ToM, the result
seems equally congenial to ST and to TT. Both can say that such exposure
improves ToM performance by, in the former case, developing simulational ca-
pacities and, in the latter case, by improving theoretical capacities. However,
Cassidy et al. (2005, p. 111) also found that twin S’s “did markedly better
when the false belief in question was that of their twin [O] instead of that of
a friend [O].” This one might say is a consequence of ST. However, explaining
it commits TT to the claim that twin S’s have a better theory of their own
twin O’s than others, even when the subject matter is the same in both cases
viz. selection of the cupboard in which Maxi will look for the chocolate. Why
would that be? If the answer is that the theory is the same, but the twin S’s
found it easier to apply to their twin O’s, we may equally ask why that would
be.
Thirdly, Kepler was a very special and talented individual while ToM is
acquired by almost all children, including the less special, the less talented, and
as mentioned above, the severely retarded. So it looks wrong to respond that
we cannot say that TT(Scientific) is not too complex and difficult for children
since we cannot say that Kepler’s theory is too difficult and complex.3
3Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 108) also plausibly press this complexity objection, complain-
ing that TT(Scientific) needs a lot of machinery to explain complex and detailed behaviour
80 CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIONS TO PURE TT ACCOUNTS
Fourthly, what is observed is that three-year-old children do not pass the
False Belief Task and five-year-old children do. There is no direct evidence
of conceptual change in the children. The Gopnik and Wellman (1992) ac-
count whereby children undergo theory change – specifically, they acquire the
concept of false belief – is just one possible account. Simulationists might
alternatively point to the dramatic expansion of cognitive capacities that chil-
dren undergo between three and five,4 or note that five-year-old children have
had two years of extra observation.
The severity of the complexity objection to TT(Scientific) is greatly in-
creased by a range of converging data supporting the Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005) breakthrough results. Ruffman et al. (1998, p. 171) note 1994 evi-
dence “that children as young as 2 years 11 months to 3 years 2 months show
signs of implicit but not explicit understanding” of false belief in that 80% of
them looked at the correct location while only 20% could answer the question
about false belief correctly. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) themselves showed
that even 15 month infants can succeed on non-linguistic variants of the False
Belief Task. Luo (2011, p. 289) notes several reports that “children in their
second year of life have been found to hold false-belief understanding, using
non-verbal tasks;” Luo (2011, p. 295) found that “10-month-old infants may
consider an agent’s beliefs, true or false, when predicting and interpreting her
actions.” Strijbos and De Bruin (2013, p. 755) cite several replications of
the Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) results including “13-month-olds.” Heyes
(2014, p. 647) includes “more than 20 experiments” favouring the claim that
infants understand false belief in her review article. Against all this, it should
be noted that Moeller and Schick (2006)[p. 757] had to eliminate non-verbal
versions of the False Belief Task from their study since they found it confused
prediction in children.
4Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 167) themselves note the “general cognitive achievements
of young children.”
3.2. OBJECTIONS TO TT(SCIENTIFIC) 81
children who were around five and thus able to pass the verbal version.
One possible response here for TT would rely on the speculation made by
Ruffman et al. (1998, p. 172) that “older siblings shorten the gap between
the first sign of implicit understanding and the emergence of correct explicit
answers.” This however would do nothing to assist TT(Scientific) in relation
to children with no older siblings, who are still completing a task which under
TT(Scientific) is highly complex. In addition, Ruffman et al. (1998, p. 161)
find “no such effect for children younger than 3 years 2 months” while the
children for which TT(Scientific) lacks an explanation are much younger.
A second potential response would be to divide ToM into multiple stages
(Butterfill and Apperly 2013), say that the simpler easier stage is what infants
are using and then to say that children have the full five years to pass the verbal
False Belief Task, because that needs to second stage as well. This could work,
but means that TT(Scientific) is still saying that infants have learned some
generalisations – those sufficient to ‘pass’ in the looking-time violation versions
of the False Belief Task – with less than 10 months (Luo 2011) – or less than
7 months (Heyes 2014, p. 651) – to learn them.
A final way out which is initially more promising could be to argue that
the infants are not in fact showing false belief understanding in the various
experiments, but are responding to novelty with increased looking time (Heyes
2014). This would allow TT(Scientific) to at least retain the five year period
of observation and generalisation formation which it could assume prior to
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) and replications. Her line can of course be
questioned, as can be seen from the response following it in the journal. The
central idea is that “infants look longer at test events that, when compared
with events encoded earlier in the experiment, display new spatiotemporal re-
lations among colours, shapes and movements” (Heyes 2014, p. 648) which is
a testable empirical prediction. It also means that TT(Scientific) is committed
82 CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIONS TO PURE TT ACCOUNTS
to the claim that the surprise of the infants is generated by novel combinations
of “colours, shapes and movements” (Heyes 2014, p. 648), which is possible
but somewhat unappealing. Why should red/square/up be surprising after
blue/triangle/down? The account of Heyes (2014) also requires a rather con-
venient memory disruption effect.
Overall, it is still the case that if TT(Scinetific) cannot explain away these
results, then the complexity objection is made more severe for TT(Scientific),
since it means that TT(Scientific) is now postulating that the ability to handle
great complexity and difficulty arrives at a very early age. As the ages at
which children appear to develop implicit false belief understanding is reduced,
TT(Scientific) is left claiming that children have not only completed whatever
learning and generalisation formation is required, but have done so using a
less developed set of cognitive capacities. This state of affairs should lead
TT(Scientific) proponents either in the direction of TT(Innate)5 or ST. ST is
also somewhat challenged by these results, but at least it is only postulating
that 10-month-olds (Luo 2011) can act as if they do not know about what they
do not see and expect O’s to be similar, while TT(Scientific) is postulating
that they have learned a generalisation to that effect and can apply it to O’s.
I conclude that this objection raises severe problems for TT(Scientific)
which have not found an adequate response.
3.2.2 Requires Solving The Frame Problem
In this section, I will expand on an objection to TT(Scientific) which has been
touched on in the literature but which has not in my view received attention
commensurate with its gravity in the ToM arena. It is mentioned briefly by
Heal (1996, pp. 81–84) in a section which deserves much wider attention, and a
response is attempted by Glymour (2000), which I will outline below. I propose
5Fodor (1987, p. 132) uses this objection to argue for TT(Innate) against TT(Scientific);
and for the cultural universality of belief/desire psychology, see §3.2.3.
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that the objection is a major differentiator between TT and ST because we
know that humans can solve the Frame Problem but we do not know how
they do it. TT assumes, implausibly, that we have a set of generalisations
that embody a solution. Heal (1996, p. 83), writing of the solution to the
Frame Problem, notes the “oddness of supposing that we have it tacitly while
at the same time possessing no inkling of how to set it out explicitly.” I
contend that ST may note, by contrast, that the mystery of how we solve the
Frame Problem in relation to others is not distinct to or more mysterious than
how we solve it in relation to ourselves.
The syllogistic form of the objection is as below.
• P1: If TT(Scientific) is the correct account of ToM, then S’s must possess
generalisations that solve the Frame Problem6
• P2: There are no generalisations that solve the Frame Problem
• C: TT(Scientific) is not the correct account of ToM
This is a serious objection since no ways of solving the Frame Problem
are at hand, either in human psychology or artificial intelligence. Worse still,
some authors have argued plausibly that the Frame Problem is insoluble.7 In
one sense, humans solve the Frame Problem all the time: whenever I decide
to raise my arm, I do not in fact consider whether the gravitational field of
Mars is relevant to how I will make the arm-raising happen. It is in the sense
of providing a formal solution to the Frame Problem that it appears insoluble.
This dichotomy is why the Frame Problem raises difficulties for TT but not
for ST.
What is the Frame Problem? Every time we make a decision or form
a belief, we must consider relevant facts before doing so if we are to do so
6This depends on the assumption that theories consist in generalisations only.
7Fodor (2008, pp. 116-121) sets out the difficulty of the Frame Problem in general; D. M.
Peterson and Riggs (1999, p. 82) mention in passing its difficulty in their ToM context.
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appropriately. The relevant facts form the ‘frame’ of a question. For example,
if I want to decide whether to take an umbrella, I will learn a relevant fact
from the weather forecast: whether it is expected that it will rain. There are
other relevant facts which fall into the frame; potentially this number is quite
large. The total set of known facts constitutes a ‘model of the world;’ the
frame will be whatever subset of facts are relevant to the question at hand.
Remaining with the example, my decision about the umbrella is defeasible by
facts in certain other scenarios. For instance, I may abandon my previous
decision to take an umbrella even if I learn from the weather forecast that
it is expected to rain if it is also true that I do not expect to be outside for
very long during the day. My model of the world is updated to include the
new information that it is expected to rain, but may not result in changed
behaviour when conjoined with other elements in the model of the world and
my own expected behaviour. If my model of the world is updated to include
new information about the weather in a remote location, this will not be in
the frame as far as my decision to take an umbrella is concerned.
This leads to the Frame Problem. I must consider all of the actually
relevant facts, but the number of potentially relevant facts is too large for them
all to be considered. But how can I decide whether a potentially relevant fact
is an actually relevant fact without considering it?8 Thus it seems I need to
examine every fact I know to see if it is in the frame for a particular question.
That task is impossible. On top of this, I need an updated model of the world
to reflect the consequences of my actions, which means I need to know what
8This formulation of the frame problem is quite approximate; I have adapted it to the spe-
cific context. More precisely, Shanahan (2009, §3) writes that the “epistemological problem
is this: How is it possible for holistic, open-ended, context-sensitive relevance to be captured
by a set of propositional, language-like representations” and how computationally “could
an inference process tractably be confined to just what is relevant, given that relevance is
holistic, open-ended, and context-sensitive?”
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facts to change in the model. The Frame Problem occurs again because I need
to work out what potentially changed facts in the world as a result of my
actions are actually changed facts as a result of my actions. The two versions
of the Frame Problem can therefore exacerbate each other.
The Frame Problem translates directly into problems for TT(Scientific) as
an account of ToM. If S is to predict and explain the behaviour of O, how does S
decide which of O’s beliefs and desires are relevant, and which generalisations
of ToM to apply on any given occasion of prediction and explanation?9 S
must somehow know which of an infinite array of beliefs are in the frame for
an action without considering them all.
Since on TT(Scientific), ToM just is the application of generalisations10
to beliefs and desires, there is no scope to avoid the Frame Problem. By
contrast, on ST, S can employ whatever mechanism people use generally to
avoid the Frame Problem when they make decisions. It may be that what that
mechanism is exactly will remain forever beyond human knowledge, but there
must be an answer, because we can make decisions. The answer will not be to
use algorithmic mechanics like those employed in ToM on the TT(Scientific)
account.
One response here might be to ask whether this objection shows that a
theory theory view is incorrect in every case. That would be unappealing
since it would entail that even scientists do not have theories. I am in effect
suggesting that having and using a theory requires being able to solve the
frame problem in the theory. The correct line here I believe is to note that
9Fodor (1974, p. 102) argues persuasively that the notions of ‘law’ and ‘theory’ are
“equally murky.” This raises problems that are side-stepped by ST but not by TT.
10As has now come up several times, it may be that some forms of TT do not involve gen-
eralisations, but TT(Scientific) certainly does. An example to consider might be a biological
theory hinging on DNA, where it might seem that a structure is central rather than some
generalisations about it. But the structure could in principle be replaced by a different one
while the generalisations about evolution etc. are what makes the structure interesting.
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scientific theories are explicitly theories i.e. they make generalisations that are
written down and discussed. No-one can in this way write down a solution to
the Frame Problem and I suggest that they never will be able to. But ToM
nevertheless solves the Frame Problem. So TT(Scientific) needs to avoid being
a theory of this sort. It can certainly avoid being explicit at no cost, but can it
reasonably include generalisations that cannot even in principle be specified?
I suggest not.11
A further response we might construct here on behalf of TT might be to
urge that the Frame Problem need not be faced by S’s under TT because
only the salient generalisations will be of relevance. This risks circularity
in that it says something like ‘only the salient generalisations are salient,’
which is true but unhelpful for TT because it does not explain how the salient
generalisations become salient. In any case, my view is that this response will
not work because TT has no recourse to any method other than additional
generalisations to specify which generalisations are salient under particular
circumstances, and that method threatens to require an infinite number of
generalisations. It looks as though if tagging a particular generalisation as
salient can only be done by considering that generalisation, explicitly or using
implicit rules, which means that the Frame Problem arises in connection with
the task of selecting which of the potentially salient generalisations are in fact
salient.
Glymour (2000) attempts a response by restating the Frame Problem in
terms of causation. In this form, the problem is knowing what facts to change
in the model of the world as a result of a potential action: what effects will
be caused by my action? This I need to know in order to decide whether
it is a good idea to take the action or not. Glymour (2000, p. 65) writes,
contra Hume (2000), that causation can be observed and learned. The child
11Again, being a theory without being constructed on generalisations might enable future
TT which is not TT(Scientific) a way out here.
3.2. OBJECTIONS TO TT(SCIENTIFIC) 87
learning TT(Scientific) “notes associations either produced by its actions or
otherwise, and the time order of associated events. From that information it
infers that some associated features are not causally connected [. . . ] or are
more or less directly causally connected.” For example, if the child observes
that the arrival of parents occurs after it cries, it will conclude that crying
causes the arrival of parents.
As Glymour (2000, p. 65) concedes, however, “the procedure is reliable
only so long as a form of ‘closed world’ assumption holds, namely that the
associations the baby [. . . ] observes are not produced by unobserved or un-
noticed common causes.” Imagine that every Sunday, father plays football.
This causes two things: he sleeps in the afternoon and runs the washing ma-
chine, causing vibrations. The child might falsely conclude that sleeping in
the afternoon on a Sunday caused vibrations. It would form all kinds of inac-
curate ToM generalisations like ‘people who get muddy in the morning sleep
in the afternoon’ or ‘people who sleep in the day on Sundays vibrate.’ This
particular difficulty might eventually be soluble empirically for the child sci-
entist of the TT(Scientific) account, though it is not clear how if Sundays are
always the same up to the age when the child completes its ToM development.
However, the TT(Scientific) account needs the child to disentangle correctly
all causal chains involving actions and beliefs which are to form the child’s
data for developing its ToM. The ‘closed world’ assumption must generally
hold, if the TT(Scientific) account is to avoid predicting that children perform
badly on ToM tasks, which is the opposite of the truth. Since the closed world
assumption does not in fact hold, I conclude that Glymour has not provided
an adequate response to the Frame Problem objection to TT(Scientific).12
Here ST appears more plausible than TT. ST requires only that S can
believe P as opposed to solve the Frame Problem in relation to believing P,
12Further difficulties for Glymour derive from the extended argument presented by Taleb
(2007) to the effect that humans ascribe more causation than is justified.
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and we already know S can believe P. Here I disagree with Wilkerson (2001),
who attempts to suggest that the Frame Problem is also a problem for ST
because it must be solved in order to generate generalisations. This is once
again “setting the bar too low” (cf. §2.8) since ST can be describable by
generalisations without it needing to apply those generalisations.13
3.2.3 Cannot Explain Convergence
This objection claims that TT(Scientific) cannot explain why children from
different cultures develop the same ToM at the same time. The objection runs
as below.
• P1: If TT(Scientific) is the correct account of ToM, children develop
their ToM by observing relevant behaviour around them
• P2: The relevant behaviour around them is different in different cultures
• C1: If TT(Scientific) is the correct account of ToM, children will not all
develop the same ToM
• P3: Children all develop the same ToM
• C2: TT(Scientific) is not the correct account of ToM
This objection can in fact be more general: different people in the same
culture can come up with different ToM. This does not make the objection
easier to handle for TT(Scientific) proponents. One question which arises here
is whether ST is consistent with there being variation in ToM. I think it is
certainly consistent with there being little fundamental variation, but the other
13See also Dreyfus (2006) for Heideggerian argument to the effect that “[o]nly if we stand
back from our engaged situation in the world and represent things from a detached theoretical
perspective do we confront the Frame Problem” i.e. TT faces the Frame Problem while ST
does not.
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possibility might be thought to be more problematic for ST. One immediate
response which is now available as a result of the account I am proposing is to
recall the major effects of biases. For all of the experiments I will later discuss,
ST results in different predictions – which are often ToM errors. This I think
should go a long way to make ST consistent with there being variation in ToM,
especially when one recalls that I will be arguing that the bias mismatches are
driven by inter alia affect mismatches and system mismatches. So this route
is available to ST if it is needed. Whether it will be or not depends on the
outcome of a lively debate in the literature, as I will briefly outline below.
Premise 2 in the first sub-argument appears highly plausible merely from
experience. There are significant differences in behaviour even among devel-
oped nations, with Japanese culture being more collectivist and less individ-
ualist than the American one, for example. It is no objection here to suggest
that if young children spend most of their time in a nursery, they will not
observe culturally specific behaviour, because inculcation of culturally specific
behaviours starts young. As Prinz (2011, p. 222) observes, data exists to show
that “in contrast to Americans, Japanese parents [. . . ] introduced toys into
play as opportunities for sharing [while] American parenting practices foster
independence.” So even if the children were only to observe the behaviour
of other children when forming their ToM, it would still be culturally specific
behaviour with more sharing behaviour in Japan and more individualistic play
in America. Moreover, moral judgments are culturally highly-specific (Prinz
2006, p. 40) and we may assume that the cultural differences in moral judge-
ments will drive differing sorts of behaviour in adults. We would therefore
also expect that different cultures would have different generalisations in their
ToM or, what is an equivalent statement on TT, different ToM in fact.
Premise 3 in the second sub-argument of this objection holds that all chil-
dren in all cultures develop approximately the same ToM. They make more-
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or-less the same behavioural predictions under similar circumstances. As Car-
ruthers (1996, pp. 31-32) puts it, “it remains remarkable that all normal
children should end up with the same body of knowledge at about the same
time.” Anecdotally, we would expect to have noticed by now if people we met
from different cultures had a different ToM, because ToM is such a ubiquitous
underpinning of human interaction and conversation. Empirically, children
from Western Europe (Wimmer and Perner 1983) and North America (Gop-
nik and Astington 1988) perform very similarly on the False Belief Task; as
do children from a preliterate society in Cameroon (Avis and Harris 1991).
Children from all of these disparate cultures begin to pass the verbal False
Belief Task by the same age, around five. Avis and Harris (1991, p. 460)
write that their Cameroon results “provide support for the claim that belief-
desire reasoning is universally acquired in childhood.” The strength of this
objection to TT(Scientific) is increased by the similar ages at which children
from different cultures pass the False Belief Task, since this entails that not
only do children acquire the same ToM from apparently different data, but
they do so at the same speed, meaning that all cultures appear to offer similar
richness of relevant ToM data. Wellman and C. Peterson (2013, p. 2358) note
that there is a five-stage sequence of ToM developments which children in the
US, Australia, Germany, China and Iran all pass in the order at the same ages.
So Premise 3 appears empirically to have a fair amount of empirical support;
I will discuss the opportunities for TT(Scientific) to deny it below.
It might be a response here to ask whether there is a mismatch between
my defence of Premise 2 and Premise 3. On Premise 2, I have pointed out
that there is variety in moral judgements. On Premise 3, I pointed out that
there is convergence on the False Belief Task. The question is: how do we
know that there is not divergence in ToM appropriate to the divergence in
data? My response is that we do not, but we do know that there is not
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divergence in performance on False Belief Task, if one accepts that data I
outlined in the previous paragraph. TT(Scientific) still needs to explain this,
or explain it away, even if later work shows that cultural ethical differences
result in cultural ethical differences in ToM. One might expect the latter;
since often S will predict that O will behave ethically and will decide what is
ethical by consulting his own ethics. Note how that is highly congenial to ST.
TT(Scientific) presumably needs to make the whole of ethics available within
ToM.
On TT(Scientific), children develop their ToM by forming hypotheses and
confirming or disconfirming them based on the behaviour they see around
them. The problem for TT(Scientific) is that this behavioural evidence base
will be very different in different cultures, with more collectivist behaviour in
Japan and more individualistic behaviour being observable in the US. So it is
hard to explain why there is a cross-cultural convergence in ToM. The objec-
tion to TT(Scientific) is then that it is committed to the interim conclusion
C1 and that conclusion is empirically false. Four potential responses are avail-
able to proponents of TT(Scientific). They may deny premise 1. They may
deny premise 2. They may deny the interim conclusion C1. Finally, they may
embrace the intermediate conclusion C1. If they do that, they are committed
to denying premise 3 in order to avoid C2, which falsifies TT(Scientific). I will
consider each of these potential responses.
It is hard to see how TT(Scientific) could deny premise 1 (the claim that
children develop their ToM generalisations by observing relevant behaviour
around them) without becoming TT(Innate). If there are no generalisations,
then we have ST14 If there are generalisations, we have TT. If they have gen-
14Unless an account can be constructed which embodies a theory that does not make
generalisations. I do not think that the account of Hughes et al. (2006) linking internal state
talk and ToM offers a way out here; interactions leading to improved ToM will still be coded
using generalisations if there is a body of knowledge.
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eralisations, then either children learn their ToM generalisations scientifically
or they do not. If they do, we have TT(Scientific). If they do not learn them,
then they are already there, and we have TT(Innate). It is unclear what other
options to put them there, short of supernatural ones, exist.
TT(Scientific) could attempt to deny premise 2 (the claim that relevant
behaviour around them is different in different cultures) by asserting that
there is a hidden equivocation on ‘relevant.’ Such a response would claim that
while there are many surface cultural differences in behaviour between different
societies, what matters to the development of ToM is ‘deeper.’ So while the
stockbroker in Manhattan may go to a hot dog stand while the Japanese doctor
visits the sushi restaurant, both are acting on similar belief/desire pairs. Both
desire food and believe that they will be able to obtain some at the stand
or the restaurant, respectively. It is the way belief/desire pairs interact to
produce behaviour that is important to the development of ToM; the exact
content of the belief/desire pairs is unimportant. This response seems unlikely
to succeed however since actual behaviour predictions are more fine-grained.
The S is in fact able to predict the eating of hot dogs or sushi as opposed to
the eating of food. Also, the S can predict that the Japanese doctor might
well eat a hot dog when in Manhattan.
Gopnik and Wellman’s response to this objection takes this form of denying
premise 2, as Segal points out. Gopnik and Wellman aim to make the denial
of premise 2 plausible by explaining why it is that children converge on the
the same, culturally non-specific ToM. As Segal (1996, p. 153) writes, Gopnik
and Wellman suggest “that if adults converge on the same [ToM] in different
cultures, then we would not expect much cross-cultural variation in children.
But this is not a good response. First, we might ask how the adults happened
to converge. The obvious answer is that they converged as children.” So
the response claims that the children converged on the same ToM because the
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adults did, even though both children and adults grew up in different cultures.
Segal provides a powerful criticism here of the Gopnik and Wellman re-
sponse. That response I think is like avoiding solving the problem by pushing
it back a level. There is something of a pair of analogies here between the
response, and its criticism, and theistic explanations of the creation of the
universe, and criticism thereof. Those who postulate a divine creator of the
universe owe an explanation of the creation of the divine being; failing that,
they have merely pushed the problem back a level. Because of this, in my
view, Segal has raised a criticism of the response which carries the day.
This leaves only the fourth option for TT(Scientific) proponents: to ac-
cept the interim conclusion C1 (that children will not all develop the same
ToM) and deny premise 3 (the claim that children all develop the same ToM).
TT(Scientific) proponents could cite additional empirical data and claim that
it is at odds with that supporting the claim that ToM is universal. For in-
stance, Strijbos and De Bruin (2013, pp. 746–747) claim that “there are large
differences between the mature folk psychologies of various cultures.” Strijbos
and De Bruin (2013, p. 746) cite empirical studies which “have confirmed
that there are several cultures without concepts analogous to BELIEF, DE-
SIRE [. . . ]” and note a further paper which argued that even “ “mind” is
a unique English-specific construct without precise equivalents, even in Euro-
pean folk psychologies such as that of the French, German, Russian or Dutch.”
Data to support these rather contentious claims is provided by asking subjects
questions; in certain cultures respondents frame their responses along the lines
of ‘what will he say?’ rather than ‘what does he believe?’ It seems as though
there is room to suspect that this reflects mere superficial linguistic differ-
ences. It also seems as though if it were true that European cultures as close
to that of native English speakers as France and Germany lack the same con-
struct “mind,” then this would be readily apparent. It is worth noting that
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Strijbos and De Bruin (2013) think that their argument is problematic only
for accounts of ToM which embrace standard belief/desire psychology. That
seems to include all variants of TT, though arguably Gordon’s version of ST
would escape the difficulty in virtue of only requiring the ability to have be-
liefs and desires rather than the concepts of belief and desire. ST can also
claim that ToM is not culturally specific since children’s minds are not very
culturally specific to begin with; Segal is in fact using this objection to argue
for TT(Innate) as opposed to TT(Scientific). It looks though as though TT
proponents would have to embrace the rather unappealing line set out above,
which would represent a substantial theoretical cost for them.
I conclude that TT(Scientific) has no adequate responses to the three ob-
jections canvassed and now we may consider TT(Innate).
3.3 Objections To TT(Innate)
3.3.1 Cannot Explain Development
This objection claims that TT(Innate) cannot explain the observed develop-
ment of ToM abilities in children. The objection runs as follows.
• P1: ToM capacities develop via data-driven learning
• P2: A correct account of ToM must explain how ToM capacities develop
via data-driven learning
• P3: TT(Innate) does not explain how ToM capacities develop via data-
driven learning
• C: TT(Innate) is not the correct account of ToM
The idea behind this objection is the claim that it is difficult to provide a
mechanism for development of modules when those modules are information-
ally encapsulated. TT(Innate) proponents have responded to the objection
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in two ways. Firstly, they have sought to deny P1, which means that they
have no data-driven development to explain. Secondly, they have attempted
to expand TT(Innate) so as to provide an explanation for how ToM capacities
can develop. This response takes the form of denying P3. I will consider both
responses in turn.
Denial of P1 at first seems unappealing, given the weight of empirical evi-
dence supporting it (Wimmer and Perner 1983), (Gopnik and Astington 1988),
(Avis and Harris 1991). It has nevertheless been attempted, by denying that
passing the False Belief Task requires only ToM capacities. If that were so,
then younger children failing it and older ones passing it would not be con-
clusive evidence for data-driven development in ToM capacities. Their ToM
capacities could remain constant over the period at issue but the non-ToM
capacities also required to pass the False Belief Task might only become avail-
able later. Bloom and German (2000, B27) argue that the verbal False Belief
Task “is too hard for 1- and 2-year-olds, as they lack sufficient attentional and
linguistic resources to cope.” The response relies on the range of empirical ev-
idence discussed above (§3.2.1) that shows younger children passing the task
if it is made simple enough for them to understand. As Bloom and German
(2000, B27) admit, though, this argument has not convinced supporters of the
developmental change view such as Gopnik. Such developmentalists note that
the empirical data merely shifts the development to a younger age but does
not eliminate it. This leaves TT(Scientific) relying on what appears to be an
ever-shorter window for data-driven learning, which may now be less than 7
months (Heyes 2014, p. 651).
One experiment sought to investigate whether language training could as-
sist with ToM capacities, as the Bloom and German (2000) line seems to
require. Partial support for the line was found, in that training on sentential
complements such as ‘A thought that B did X’ produced improved performance
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on the False Belief Task. However, Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003, p. 355)
also write that the “children who were trained on false belief showed equiva-
lent developmental changes in theory of mind as did the children trained on
sentential complements,” so the improved sentential component abilities are
sufficient for ToM improvements but not necessary. This seems difficult to
explain on the Bloom and German (2000) line.
Note also that pursuing this non-developmental approach requires assum-
ing that the medium-sized army of psychologists who have written on ToM
using the False Belief Task have all been conducting experiments which do not
measure ToM capacities. It is safe to say that this area of debate is extremely
controversial and so denial of P1 is not a low-cost option for TT(Innate) pro-
ponents. Finally, I will note the discussion I have provided elsewhere (Short
2015, Ch. 10) on schizophrenic subjects. These individuals exhibit widely
replicated ToM deficits which a) come and go as their symptoms appear and
remit and b) are independent of cognitive ability. One schizophrenic sub-
ject with an IQ of 125 failed eight of nine simple irony comprehension tasks.
Anti-developmentalists who suggest that apparent ToM deficits are caused by
cognitive deficits need to explain this. They will also need to decide whether
they accept that the irony comprehension task is a measure of ToM perfor-
mance, as is widely accepted in the literature.
I now turn to the attempts to add a developmental explanation to
TT(Innate). I will observe in passing that denial of P3 is incompatible with
denial of P1, so defenders of TT(Innate) will have to choose. TT(Innate)
proponents have so far been Modularists, claiming that ToM is subserved
by a Fodorian module. This Modularism has shaped the two ways in which
TT(Innate) proponents have attempted to deny P3. As discussed above, the
originators of TT(Innate), Scholl and Leslie, suggest that the Modularist
can account for development by postulating that different modules may
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come online at different points. Scholl and Leslie (1999, p. 131) write that
“[m]odules must ‘come on-line,’ and even fully developed modules may still
develop internally, based on their constrained input.”
The account immediately loses some of its appeal and parsimony15 in virtue
of being forced to postulate multiple modules subserving ToM. It will be diffi-
cult for the account to escape charges of being ad hoc and unmotivated. The
most serious problem with this response on behalf of TT(Innate) is that one
of the central elements of what it is to be a module is informational encap-
sulation. Information cannot pass across the boundary of a module in either
direction. This seems to mean that the multiple modules postulated cannot
communicate with each other. The exception to this is in relation to the in-
puts and outputs to a module: that information and only that information
can cross module boundaries. However, we would then be left with an account
on which the several modules subserving ToM on the modified TT(Innate) ac-
count could only communicate via these inputs and outputs. They could in
other words only be connected in a chain, with the output of one being the
input to another. It is hard to see how the TT(Innate) account as modified
could square the circle of there being multiple modules which can only feed
into each other and that still meaningfully counting as being multiple mod-
ules. The interaction picture could perhaps be more complex, involving for
example feedback loops between modules. This would add flexibility to the
account but threaten to make it unmanageable and unparsimonious.
TT(Innate) proponents may demand to know: what evidence is there that
ToM abilities are a consequence of developmental changes that cannot be
explained by invoking innate modules which might come online at a particular
point in development? I concede that it is difficult to imagine such evidence.
The criticism would have to be, rather, that a very large number of modules
15Here again the original p. 32 definition of minimal number of moving parts.
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would have to be postulated to explain the data. There would need to be a set
of modules to explain the non-verbal False Belief Task data which come online
in the period from perhaps 7 months to 3 years, and a second set of modules
to explain the verbal False Belief Task data, which come online in the period
from perhaps 4 years to five years. The first set would already include a set of
complicated generalisations about ‘O does not know about what O does not
see’; ‘O reaches for what O desires’ and ‘O cannot see through visors.’ Perhaps
the latter is implausibly innate, and so the account would have some learned
generalisations as well. The second set would either include a further set of
generalisations or it would say that the first set was sufficient. I am not sure
what they would be in option one. In option two, the account would be taking
the Bloom and German (2000) line that what changes in the verbal version of
the False Belief Task is verbal abilities not ToM ones. It will then still need
to deal with the Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003, p. 355) results. Overall, this
account would be doubly unparsimonious on the original p. 32 definition of
moving parts, because it has a lot of modules and a lot of generalisations.
It is also hard to see how these ToM modules could develop internally,
since “ToM has a specific innate basis in that the essential character of ToM
is given as part of our genetic endowment.” (Scholl and Leslie 1999, p. 134)
This appears to be a claim that the development of the modules is genetically
specified. That is prima facie implausible, because it would not appear to
allow much scope for differential development speeds in different populations,
including some clinical populations. The TT(Innate) account also becomes
committed by this line to a genetic explanation of all ToM differences. That
means for example that autism has a genetic basis, which may be true, but
is an empirical question. It is of course true that TT(Innate) proponents are
not required to sign up to all of the commitments of Scholl and Leslie (1999).
It does seem though that given the assumption that everyone has a broadly
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similar ToM, modular accounts of ToM will be committed to everyone having
broadly similar ToM modules and connections between them. Otherwise the
account would be claiming that broadly similar ToM performance can arise
from several different modular constructions, which is possible but lacks in-
dependent motivation. So it looks like such accounts would need to explain
why everyone has a broadly similar construction of ToM modules, which looks
in turn like it will rely on a genetic explanation. A further response here
for TT(Innate) might involve noting that to say that a module is genetically
specified does not preclude the possibility that the expression of the genes
specifying it is affected by environmental factors. That seems to allow the
account to explain the ToM deficits of, for example, autistic subjects, by sug-
gesting that their ToM deficits result from atypical development of their ToM
modules which in turn results from environmental factors affecting how the
relevant genes are expressed. This seems possible, but is an empirical question
and also an assumption of some magnitude.
More troubling still for TT(Innate), the ToM deficits of all clinical groups
which exhibit them will have a genetic basis. Schizophrenic subjects, for exam-
ple, exhibit ToM deficits when they are suffering from the effects of schizophre-
nia and not when they are not so suffering (Koelkebeck et al. 2010, p. 115),
(Bora and Pantelis 2012, p. S142). About a third of schizophrenic subjects
have a relapsing/remitting form of the disease whereby they go through pe-
riods when they are not suffering the effects and periods when they are. A
genetic explanation of such a pattern of relapsing/remitting deficits in ToM
seems difficult to provide, even if TT(Innate) can avail itself again here of the
potential escape routes canvassed above. Again, there are significant empiri-
cal predictions here which would need testing. I conclude that pending such
empirical data, the attempt of Scholl and Leslie (1999) to deny premise 2 fails.
The second attempt to deny P3 (the claim TT(Innate) lacks a mechanism
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to explain development) is due to Segal (1996). Segal offers a response to the
developmental objection involving the use of parameters. The response claims
that the modules making up ToM are innate but can develop according to
the switching of parameters. As the the child learns, it does not create new
modules, but tunes innate modules by the setting of such parameters. As an
example, we may consider the way that the child’s ToM improves in relation to
belief and pretence. Younger children are unable to distinguish between belief
and pretence. This means that they cannot distinguish between a situation
in which someone asserts in the context of a pretend teddy-bear’s picnic that
teddy is drinking tea and a genuine belief that teddy is drinking tea. Formally,
the lack of such a distinction is indicated by the child continuing to use the
inaccurate concept of PRELIEF, which has not yet separated out into the two
adult concepts of PRETENCE and BELIEF.
The way development would occur in such a scenario would be that initially
a parameter – call it the PRELIEF parameter – is set to ON and the BELIEF
and PRETENCE parameters are both set to OFF. As the child develops, it
gains the ability to distinguish the two concepts and so the PRELIEF param-
eter is set to OFF and the BELIEF and PRETENCE parameters are both set
to ON. By this, I simply understand the parameter as an on/off switch, which
represents whether a particular module or a submodule is operative. As a way
of denying premise 2, and allowing TT(Innate) to accommodate development
in ToM, the parameter response appears more promising than the multiple
module response of Scholl and Leslie (1999). It nevertheless fails in my view
because of the rather large and cumbersome nature and number of parameters
that would be needed. We already have three parameters here to accommo-
date a single development, and it appears that there is a vast amount of such
development that takes place before the age of five. We would need further
parameters to represent all developments in ToM, such as ‘people who want an
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X and think they are getting one will be happy’ and ‘people who see that X is
the case know that X is the case’ and in fact all of the generalisations foreseen
in TT. So, maybe several thousand parameters would be needed to explain
the enormous amount of development that occurs in the child’s ToM between
the ages of three and five. ToM(Innate) defenders may respond with a denial
that there are an enormous amount of changes, but not necessarily by denying
that there are any. This would equate to taking the position that a minor
number of changes in the ToM modules could explain the very great changes
in ToM performance, whose existence seems empirically unassailable. Such a
line would therefore involve enormous changes hanging from few parameters,
which seems implausible, especially when one considers the example given of
PRELIEF. The parameter which controls the switch to PRELIEF would also
have to trigger a large number of similar changes, which then appears to have
the account saying that switching this one parameter produces many improve-
ments in ToM simultaneously. This then looks less like a parametrised account
of ToM and more like a general development picture of ToM. In addition, the
account would need to explain how the parameters became switched around
again or disturbed in schizophrenic subjects in a period where they are exhibit-
ing symptoms, since a substantial minority of schizophrenic subjects exhibit
episodic ToM impairments (Short 2015, Ch. 10).
A further problem with the large number of parameters is whether their
use is even consistent with TT. As Scholl and Leslie (1999, p. 144) point
out, Stich and Nichols “defend a modularity view against a ‘theory’ theory
by repeatedly pointing out that a module with enough parameters effectively
reduces to a theory.” This is a slightly strange defence, in that it seems
in fact to point to collapse risk between TT(Innate) —the ‘modularity view’
—and TT(Scientific) —the ‘theory’ theory view. If TT(Innate) is not separate
from TT(Scientific), then it cannot be defended by attacking TT(Scientific).
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However, for our purposes, collapse risk between different sorts of TT is not a
concern. In any case, it does appear that both accounting for development of
ToM by postulating either a large number of parameters, or a large number
of stages of module initiation, represents a significant lack of parsimony16 and
is rather ad hoc. I conclude that TT(Innate) cannot explain the observed
development of ToM without making large number of ad hoc changes which
substantially destroy its parsimony as an account of ToM.17
ST can avoid this developmental objection by suggesting as a first ap-
proximation that the child can simulate in others what it can do itself. That
account is also naturally developmental, but also allows for a less than total
correlation between development of the child’s own mental capacities and its
abilities to simulate those same mental capacities in others because the latter
task is more difficult.
3.3.2 Cannot Explain Default Belief Attribution
Default belief attribution is the process whereby S’s starting point for using
ToM in relation to O is to make predictions on the basis that O has the same
beliefs as S. Default belief attribution seems to occur. This objection claims
that TT(Innate) cannot explain such default belief attribution. The objection
takes the following form.
• P1: If TT(Innate) is the correct account of ToM, there is no default
belief attribution in ToM
• P2: Default belief attribution is a very valuable starting point in ToM
capacities
16On p. 32, I defined unparsimonious as meaning having a large number of working parts.
Here we have something slightly different, in that there are a large number of parameters or
stages.
17Karmiloff-Smith (1998) also suggests that Williams Syndrome data are hard to explain
on TT(Innate) for developmental reasons.
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• P3: If TT(Innate) is the correct account of ToM, ToM capacities do not
avail themselves of a very valuable starting point
• P4: ToM capacities avail themselves of a very valuable starting point
• C: TT(Innate) is not the correct account of ToM
Premise 2 seems very plausible. If S is to predict the beliefs of O, it is very
valuable as a first approximation for S to ascribe to O all of S’s beliefs that are
relevant. It will be impossible for S to predict O’s behaviour without ascribing
any beliefs, while it would also be inefficient for S to explicitly consider what
O’s beliefs are on a case–by-case basis. Since S and O are roughly similar and
inhabit roughly similar worlds, it is a valuable efficiency gain for S to start
from the assumption that all of S’s beliefs are shared by O.
ToM could succeed in many simple cases without going further. Imagine
S is to use ToM to explain the behaviour of O who has just entered the coffee
shop. S can ascribe a desire for coffee to O, since some desire has caused O to
act and that seems like a good candidate. S can ascribe S’s belief that there
is coffee in the coffee shop to O without further ado; S now has a belief/desire
pair to ascribe to O which explain O’s behaviour. Leslie, Friedman, and
German (2004, p. 528) accept premise 2 on behalf of TT(Innate) when they
write: “because people’s mundane beliefs are usually true, the best guess about
another person’s belief is that it is the same as one’s own.”
The difficulty for TT(Innate) will be seen when O has different beliefs to
S. This is a central case in ToM since predicting the behaviour of O’s who
have false beliefs, which are perforce different to those of S in the False Belief
Task paradigm, is the most common experimental test of ToM. S must here
decide which of O’s beliefs are different to S’s and false. It still is an efficient
start point in either the experimental or an everyday setting to ascribe in some
sense all of S’s other beliefs to O, such as ‘I have enough money for coffee’
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and ‘I can safely enter the coffee shop,’ in order to predict O’s behaviour.
Note though in passing how such an approach is much more congenial to ST
than either variant of TT. Both variants of TT would need to solve the Frame
Problem here in order to decide which of O’s ancillary beliefs were relevant
to O’s behaviour whereas on ST these ancillary beliefs can just remain in the
background unless needed, as it were. On ST, S does not need explicitly to
consider whether O believes that it is safe to enter the coffee shop unless there
is a specific reason to do so. ST avoids this default belief attribution objection
because the whole approach under ST is to simulate O as being like S, meaning
that the starting point for S is default belief attribution to O of S’s beliefs.
Premise 4 (the claim that ToM capacities avail themselves of a very valu-
able starting point) seems hard to deny, since its denial entails that ToM
performance is generally poor, which is empirically false. A denial of premise
4 also entails that there is no default belief attribution in ToM, which again
seems contradicted by experience.
Premise 3 can be denied, but one of premise 1 or premise 2 must also be
denied on that route. As discussed above, denying premise 2 is unpromis-
ing and TT(Innate) proponents have not gone down that route. This leaves
the option of denying premises 1 and 3, which means finding a way of allow-
ing TT(Innate) to accommodate default belief attribution. Nichols and Stich
(2003, p. 120) note that Leslie attempts to do this when he writes that the
ToM mechanism “always makes the current situation available as a possible
and even preferred content because (a) the current situation is a truer picture
of the world, and (b) beliefs tend to be true’ .” Note that ‘the current situa-
tion’ is shorthand for a vast amount of data which is to represent a ‘picture
of the world’ as seen by O. All of these data must be available inside the ToM
module; moreover, this picture of the entire world must also be adjusted for
O’s false beliefs or errors in his picture of the world.
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Some observers attempting to deny Premise 1 on behalf of TT(Innate)
might respond to this difficulty by urging that in fact, S only needs the content
of the belief which O would have if O had a true rather than a false belief on
the matter concerning which O has a false belief. This is certainly a more
parsimonious18 line, if it can be made out. One issue with the line will relate
to the individuation criteria for beliefs; does someone who believes a single
proposition also ipso facto believe all of its entailments? Perhaps TT(Innate)
defenders can avoid this potential pitfall by saying that if the entailments are
indeed required, they in some sense come for free. It will still be the case
though that there is a very large number of beliefs inside the ToM module,
which does not sit well with encapsulation. As I will now outline, TT(Innate)
defenders have not in fact taken this line, which I believe is telling.
In sum, not only is this account immensely unparsimonious as an expla-
nation of ToM, but there is also a fundamental conflict between this idea and
the advertised Fodorian nature of the modules proposed in TT(Innate). The
conflict flows from the aforementioned fact that “an essential characteristic
of modules is that they are informationally encapsulated” (Nichols and Stich
2003, p. 120). So how can ‘the current situation’ be made available to an en-
capsulated module? Indeed, “a cognitive system that has unrestricted access
to all of the mindreader’s beliefs would be a paradigm case of a non-modular
system” (Nichols and Stich 2003, p. 121). The TT(Innate) proponents at-
tempt to respond to this serious objection by introducing a new item, called a
‘Selection Processor’ (SP) which is to handle inhibition of some of the default
beliefs ascribed to O by S. This is unmotivated, but worse, Leslie, Friedman,
and German (2004, p. 532) ask the speculative question as to whether “SP,
and not ToMM, [could] be the source of the true-belief default? SP is a non-
18Here, again in slight contrast with the definition of parsimony I gave on p. 32, lack of
parsimony means fewer beliefs rather than fewer moving parts.
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modular, penetrable mechanism.”19 This introduction of a non-modular item
to TT(Innate) loses parsimony20 and makes the TT(Innate) account incoher-
ent. If a closed module must communicate with a non-closed module, in what
way is the system still modular and encapsulated?
I conclude that TT(Innate) does not have an adequate response to the
default belief attribution objection.
3.3.3 Cannot Parsimoniously Explain Autism
Some children exhibit a deficit in pretence, meaning that they engage in pre-
tence less often and at a later age than other children. Such a pretence-deficit is
a noted feature of autistic children. Autistic children also exhibit ToM deficits.
This objection claims that TT(Innate) is not a parsimonious21 explanation of
autism because it does not explain both the pretence and ToM deficits seen
in autistic subjects. More widely, as Ruffman et al. (1998, p. 161) point out,
“[n]umerous researchers have suggested that false belief understanding may
be assisted by pretend play.” Such a unified explanation is a consequence of
ST. Formally, the objection is as set out below.
• P1: A major symptom of autistic subjects is a deficit in pretend play
• P2: A major symptom of autistic subjects is a deficit in ToM
• P3: A parsimonious account of ToM must explain both deficits
• P4: TT(Innate) does not explain both deficits
• C: TT(Innate) is not a parsimonious account of ToM
19As mentioned previously, the authors use in their TT(Innate) approach a ‘Theory of
Mind Mechanism,’ or ‘ToMM.’
20Here exactly as specified on p. 32 i.e. too many moving parts.
21Here, the other aspect of the parsimony definition I gave on p. 32 comes to the fore:
with a given number of moving parts, how much explanatory power does an account have?
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This objection is philosophically slightly weaker than the foregoing two, in
that it points to a demerit in TT(Innate) as opposed to a fatal flaw. Neverthe-
less, as Nichols and Stich (2003) correctly observe, the objection constitutes an
embarrassment for TT(Innate) proponents since they focussed on autistic sub-
jects to provide much of their supporting evidence. Nichols and Stich (2003)
also correctly note that proponents of TT(Scientific) have not addressed in de-
tail the topic of autism, and that this is a problem since autistic subjects have
well-known ToM deficits which all plausible accounts of ToM should explain.
ST parsimoniously explains the paired deficits since on ST, S is the model for
O. TT(Innate) proponents could conceivably find another type of evidence to
support their case, but a modular account naturally will find its best support
from paired deficits, involving the claim that a single deficient module ex-
plains both deficits. I will start by laying out the original TT(Innate) account
of autism and then consider the objection in more detail.
The original TT(Innate) account of autism begins from two suggestive
facts about autistic subjects. They engage in pretend play much less and
much later than non-autistic children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985).
They have well-known ToM deficits, passing the False Belief Task much later
than non-autistic children, even when matched for IQ (Baron-Cohen 2001).
These two empirical claims are not disputed and mean that all sides of the
debate accept premises 1 and 2.
Leslie (1987), who is one of the main proponents of TT(Innate) (Leslie,
German, and Happe 1993), (Scholl and Leslie 1999), (Scholl and Leslie 2001),
(Leslie, Friedman, and German 2004), agrees that these two deficits are re-
lated. Nichols and Stich (2003, pp. 128-129) set out the TT(Innate) view
here as follows: “Leslie also maintains that mindreading is central to pretence
and [. . . ] ToMM plays a central role in the capacity for pretence [. . . ] It is
ToMM [. . . ] that does not develop normally in people with autism.” So the
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TT(Innate) view is that the undeveloped ToMM in autistic subjects causes
both the impaired mindreading and the lack of pretend play that is observed.
This is consistent with acceptance of premise 3.
One merit of an account which accepts premise 3 is that it explains why
children spend so much time engaged in pretend play. They pretend that they
are, for example, at a tea party with teddy bears who drink pretend tea and,
it is pretended, enjoy conversation. The children are in fact exercising their
ToM, which brings important social advantages in childhood and later. The
type of exercise involved would be in predicting what teddy might say about
the tea he is enjoying, and how he might later say he has had enough tea and
it is time to go back to the woods etc. All of this is good practice in ToM use
for the children, who we know are in a way predicting the speech and action
of teddy because they are supplying teddy with that pretended speech and
action.
All accounts of pretence must explain quarantining, or the way some propo-
sitions that are held true only within the pretence must be separated from the
general beliefs of the pretending subject. Leslie (1987) terms this ‘decoupling’
and postulates that it is a failure of decoupling that explains both the lack
of pretend play and the ToM deficits of autistic subjects. It would not occur,
for example, that an adult who had been pretending to be at the teddy bears’
tea party would refuse an actual cup of tea later on because they had already
pretended to drink a cup of tea. Leslie (1987) proposes that one of the men-
tal representations underlying the tea party pretence might have the form: I
Pretend ‘this empty cup contains tea.’ So there is a Pretend operator which
operates on an actual object, the empty cup, and applies a special proposition
to it: that it contains tea. The special proposition is special in that its entail-
ments are not to be used to form further beliefs, as they would be normally.
By contrast, if I had already in reality drunk a cup of tea, I would later be
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disposed to assert the proposition ‘I have had a hot drink’ which I would not
be if I had merely pretended to drink a cup of tea.
The central objection of Nichols and Stich (2003) is simulationist in spirit.
It challenges the Pretend operator of Leslie (1987) which they argue plausibly
is too sophisticated for young children to use. As Nichols and Stich (2003,
p. 52) observe, “[f]or Leslie, all episodes of pretence are subserved by rep-
resentations of the form: I PRETEND ‘p.’ Thus, while Leslie would agree
that an agent can have desires and act on them without having the concept
of desire, his theory entails that an agent cannot engage in pretence without
having the concept of pretence.” Recall again that children as young as four
(Wimmer and Perner 1983) are competent ascribing false beliefs; and other
evidence suggests that those as young as 15 months are competent as well
(Onishi and Baillargeon 2005). Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 51) write that
“the pretence could proceed perfectly well even if the subject did not have the
concept of pretence.” This is the crux of my argument against the account of
Leslie (1987) of the relation between pretence and false belief in autism.
So the line of Nichols and Stich (2003) is similar to the simulationist one
that S does not need the concept BELIEF in order to have beliefs and requiring
the former as well as the latter to explain young children’s ToM capacities is to
require too much. There are lines on which concepts are innate (Fodor 2008),
(Carey 2009) which allow TT(Innate) defenders to hold that 15-month olds
have concepts like PRETEND. This in fact is the line taken by TT(Innate) de-
fenders. Scholl and Leslie (1999, p. 147) write that their ToMM “incorporates
innate notions/concepts of propositional attitudes such as BELIEF and PRE-
TENCE, and makes them available to a child before general problem-solving
resources have fully developed.” It is safe to say that the line that concepts
are innate is highly controversial.
An alternative formulation of the dialectic here would run as follows. Leslie
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(1987) argues that both passing the False Belief Task and engaging in pretence
both require a mental operation involving representing a non-true proposition.
That mental operation is termed ‘decoupling’ by Leslie (1987). Therefore they
could both be impaired by such an inability to represent a non-true proposi-
tion. Nichols and Stich (2003) then argue that pretence does not obviously
involve representing a non-true proposition. Leslie (1987) can then say that
this is not an objection to his view since he never said it was obvious. Ob-
servers taking this line will likely think that Leslie (1987) does have a candidate
explanation of the link between pretence and passing the False Belief Task;
although Nichols and Stich (2003) show that this candidate explanation relies
on a non-obvious premise, this does not mean that the candidate explanation
is incorrect or that TT(Innate) cannot explain links between pretence and the
False Belief Task. One issue with this line is the difficulty explaining, as is
admitted by Leslie (1987), the developmental lag. Two-year-old children can
pretend but only four-year-old children can pass the conventional False Belief
Task (this might be an occasion where the results of Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005) are of assistance to TT, but again, there are theoretical costs associated
with taking that nativist line).22
ST can explain links between pretend play and ToM. It can simply say that
autistic subjects who are less able to supply pretend dialogue for teddy are
by the same token less able to imaginatively project themselves into teddy’s
position or anyone else’s. Since that is exactly what ToM requires on the
simulationist account, it is unsurprising that autistic subjects exhibit ToM
deficits.
22A final further problem for TT(Innate) is the lack of supporting data; in the assessment of
an experimentalist, there is “presently little specific evidence” for modular accounts (Doherty
2008, p. 5).
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3.4 Conclusion
There are severe objections to both TT(Scientific) and TT(Innate). TT pro-
ponents in the psychological literature do not escape these difficulties by the
expedient of not spelling out to which account they cleave. Since both of the
pure accounts have been found wanting, the next step is to consider whether
hybrid accounts involving mixtures of capacities can improve the position for
TT.
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Chapter 4
Objections To Hybrid
Accounts
4.1 Introduction
Given the severity of objections set out above to pure TT(Scientific) and pure
TT(Innate), TT proponents may attempt to add resources to their position
by considering hybrid accounts of two sorts. The hybridity may be within TT
itself, or may involve the addition of some simulation capacities as well. The
first option involves what I will term Theoretical Hybrid accounts. The idea
would be that such a combined account could perhaps avoid some of the severe
objections I raised against TT(Scientific) and then TT(Innate) separately.
In §4.2, I will examine which of the objections raised against TT(Scientific)
and TT(Innate) separately may be avoided in this way. I will conclude that
while this does enable some progress to be made, severe objections remain
unaddressed and the account has become considerably more unparsimonious
– it has many more moving parts, as I specified in the original definition of
parsimony on p. 32. These sorts of account should therefore not be preferred
to a more parsimonious account of the sort I will later be proposing.
113
114 CHAPTER 4. OBJECTIONS TO HYBRID ACCOUNTS
I understand Strong S/T Hybridism and Weak S/T Hybridism as below.
• Strong S/T Hybridism: ToM use involves significant application of
both theory and simulation.
• Weak S/T Hybridism: ToM use involves application of both theory
and simulation, but the role of theory is extremely limited.1
The Weak S/T Hybridist account is the one I will defend; the Strong
Hybrid account is the mainstream one favoured by Saxe and many other com-
mentators. They vary in the amount of significance they allow to either theory
or simulation, but all allot major involvement to each. As I will argue below,
this raises interaction problems which a Weak S/T Hybridist account avoids.
Since we now have rather a lot of terminology referring to various accounts
of ToM, I provide fig. 4.1 below for illustrative purposes. For simplicity, I do
not show all ST versions. I also show the one example of a Theoretical Hybrid
which is possible with two variants of TT and one example of the several
possible S/T Hybrids, which could be either Strong or Weak.
As is by now clear, my sympathies lie very much with ST. Yet there is rea-
son to avoid a completely pure ST account. The reason is that it seems clear
that there are occasions when S explicitly reasons about the mental states of
O and do so in order to predict and explain O’s behaviour. There are some
occasions when I explicitly ask myself why O has gone into the coffee shop.
Perhaps I know that O dislikes coffee and therefore infer that O is meeting
someone in the coffee shop and will drink something else. It would be unap-
pealing to deny that this type of reasoning occurs, and it also looks difficult
to deny that it is theoretical. Even if it is not theoretical, assimilating it to
simulation would require argument. There might be scope to deny that this
1One might also term an account which was almost entirely theoretical with minor simu-
lation elements a Weak S/T Hybrid account, but I of course do not favour such an account
and neither does anyone else in the literature.
4.1. INTRODUCTION 115
Theory of Mind
Theory Theory Simulation Theory
TT(Scientific)
TT(Innate)
Theoretical Hybrids
ST(Replication)
ST(Transformation)
ST(3)
ST(4) etc.
S/T Hybrids
Figure 4.1: Types Of ToM Hybrids
type of activity forms part of ToM. One way to do that might be to stipulate
that all ToM use is sub-personal and non-explicit. On reflection, this is also
unappealing, being rather unmotivated and also excluding processes from ToM
that look very much like ways to predict and explain the behaviour of others.
For these reasons, I embrace Weak S/T Hybridism rather than the concep-
tually adjacent pure ST account. Weak S/T Hybridism allows that explicit
reasoning processes of the type outlined above do in fact occur, they do form
part of ToM and they are theoretical. This however is the only concession that
Weak S/T Hybridism makes to TT; there are no other occasions when theo-
retical activity is a part of ToM other than these rare occurrences of explicit
step-by-step reasoning. This bridgehead falls far short of the amount of the-
oretical activity envisaged by the mainstream Strong S/T Hybridist account
and does not require an account of the interaction between the theoretical and
simulation elements. It simply allows that sometimes S uses explicit reasoning
purposes as described but does not see any interaction problem between the
use of those processes and the vast bulk of ToM activity which is processed
by simulation.
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We have already seen that TT comes in two major variants: TT(Scientific)
and TT(Innate). I will press the three major objections to each of those
accounts. Saxe responds to the difficulties raised in the previous chapter for
ST by urging the merits of the third option beyond pure TT and pure ST:
a Strong S/T Hybrid account of ToM in which both theory and simulation
play a major role. Such a Strong S/T Hybridist account is the mainstream
view in psychology. Strong S/T Hybridist accounts, since they involve TT,
inherit either the three objections to TT(Scientific) or the three objections to
TT(Innate). Beyond that, Strong S/T Hybridist accounts are prone to further
unique objections, because any successful Strong S/T Hybridist account must
also describe how the two parts of ToM are to work together. Weak S/T Hybrid
accounts need not do this. I will therefore close this chapter by considering a
further three objections unique to Strong S/T Hybrid accounts.
In §4.3, I will cover two objections to the Strong S/T Hybridist accounts
favoured by Saxe and others. We see that her position is Strong S/T Hybridism
when she writes that “to conclude that a na¨ıve theory of mind, and some
capacity to simulate, interact” is a “better option” than the idea that “in
some contexts, [S] is a pure simulator, whereas in other contexts [S] uses pure
theory” (Saxe 2005a, p. 175).
All successful Strong S/T Hybridist accounts must specify how the two
elements of ToM are to interact. To provide such specifications, Saxe (2005a)
appeals to two Strong S/T Hybridist approaches in the literature, referred to
by the terms ‘which tool when?’ and ‘perspective taking.’ I will be raising
objections to both specifications, primarily on the grounds that setting out in
detail how they would work would involve immense complexity. Indeed, as set
out it seems that they are grossly underspecified; prospects of finding such a
full specification are in my view slim. It will be clear I think from a description
of how the interaction is supposed to work in even simple cases that a Strong
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S/T Hybridist account of ToM would require a great deal of rule setting and
caveating.
In view of all of the objections raised in this chapter and the previous one,
I will conclude in §4.4 that the merits of the almost pure ST account I term
Weak S/T Hybridism deserve reconsideration, since the array of objections to
all of the alternatives appear insuperable.
4.2 Objections To Theoretical Hybrids
Faced with the above objections, TT proponents might aim to respond by con-
sidering whether a Theoretical Hybrid account is an improvement. Although
the account would be less parsimonious, perhaps TT(Innate) can meet the
objections that TT(Scientific) could not, and vice versa, leading to an account
which overall handles all the objections. Saxe (2005a, p. 174) gestures tenta-
tively at such a possibility when she writes that a “lay theory of psychology
[. . . ] could be constructed (possibly over a scaffold of innate concepts) from
observation, inference and instruction.” The “observation and inference” is
TT(Scientific) while the mention of “possibly innate” concepts points in the
direction of TT(Innate). It might be possible to construct an account of con-
cepts and ToM such that concepts are innate but that ToM is not, but it
seems more likely that they would both be innate, since at least mental state
concepts such as BELIEF and DESIRE are so central to ToM on most views.
Saxe’s gesture to innate concepts is likely aimed at Carey (2009) who puts
forward an account based on innate concepts which can be considered as a
Theoretical Hybrid account of ToM.
I will in this section examine each of the six objections to TT(Scientific) and
TT(Innate) mentioned above from this new Theoretical Hybrid perspective.
I will conclude that three can be met by a Theoretical Hybrid account and
three cannot. I will cover the ones that can be met first and the ones that
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cannot be met second. It will of course still be the case that the account is less
parsimonious than either of the pure TT accounts, since it has more moving
parts and their interaction will need to be specified.
4.2.1 Objections Avoided By Theoretical Hybrids
Too Complex And Too Difficult (cf. §3.2.1)
Theoretical Hybrid accounts can reduce the force of this objection by pointing
to the innate components of the account. Since these do not need to be learned,
it is not a problem that the generalisations in that part of the ToM machinery
are complex or difficult. Naturally the account would be committed to quite
a heavy weighting of TT(Innate) in the mix in order to reduce the complexity
significantly – which is not a problem for the account.
Entails Inexplicable Convergence (cf. §3.2.3)
Theoretical Hybrid accounts can reduce the force of this objection by appealing
to some common genetic or other basis to TT(Innate). Proponents of the view
could then make the reasonable assumption that the evolutionary environment
has selected for fairly similar ToM capacities across cultures. As above, the
account would again be committed to quite a heavy weighting of TT(Innate)
in order to counter this objection.
Cannot Explain Development (cf. §3.3.1)
Theoretical Hybrid accounts can avoid this objection in one new way.
TT(Scientific) is naturally developmental by definition, so adding it to
TT(Innate) could in principle make the whole developmental. It would
need to be explained how the two elements fit together. Secondly, while
there are, as discussed above, some difficulties in providing a mechanism for
modules to develop, TT(Innate) proponents can again take the viable albeit
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controversial route of Bloom and German (2000) and deny that the False
Belief Task measures ToM capacities. That second escape route is available
to TT(Innate) alone, so it is not strictly speaking an additional benefit of
theoretical hybridity.
4.2.2 Objections Not Avoided By Theoretical Hybrids
Cannot Explain Default Belief Attribution (cf. §3.3.2)
This objection which was raised to TT(Innate) seems to still apply in perhaps
slightly less virulent form to TT(Scientific). The particular problem with de-
fault belief attribution for TT(Innate) was that it was difficult to square a
modular and informationally encapsulated ToM with the apparent need to
access the entirety of S’s belief set as the default belief set for O. This objec-
tion continues to apply to the TT(Innate) component of a Theoretical Hybrid
account. While TT(Scientific) is not described as modular and encapsulated
by its proponents – which might lead us to ask how coherent it is to har-
ness a modular and non-modular ToM system together – it also does not look
highly parsimonious in this connection. S would need to apply a generalisation
similar to ‘If S believes X then O believes X unless there is reason to think
otherwise.’ This could scarcely be applied to the entire belief set of S within
any reasonable efficiency constraint. So a selection of S’s beliefs must be cho-
sen to ascribe to O. They must be the relevant ones for the action prediction
at issue, which runs straight into the Frame Problem again.
Requires Solving The Frame Problem (cf. §3.2.2)
Adding TT(Innate) to the TT(Scientific) element of the account does nothing
to assist with this objection. Whether a generalisation arises from observation
or is innate does not change the fact that it must key off relevant factors only.
We might equivalently say that the Frame Problem objection applies equally
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to TT(Innate) as to TT(Scientific). Practically speaking, humans solve the
Frame Problem somehow but theorists do not know how humans do it and so
cannot axiomatise the solution. Suggesting otherwise involves presupposing
that there is a definable solution. Also, it is a very strong assumption that
there is an innate solution to the Frame Problem, which is a much stronger
assumption than that humans can solve the Frame Problem. Humans cannot
have an innate theory of a solution that even today no cognitive scientist can
specify.
ST accounts sidestep this objection simply because on the ST account, S
can just use whatever method S uses in his own case to solve it in the case of
O. Similarly, the Weak S/T Hybrid account which I favour is immune to the
objection. As I specified on p. 114, the Weak S/T Hybrid account is pure ST
with a carve-out to allow for some occasions when S explicitly reasons about
the mental states of O in order to predict the behaviour of O. Similarly to the
case with the response I briefly sketched in the previous paragraph, the Weak
S/T Hybrid account can simply appeal to whatever mechanism allows us to
perform deductive reasoning without considering irrelevant factors.
Cannot Parsimoniously Explain Autism (cf. §3.3.3)
As is suggested by the fact that Nichols and Stich (2003) employ this objec-
tion in order to favour ST as opposed to TT(Innate), it is unclear how adding
TT(Scientific) to TT(Innate) would be of assistance to Theoretical Hybridists
seeking to respond to this objection. If the Pretend operator is too sophisti-
cated for young children to have specified innately, is it not even more likely to
be too sophisticated for the same young children to have derived scientifically?
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4.2.3 Interim Conclusion
I conclude that there remain objections that have not been solved by any
version of TT. I will now move on to consider the question as to whether those
problems can be dealt with by moving to Strong S/T Hybridist accounts i.e.
whether adding simulation into a pure theoretical account is of assistance to
TT proponents.
4.3 Objections To Strong S/T Hybrid Accounts
I will in this section raise further objections to Strong S/T Hybridist accounts.
This does not imply that I believe that Strong S/T Hybrids are immune to
the earlier objections. To take one example, Strong S/T Hybrids will still
be in difficulty with the Frame Problem, since adding ST to TT(Innate) or
TT(Scientific) does not mean that the generalisations in the TT elements of
the ToM machinery can avoid the need to specify a solution to the Frame
Problem within those generalisations that remain.
Saxe appeals to two Strong S/T Hybrid accounts. I lack space to consider
triple hybrids not cited by Saxe (2005a). Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 60)
propose a “highly eclectic account” which “includes processes that fit with
[TT(Scientific)], [TT(Innate)], and [ST] as well as processes that do not have
any clear parallel.” Also, Slaughter and Gopnik (1996, p. 2986) write that “it
seems likely that maturation, simulation, and theory formation all contribute
to our intuitive psychological understanding.” Such accounts it seems to me
will be maximally complex and unparsimonious and inherit the bulk of the
objections to the separate accounts as well as the interaction problems I am
about to outline. Basically, I will object that the accounts are too complex and
too unparsimonious; especially when one asks how the interactions between
simulation and theory will be prescribed. These factors are exacerbated by the
involvement of theory, since it seems that the only way of handling conflict
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of generalisations in theoretical systems will be more generalisations. This
threatens to result in a requirement for an unlimited number of generalisations
and also raises the Frame Problem again at each new meta-level. The first
Strong S/T Hybridist account to which Saxe appeals addresses the question
of ‘which tool when?’ and the second deals with ‘perspective taking.’2 I will
also be suggesting that ST avoids all of the complexity and lack of parsimony
but can still explain the observed ToM performance.
The problem of ‘which tool when?’ arises in all Strong S/T Hybridist
accounts which involve simulation and theory. The question is, when does
ToM use involve simulation and when does it involve theory? Saxe cites Ames
(2005) in order to make use of its account of ‘which tool when?.’ My primary
objection here is similar to the excessive complexity and lack of parsimony one
that I have previously levelled at pure TT accounts. The position in terms of
complexity and parsimony is made much worse even than in the case of pure
TT accounts because there need to be many more moving parts to handle
the interaction. I will be suggesting that no reasonably parsimonious account
including such interactions can be given. The problem cannot be avoided by
prescribing a Strong Hybrid Non-Interactionist account because there would
still have to be extra rules setting out how interaction was to be avoided;
presumably by setting out specific areas of sole competence for simulation and
theory. The Weak S/T Hybridism I favour must also do this, but can do so
simply by adopting a minor carve-out for the explicit reasoning about mental
states discussed above. Everything else is simulation.
On perspective taking, Saxe cites Epley et al. (2004). My objection here
is once again the excessive complexity and lack of parsimony one, leading as
above to difficulties in setting out how the different elements interact. I will
suggest that the account is under-specified and replete with caveats. Removing
2For other objections and responses, see: Goldman and Sebanz (2005); Saxe (2005d);
Gordon (2005); Saxe (2005c); J. P. Mitchell (2005); Saxe (2005b).
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those caveats, were that possible, would leave one with a dramatically unpar-
simonious account of ToM, especially if the removal were done on a TT-basis.
In both contexts, I will suggest that pure ST (or rather Weak S/T Hybridism)
can handle the situation more straightforwardly. The problem throughout will
be that all TT-approaches result in a metaphorical ‘explosion of rules’ with
more and more rules needed to handle the rules. We would have an exponen-
tially complex situation arising from such a need to have rules controlling the
application of rules. Indeed, it seems as though there is no limit to the number
of rules handling rules (and further rules handling those?) These will need to
be specified by the account if it is to succeed in laying out a full and adequate
set of generalisations which on the TT or Strong S/T Hybridist views underlie
ToM.
4.3.1 Which Tool When?
On the Strong S/T Hybridist account proposed by Ames (2005), both theoret-
ical and simulational activity form part of ToM capacity. Ames recognises four
routes to mental state inference. I will set out the routes with a view to giving
the account a fair hearing, but also of showing how it is extremely complex
even as set out so far; it would not become simpler if extended to increase
its explanatory power. Also, we want to know when the four routes are em-
ployed, whether they collaborate or compete, and whether such intra-account
interaction is prescribed by further generalisations.
The four routes to mental state inference are as set out in Table 4.1. The
first two routes fall into the category of ‘evidence-based strategies,’ which are
the theoretical elements of the approach, though the second route appears to
have simulational elements. The second two routes are called ‘extra-target
strategies.’ ‘Extra-target’ means S is to use his own non-evidential resources
to infer the mental states of O. The first of these, projection, is simulational.
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ToM In Use Source of Data Use of Data
1. TT behaviours in context attribution of men-
tal states
2. TT/ST emotional displays emotion perception
3. ST S’s own mental states projection
4. TT stereotypes stereotyping
Table 4.1: Ames’s Four Routes To Mental State Inference
The fourth route appears to be mostly theoretical.
We know that the first ‘evidence-based strategy,’ Route 1, is theoretical
since “perceivers readily work from the visible evidence of human behaviour
to posit invisible underlying mental states” (Ames 2005, p. 159). The mental
states of O that are posited by S are theoretical entities because they cannot
be directly observed. As an example of Route 1, Ames (2005, p. 159) gives “a
grabbing hand entails wanting,” which is the theoretical generalisation here.
Whenever S observes the hand of O making a grabbing motion towards object
X, then S is apt to ascribe to O the mental state of wanting X. Ames notes
evidence that even six-month old infants seem to apply this generalisation.
The ST account replacing Route 1 would be that when S sees the grabbing
hand of O, this may be combined with the simulational output akin to ‘when
my hand grabs, I want something’ to ascribe the wanting to O. This would be
another process analogous to that postulated in the Motor Theory of Speech
Perception discussed above on p. 34.
The second ‘evidence-based strategy,’ Route 2, is also theoretical. A sam-
ple generalisation is “a person beams when proud of her work” (Ames 2005, p.
160). So when O beams, S uses ‘emotional perception’ to observe the beaming
and interpret it, and S then attributes the emotion of pride to O based on the
beaming. We may assume that ‘emotional perception’ involves simulation,
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as outlined by some ST proponents (Gallese and Goldman 1998), (Goldman
and Sebanz 2005), absent specification of generalisations keying off descrip-
tions of facial expressions. The simulationist explanation is that S recruits his
emotional display production mechanisms in the service of emotional recogni-
tion. Since simulation is now a component of Route 2, then Ames’s account
must provide a specification of whether there is interaction between theory
and simulation and how the interaction works within Route 2. I contend that
no parsimonious3 specification thereof can be given, since it would involve
generalisations adjudicating the application of generalisations, and a version
of the Frame Problem would occur.
The ST account replacing Route 2 would be straightforward pure simula-
tion. S simulates being proud of his work and finds that beaming is sometimes
a consequence of such pride. Therefore if S observes O beaming, ascription of
pride to O becomes one of the outputs. There are of course other reasons why
O may be beaming, and so S may make a simulation error here. However,
such an error does not add any traction in the TT vs ST debate since applica-
tion of the generalisation is equally error-prone. If the generalisation is read
as ‘O beams if and only if O is proud of his work’ then the account would,
implausibly, be denying that O could beam for any other reason than pride. If
the generalisation is weakened, to read ‘sometimes O beams when O is proud
of his work,’ then it becomes true but loses predictive power. How will this
account provide generalisations to handle cases when people are beaming be-
cause they are happy, or intoxicated, or enamoured? ST here merely accesses
contextually plausible emotions which can result in beaming; these become
candidates for ascription to O.
Route 3 is an ‘extra-target strategy’ involving projection. S “assumes [O]
has the same mental states that he or she has or would have” (Ames 2005, p.
3Here, lack of parsimony means too many generalisations, which can I think be counted
as moving parts.
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163). The example Ames (2005, p. 159) gives here is “I’d be embarrassed if
I were in your shoes.” For example, if S sees O raise his hand in a seminar
and then forget the question, S might think that had he done that, he would
be embarrassed and therefore ascribes embarrassment to O. This looks as
though it has some simulation elements, at least, though below I will raise
the question as to whether the processes involved may be both simulation
and theoretical. Naturally, the major objection to the entire Ames account
continues to be how the simulation described in Route 3 interacts with the
theoretical elements within itself, and with those in the first two routes, and
what parsimonious description of these interactions can be given.
Route 4 is an ‘extra-target strategy’ involving stereotyping. This means
the rather lazy prediction of the type that when S is using ToM in relation to
an O who is Canadian, S assumes that this O “loves playing hockey” (Ames
2005, p. 163). There is no prospect that such generalisations are innate, so
they can only be learned. This raises the difficulty that there will be a very
large number of such generalisations and very often they will be wrong. So how
are they learned? In any case, we can see that stereotyping is not regarded by
the mainstream as a component of ToM since, as Ames (2005, p. 163) notes,
“stereotyping has been almost entirely ignored” by ToM scholars.
Recall that Ames (2005, p. 159) offers “I’d be embarrassed if I were in your
shoes” as a generalisation ascribing embarrassment. The question arises as to
whether this ascription is theoretical or simulational. Such an ‘embarrass-
ment’ generalisation is a good candidate for the sort of simulation-generated
regularities that in ST replaces the body of generalisations needed by TT.
Imagine that the embarrassing situation in question is raising one’s hand to
ask a question in a seminar and finding one has forgotten the question. S’s will
all predict that O’s doing this will feel embarrassed. On TT, that prediction
arises because S has a theoretical generalisation which states: ‘O’s who raise
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their hand in a seminar to ask a question and then forget what it is will be em-
barrassed.’ On ST, the account is simpler. S merely inputs the pretend belief
‘I have just raised my hand to ask a question and forgotten what it is; how do
I feel?’ and produces the output ‘embarrassed.’4 The fact that the simulation
produces the same result every time and could thus merely be described as
generalisation-like does not mean that a generalisation was used: to make such
a claim would once again set the bar too low for TT proponents. So we might
be unable to know whether embarrassment prediction is simulation or theo-
retical on any given instance of prediction, because the observable inputs and
outputs might be identical in different instances even though different mixes
of simulation and theory were used. This makes providing a specification of
interaction difficult for Ames, or at least makes it difficult for empirical results
to shore up such a specification by showing whether simulation or theory was
used.
Non-interactionist accounts like Weak S/T Hybridism avoid this difficulty
by avoiding any need to specify how simulation and theory work together.
I agree that when S explicitly runs through a sequence of arguments like “O
wants X, O believes that O will get X if O does Y, O will do Y,” this cannot be
simulation. The reason though that such an account does not need to specify
interactions is that this explicit standalone theoretical reasoning is as it were
isolated and epiphenomenal. It does not communicate with any simulation
outputs; if there are any produced subconsciously on the same question, they
are superseded. So since there is no interaction, the account does not need to
specify any interaction.
4It might be objected here that surely one has to actually ascribe the embarrassment
and not merely feel it, which makes the ST account less simple. Firstly, as I mentioned
above, at least the ST account of Gordon (1995a) does not really have to handle mental
state ascriptions since it remains on the level of action prediction. Secondly, is it really a
significant additional complexity to target the output on O?
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The question arises here as to whether there is an implicit parallel of this
explicit reasoning. If there is, the further question is whether this carve-out
should extend to such an implicit parallel of the explicit reasoning. The ar-
gument for this is that there are many cases where it seems that explicit
sequences of reasoning have implicit parallels. This could look something like
arriving instantaneously at ‘Socrates is mortal’ without having any staged phe-
nomenology representing each premise in the famous syllogism. The argument
against is dialectical; I wish my account to be plausible without conceding so
much ground to theory that interactions must be specified or worse, that my
account becomes a Strong S/T Hybrid. I think the best way to thread this nee-
dle is as follows. My account can claim that the existence of implicit reasoning
parallel to the explicit reasoning is consistent with simulation; this theoret-
ical reasoning is not playing an explanatory role. So Weak S/T Hybridism
claims that simulational capacities alone provide a sufficient understanding of
other minds and behaviour predictions. The nature of the body of knowledge
employed in ToM is decisive in the question as to whether ToM reasoning is
theoretical or simulational. Weak S/T Hybridism denies that that body of
knowledge is theoretical; the ‘body of knowledge’ is simulational even if there
is theoretical reasoning going on. (Under ST, one might say that there is no
‘body of knowledge’ since the answers to ToM questions are generated on the
fly.) Simulation always runs in the background so if there is in additional
theoretical reasoning, it is epiphenomenal; it is not part of the answer as to
how S arrives at ToM predictions in general.
Can the emotions be formalised? Consider again the generalisation to the
effect that ‘O’s who blush are embarrassed.’ Under TT, an implicit formali-
sation of the emotions and clear statements of when they are in play would
be needed, in order to call the right generalisations into operation. However,
problems for such an approach include, for example, serious difficulties in dis-
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tinguishing shame from embarrassment (Zahavi 2010) and identifying what
embarrassment is and when it occurs (Purshouse 2001). ST avoids this type
of problem since S’s know when they are likely to be embarrassed or ashamed
even if they cannot give formal definitions of those emotions or state precisely
in which circumstances they will likely be felt and which not. The vague de-
lineation of S’s dispositional emotional landscape is paralleled by that of O,
giving S some chance of being able to make a prediction of O’s emotions.
Further complexity arises for Ames in terms of the interaction of mental
state ascription and affect ascription, and the time profile of this interaction.
Ames notes that we may forgive someone who has, for example, spilt wine
on a white carpet, if they exhibit appropriate remorse. The generalisation is
“[a]ffect qualifies behaviour in the near term: perceived remorseful affect can
lead to ascriptions of good intent to harm-doers in the short run, but repeated
harm drives long run ascriptions of bad intent” (Ames 2005, p. 162). This
makes clear the difficulties of providing simple generalisations, but the very
name Ames gives his generalisation is telling: he calls it a ‘contingency.’ Now,
a contingent event is one which is not certain but perhaps probable, and in
this sense of contingency, Ames means to refer to something aiming to provide
for the contingent event, should it occur. This again brings out the complexity
of generalisations problem for TT discussed above. Further complexity may
be seen in the description offered by Ames (2005, p. 162) of the inputs: they
include “behaviour [and] arcs of behaviour over time and across situations”
while “affective displays may augment or discount behaviours” and that last
factor also has a changing profile of effects over time. The ST account here is
rather more simple: S poses the question ‘what were my intentions?’ under the
circumstances of having acted as O has. S can then ascribe those intentions
to O and assess whether O is to be forgiven or not.
Another problem for generalisation-based accounts of ToM will be deciding
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which generalisation to apply to whom without succumbing to circularity.
Ames (2005, p. 159) gives a further example of stereotyping: “Jocks hate
romantic comedies.” We now have the question though: ‘who is a jock?’ i.e.
to which O should S apply the generalisation in order to predict that O does
not like romantic comedies? The answer had better not be ‘anyone who does
not like romantic comedies is a jock’ or the generalisation has become circular.
But there are similar risks involved in the other candidate characteristics.
The chain ‘jocks like beer;’ ‘who is a jock?;’ ‘everyone who likes beer is a
jock’ is vacuous and so are all the other candidate characteristics. These
problems are familiar in philosophy in the form of ‘how do we identify what falls
under a concept?,’ to which question none of the available candidate answers
—including ‘concepts as prototypes’ or stereotypes —seems workable.5 This
type of problem is avoided by ST because it does not have any generalisations.
A similarity generalisation is proposed by Ames to decide whether a projec-
tion (Route 3) or stereotyping (Route 4) approach will be used in a particular
use of ToM. Ames (2005, p. 160) writes that “perceptions of general similarity
guide a trade-off between projection (ascribing [S’s] own beliefs and desires to
O’s) and stereotyping.” So the idea is that if S thinks O is like S, then S will
simply simulate O on the model of S. That approach will not be used if S
perceives a gross dissimilarity between S and O. If, for example, S perceives
O as a jock and S himself as not a jock, S will use stereotyping to predict the
behaviour of O. The similarity generalisation is again described as a second
‘contingency’ (Ames 2005, p. 164) so we have further multiple branches of
conditionality. Ames (2005, p. 165) summarises the research as showing that
often, “projection and stereotyping function as alternative strategies that dis-
place each other” which brings out a question deriving from Saxe’s citation of
5There is an enormous philosophical literature on concepts and what falls under them,
which is a measure of the difficulty of the problem. See Wittgenstein (2001), Fodor (1994),
Fodor and Lepore (1996), Crane (2003).
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this paper as an illustration of a purportedly superior Strong S/T Hybridist
theory. The superiority might come from the two elements working together
—i.e. at the same time on the same question —to provide a superior answer
to a ToM question, where a superior answer is presumably a more accurate
one. The other possibility though is that the interaction takes the form of a
division of labour. Some questions may be best answered by simulation and
others may be best answered by theory. The superiority may devolve from an
apposite selection of methods rather than the application of both. It may be
a stretch to call this a Strong S/T Hybridist Interactionist theory, but it still
seems possible. However —what decides which approach is used if S has both
routes open?
Handling this division is complex; all four possible routes to mental state
inferences proposed in Ames’s diagram must be accommodated coherently
in the interactionist account of ToM it proposed is to be successful. Ames
(2005, p. 166) offers a third contingency to do this, as follows. “Cumula-
tive behavioural evidence supersedes extra-target strategies: projection and
stereotyping will drive mindreading when behavioural evidence is ambiguous,
but as apparent evidence accumulates, inductive judgements will dominate.”
From our perspective, this means that before there is a sufficient weight of
behavioural evidence, some mix of projection and stereotyping —i.e. some
mix of simulation and theory —will prevail, but after that, the behavioural
evidence will prevail. So we have a complex time development of interactions
to handle as well.
We also need to know what mix of simulation/projection and stereotyp-
ing/theory operates in the initial stage. Empirically, it seems that stereotyping
is “a default or initial stage of judgement” (Ames 2005, p. 166). This means
that S will make stereotypical predictions about O until S has sufficient ob-
servations of O to make a less stereotyped prediction. Other accounts though,
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take the opposite line. Ames (2005, p. 166) mentions one view on which
“[w]hen the responses of [O’s] are not known, [S’s] project their own as a first
bet.” That account leads on to the Epley et al. (2004) perspective-taking ac-
count to be discussed in the next section, where S predicts O’s behaviour by
using S’s own projected behaviour as a starting point to be adjusted for O to
produce the prediction. That then looks like a simulation starting point with
a theoretical adjustment. Ames (2005, p. 166) cites research intended to show
that “time pressure may reduce these adjustments while accuracy incentives
may increase them.” This gives us a view of how simulation becomes more
prominent in the mix of approaches used in ToM as time goes on. It looks like
we have a simulation/theory mix with time pressure increasing the amount of
simulation to be expected, or perhaps the probability that the prediction made
by ToM will reflect the quick, simulation answer, while accuracy incentives will
decrease the probability or weighting of simulation in the final answer. We
will now want to know whether this works for some stereotypes or all of them,
and whether an S who has overcome stereotyping in relation to one group of
O’s will be more likely to do so in respect of other O’s for the ascription of the
same and different mental states. This account is highly complex; the com-
plexity is further increased by Ames’s lengthy and diverse list of items that
may boost or inhibit consideration of behavioural evidence viz. “interaction
goals [. . . ] self-relevancy [. . . ] cognitive load [. . . ] time constraints [. . . ] social
power” (Ames 2005, p. 168). Do these items also interact with each other?
We might further think that stereotypes themselves can evolve, which would
also need to be described by the account.
In conclusion, the Ames account of ‘which tool when?’ is extremely com-
plex and specifying generalisations for its application will invariably result
in a highly non-parsimonious account of ToM. The generalisations needed to
specify the interaction between the various elements will add further complex-
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ity. ST avoids all of this complexity and thus also avoids the need for any
interactions to be specified.
4.3.2 Perspective Taking
I will again be suggesting that the generalisations-based approach involved in
Strong S/T Hybridist accounts which include TT means the account of ToM
succumbs to excessive complexity and lack of parsimony leading to interaction
problems, and that simulational accounts explain the data more simply. Here
I am using the original definition of parsimony given on p. 32, whereby a
parsimonious account combines few moving parts with a significant amount of
explanatory power. On this parameter, I will suggest that Weak S/T Hybridist
accounts perform better than Strong S/T Hybridist accounts.6
Epley et al. (2004, p. 328) argue for an ‘anchoring and adjustment’ ToM
paradigm which “simplifies the complicated assessment of another’s perspec-
tive by substituting one’s own perception and adjusting as needed.” The first
element, the substitution, is simulation because S uses S’s own perspective
as his starting point for predicting O’s perspective. The adjustment is then
added by theoretical means on this interactionist Strong S/T Hybridist ac-
count. This model “is therefore most likely to be engaged when one’s own
perspective is readily accessible but another’s perspective must be inferred”
(Epley et al. 2004, p. 328). On this account, the model is not invariably en-
gaged, and thus we are entitled to ask when and why on the occasions when
it is. Are there generalisations to specify when it is engaged and when not?
Epley et al. (2004) investigated understanding of ambiguous messages
which could be interpreted as sarcastic or not. For example, one message
6While I also believe that this means that Strong S/T Hybridist accounts are more com-
plex overall, and also that the Strong S/T Hybridist accounts is excessively complex, I do not
here provide argument for these stronger claims. I concede that they do not follow from the
earlier claim about Strong S/T Hybridist accounts being more complex in certain respects.
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about a comedian was that “you have to see him yourself to believe how hilar-
ious he really is” (Epley et al. 2004, p. 329). The variable that was adjusted
was a description of the comedy show that was either positive or negative.
S’s were then asked to predict whether O’s would understand the message
as being sarcastic depending both on whether S had the positive or negative
description and whether O did. Epley et al. (2004, p. 329) found that “people
adopt others’ perspectives by adjusting from their own.” This is consistent
with a simulational start point —‘own perspective’ —and a theoretical adjust-
ment —O had a different description of the event than S did. However, it is
also consistent with an entirely simulational account: ‘what would I think if I
had a different description of the event?’
Another type of adjustment investigated by Epley et al. (2004) is where
people shift their estimates of the percentages of their peers who will hear
something unclear when they themselves know the ‘right’ answer. For exam-
ple, there are claims that certain songs contain secret messages when played
backwards. The lyrics of a song sound meaningless backwards until one is
told what the hidden message is supposed to be, whereupon that ‘hidden mes-
sage’ becomes obvious. The results were that 88% of informed participants
believed that they themselves heard the message while 0% of uninformed par-
ticipants believed that they themselves heard the message. Epley et al. also
expected “informed participants to estimate that a higher percentage of their
peers would hear the phrase than participants who were uninformed” (Epley
et al. 2004, p. 334) and this is indeed what was found. So the anchor here
is whether S gets the message, which itself is basically controlled by whether
S has been told the content of the message. S is then asked to estimate how
many O’s will get the message, and does this by starting from whether S did
as an anchor. This is in essence a simulational account.
Remarkably, people agree with propositions more if they are nodding their
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heads when they say them. Epley et al. (2004, p. 334) use this result to
hypothesise that S’s “who were nodding their heads should be more egocentric
and give more extreme responses than participants who were shaking their
heads.” This hypothesis was confirmed; the nodders gave responses that if true
would have had O more like S than was the case with controls or the shakers.
“Extreme” here means that the nodding S’s became more egocentric about the
O’s and the shakers less egocentric. It does not appear that TT can explain
these results, because nothing about head movements should influence theory
use. ST can offer an explanation which is once more based on claims analogous
to those made by the Motor Theory of Speech Perception discussed above on
p. 34. The central idea there is that motor capacities for speech production
are also used in simulation mode to comprehend speech. Simulationists can
argue that head nodding influences simulation, since head nodding is what S
does when S favours a view. The original strange point that S will agree with a
proposition more if S is nodding comes back into play, with the proposition in
question being ‘O has ‘got the message.’ ’ Therefore if S is making a prediction
about O based on S and S is currently nodding, the simulation process will
start by modelling O’s level of assent as adjusted upwards by S’s nodding.
It ‘looks to S’ more like O is favouring a view, or in this case, ‘getting the
message.’
Accuracy increases over time; Epley et al. find that the amount of ad-
justment increases from the egocentric anchor if time is not an issue while
egocentric errors increase for harried S’s. This might be explained as meaning
that extra time is available to apply theoretical adjustments thus improving
accuracy. However, part of the explanation for this effect may also be found
from a simulationist perspective, since there is a very clear route elsewhere
wherein additional simulation may improve accuracy. There is a technique
known in mathematics and physics as Monte Carlo simulation. The idea is
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to run many simulations with slightly shifted input conditions and consider
the results of all of them. This provides a better estimation of the outcome
when the exact initial conditions are unknown.7 We may assume that multi-
ple simulations will also allow S to make better ToM judgements if the time
is available to perform them; also many simulations could be run in parallel.
There is thus no need to retreat to a Strong S/T Hybridist theory, as Gold-
man (2006, p. 184) does when faced with this question. It is no objection here
to say that we do not have phenomenology consistent with running multiple
simulations, since we also do not have phenomenology consistent with running
a single simulation or using a theory. Although Monte Carlo simulations for
physics purposes use theoretical input, they need not do so. Running multiple
simulations can explain why S becomes more accurate over time, though per-
haps not why S always starts with the same egocentric bias. The explanation
for that may rely on the simulationist case more broadly.
The conclusion of Epley et al. (2004, p. 338) is replete with caveats: “indi-
viduals’ attempts at perspective taking are often something of an integration
of theory and simulation. Adults’ use of their own perspective as an anchor
is similar to using one’s self as a source model for predicting others. Addi-
tionally, adults’ adjustment from that anchor is likely guided by their theories
about how different perspectives and psychological states influence judgement
and perception.” Perspective taking is “often” “something of an integration”
i.e. not always; we are not told what “something” means and we do not know
whether to interpret ‘integration’ as more like ‘summation’ or ‘selection.’ The
anchoring is “similar” to simulation. Adjustment is “likely” guided by theory.
We are entitled to ask what evidence supports all of these hedges, what they
are intended to carve out, and why, if not to explain inconvenient data. The
ST perspective can naturally accept the anchoring side wholesale, so whether
7For an example of repeated Monte Carlo simulation being used to produce more accurate
predictions, see Short (1992).
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the adjustment process must be theoretical is a crucial point. There seems to
be no reason at all why it could not be further application of simulation, but
with shifted inputs: what would O believe if O was missing facts known to S
is a different simulation that allows S to take O’s perspective.
All of the theoretical elements in the Strong S/T Hybridist account here
investigated depend on the adjustments in, for example, the lyric perception
task, which can be equally well or better explained by additional simulation.
In addition, the Epley et al. account is scarcely less complex than the foregoing
Ames account. Finally, there is a recursive problem of the same nature as the
under-specified nature of the interaction in a single account. Now we have two
accounts: are the mechanisms they employ also to interact?
4.4 Conclusion
The options are pure TT, pure ST and Hybrids. I contend that the arguments
presented in this chapter and the previous one provide strong motivation for
a new examination of an option close to pure ST: Weak S/T Hybridism. That
view appears more plausible than Strong S/T Hybridism or either of the to-
tally pure accounts. Both pure TT accounts face at least three severe objec-
tions each, as I outlined in §3.2 and §3.3. These objections are not resolved
by Theoretical Hybrid accounts as I showed in §4.2. Strong S/T Hybridist
accounts suffer from all of these problems, since they include a major theoret-
ical component, with moreover the additional complexity problems outlined
in §4.3.
All Strong S/T Hybridist accounts face severe dialectical challenges. The
Strong S/T Hybridist line seems to be forced on TT proponents by hard cases
brought by the ST side. Apart from the obvious lack of parsimony, the claim
would presumably be that while their preferred ST or TT account does the
bulk of the work, some admixture of the other account must be admitted for
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some questions. Alternatively, some questions may lie entirely in the domain
of the other theory. This then entitles us to ask how much of the work is
ascribed to the other theory, and what that claim even means. Commentators
are here forced into vagueness. For example, Goldman (1993, p. 107) writes
that he will “make no blanket rejection of ‘theoretical’ inference in self- or
other-ascription. I just doubt that that’s where all the action is, or even most
of it.”
We can understand what it would mean for less than all of of the action
to be in simulation or theory. That is not much more than a restatement
of the Strong S/T Hybridist position. However, we may legitimately require
the Strong S/T Hybridist to say more about the mix. Goldman thinks that
‘most of the action’ is simulation. Does that mean that 80% of ToM activity
is in simulation, and how would such a calculation be made? It might be
done by dividing the number of questions resolved by simulation by the total,
or the number of propositions, or the occasions of use. All of that would
be complicated by any occasions of interactionist ToM use. Bach (2011, p.
28) describes the positions of the hybrid8 theorists as involving the following
calculation: “[i]f the majority of tasks are given to simulation, then simulation
is termed the ‘default’ process (Goldman), and if the majority is given to
theory, then theory is the default process (Nichols and Stich).” This seems
unhelpful since not only is the question unanswerable, but it is not clear what
non-circular value has been added by declaring one other of TT or ST the
default process. We might allow commentators to define either ST or TT the
default process while restricting that claim to meaning simply that one or the
other is more frequently used, but that weaker claim is not very illuminating.
Of course, Goldman’s position is consistent with the Weak S/T Hybrid account
for which I will argue as well as the Strong S/T Hybrid account which I oppose.
8He does not call them ‘Strong S/T Hybridists’ since that is my term; the definition
nevertheless fits the theorists to whom he refers.
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My criticism here is more of the vagueness which allows the view to extend
over two very different accounts, one of which is I have argued is untenable.
One might ask about the possible view that says that both ST and TT
mechanisms exist and we know relatively little about when each is used or how
they interact. It might be thought that this is a view that says less but faces
fewer objections. I accept this, but still insist that this is a less parsimonious
account than Weak S/T Hybridist ones. It does not really reduce its number
of moving parts by simply stating that the interaction cannot be explained,
which is then not a positive move from the perspective of parsimony on the
original p. 32 definition. It also fares badly from the explanatory power
perspective, because it does not attempt to explain the interactions, which
are a fundamental aspect of how ToM predictions are made if this view is
correct.
One possible alternative to Saxe’s Strong S/T Hybridist Interactionism
would be Strong S/T Hybridist Anti-Interactionism. This position asserts
that there are two major elements of ToM, theory and simulation, but denies
that there is any interaction between the elements. They do not communicate
with each other, or use each other’s outputs as inputs. There is in addition no
third master system combining the two theoretical and simulational systems.
Such an Anti-Interactionist account would need to describe why it might come
about that there is no interaction in order to be plausible. One option might
be to specify separate domains of application. Some questions in ToM might
always be resolved theoretically, and other questions might always be resolved
simulationally. Or, particular questions might generally be solved theoreti-
cally and sometimes simulationally. Providing no episode of consideration of
a question involved both simulation and theory at the same time, that would
still count as an Anti-Interactionist account. There might even be ways of
having a particular question considered both theoretically and simulationally
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on a given occasion, but still qualifying as a non-interactionist account. But
all of these options appear irremediably complex.
There is also the question as to where the charge of ad hoc domain spec-
ification may best be laid. Saxe (2005a, p. 177) claims that historically,
“proposals for when [S’s] use simulation tend to be somewhat ad hoc.” The
problem with this charge for Saxe derives from the fact that Saxe is a Strong
S/T Hybridist, accepting a role for ST. Therefore her criticism about the ad
hoc nature of the domain of application of simulation applies with equal force
to her position. Indeed, it is even more virulent, because Saxe has not only
the ad hoc domain for simulation, but additional ad hoc domains for theory
and then for the interaction region where simulation and theory interact.
Chapter 5
The Systematic Error
Challenge
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will set out the major challenge to ST as urged by Saxe
(2005a).1 Naturally any challenge to ST is ipso facto a challenge to the Weak
S/T Hybridist view which I support. The challenge is that ST cannot account
for the systematic errors observed when people perform ToM tasks. These
errors exist; they are widely reproduced in the psychological literature. This in
itself is not a problem for ST, because it can, as Saxe allows and ST proponents
have proposed, avail itself of the Wrong Inputs Defence. I will discuss that
defence more fully in Ch. 6, but in sum the Wrong Inputs Defence observes
that it is not an objection to ST that a simulation is wrong when the inputs
to the simulation were wrong. A wrong input could consist in a false belief
held by S about the beliefs or desires held by O. Alternatively, it could consist
1She in fact brings two challenges to ST; I will not discuss the second one which relates
to differential time development in children’s ToM. Saxe (2005a, p. 176) notes that although
children have their own beliefs and desires “all along,” they can ascribe different desires to
others a year before they can ascribe different beliefs.
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in a false belief held by S about the factual environment around O which is
of relevance to whatever behaviour of O’s S is seeking to predict or explain.
However, Saxe’s particular challenge relates not to the errors but to their
systematic nature. This means that all or a large proportion of S’s will make
the same mistaken predictions about O’s behaviour in a particular context.
ST does not, according to its opponents, predict that ToM errors will be
systematic. In fact, ST should predict a random spread of errors, according
to TT proponents. I will outline the TT argument for this here by sketching
the Two Colours task (Ruffman 1996), cited in support of TT (Saxe 2005a,
p. 175). The task involves a child who sees a green bead being moved from
a dish containing red and green beads into an opaque bag. An observer A is
behind a screen so that A sees that a bead has been removed from the dish
but not its colour. Also behind the screen —and thus visible to the child but
not to A —is another dish containing yellow beads. The critical question is
asked of the child ‘what colour does A think the bead in the bag is?.’ If the
child is simulating, it should place itself in imagination behind the screen and
conclude that it cannot see the colour of the bead. So it will give answers
randomly spread across red and green (or conceivably also yellow, since there
are yellow beads in the other dish that only the child can see) because the
child has no reason ‘from behind the screen’ to pick one colour over another.
This is not what is observed, as we will see: the child in fact will mostly say
that A thinks the bead is red.2
TT, by contrast, has a ready explanation for the systematic nature of
the errors. It can postulate a single item of theory, a generalisation, that is
wrong. If everyone has the same incorrect generalisation, then everyone will
make the same mistaken ToM prediction in all circumstances that activate
that generalisation. Thus, Saxe can argue that the systematic ToM errors
2I will not offer in this thesis a specific ST defence against the Ruffman data; see Short
(2015, Ch. 9) for such a defence.
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that are observed are good evidence for TT and against ST.
Saxe (2005a) introduces a large variety of experimental evidence to support
her claim. The evidence is broken down into several classes. I will consider
two classes of data in this thesis. Later in this thesis, I will provide a chapter
responding to each class of data on behalf of ST, but for now my task is solely
to set out the problem. The two classes of data show the following types of
systematic ToM error.
• In some experiments, ToM is systematically too ‘rosy’: S’s are un-
warrantedly optimistic about the rationality and logic employed in O’s
decision-making.
• In some experiments, ToM is systematically too ‘cynical’: S’s are un-
warrantedly pessimistic about the rationality and logic employed in O’s
decision-making.
In the next two sections of this chapter, I will introduce each class of data:
first the too rosy data (§5.2) and then the too cynical data (§5.3). For now,
I will only give one of the experiments cited by Saxe (2005a) in each class as
an example. In later chapters, I will retain the separation into two classes but
consider many more experiments cited by Saxe within each class.
5.2 The ‘Too Rosy’ Challenge
The class of ‘too rosy’ data supporting Saxe’s systematic error challenge is
introduced by her as below.
“Adults, too, have systematically inaccurate and over-simplified beliefs
about beliefs that are often self-flattering. ‘We are convinced of the rational-
ity of [human] reasoning, highly adept at constructing plausible explanations
for our decision behaviour, [. . . ] and so on’ (Evans 1990, p. 109). That is, we
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share the conviction that, in general, beliefs follow from relatively dispassion-
ate assessment of facts-of-the-matter and logical reasoning. As a consequence,
people’s expectations of how they and others should reason and behave corre-
spond more closely to normative theories of logic, probability and utility, than
to their actual subsequent behaviour (Gilovich 1993).
Historically, proposals for when observers use simulation tend to be some-
what ad hoc. In fact, if we could accurately simulate other minds, half a
century of social psychology would lose much of its power to shock and thrill.
The charisma of many famous experiments in social psychology and decision-
making derives from the fact that they challenge our too-rosy theories of mind
(Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977). The experiments of Milgram (1963),
and Asch (1952), and Tversky and Kahneman (1974), are famous because
there is a specific, and vivid, mismatch between what we confidently expect,
and what the subjects actually do” (Saxe 2005a, p. 176).
As one example of Saxe’s too rosy data, I will consider the Milgram ex-
periment. I will cover many more in the chapter devoted to explaining this
class of data, Ch. 8. This famous experiment involves some deception of the
experimental subjects, which means that it has not been widely replicated,
because it would not pass modern university ethics panels. It was conducted
at Yale in 1961. The context continues to be that of the aftermath of World
War Two, and the preliminaries to the experimental writeup mention that the
Nazi regime is an explicit concern. How will ordinary people respond when
asked to perform extraordinary acts that are beyond what they would claim
are their moral limits? Should we understand the Nazi phenomenon as an
aberration, or will ordinary people be generally be susceptible to persuasion
beyond expectations when placed in extraordinary circumstances?
There are three protagonists in the Milgram (1963) experiment: the exper-
imenter, the actual subject and the ‘dummy subject.’ The actual subject is an
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innocent member of the public. The actual subject believes that the dummy
subject is also an innocent member of the public, but this is not the case. In
fact, the dummy subject is a collaborator of the experimenter. An apparently
random but in fact rigged selection is run to allocate roles between the actual
subject and the dummy subject. The two roles are ‘learner’ and ‘teacher’ in
a word pair learning test. The selection is rigged such that the actual subject
is always the teacher, and the dummy subject is always the learner.
The experimenter explains to the actual subject that the experiment is an
investigation of how learning may be improved by mild punishment of error.
In the standard version of the experiment, the dummy subject is placed in
a different room to the actual subject and communicates the word pairs via
a panel. Their performance is to be assessed by the actual subject, who is
also tasked with applying punishment to them if they make a mistake. The
situation is rigged so that the dummy subjects do in fact make many mistakes.
The actual subject is now told to apply an electric shock to the dummy subject.
They have a range of electric shocks available to apply, beginning from mild
and increasing in voltage. In reality of course, no electric shocks are applied at
all to the dummy subject. However, they do react as if they were being applied.
The intensity of their reaction increases dramatically as the purported shock
level increases. Bear in mind that since the dummy subjects are in a different
room, their behaviour under the apparent shocks is not seen by the actual
subjects. There is no verbal response from the dummy subjects, though the
dummy subjects make audible sounds of protest as the experiment proceeds.
At extreme levels in fact, they cease to respond to the requests for a new word
pair, and “[w]hen the 300-volt shock is administered, the learner pounds on
the wall of the room in which he is bound to the electric chair” (Milgram 1963,
p. 374).
The actual subjects believe they are administering shocks ranging from
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‘Moderate’ through ‘Intense’ to ‘Danger: Severe Shock’ and beyond to the
mysterious ‘XXX’ category. If the dummy subject protests that this treatment
is unreasonable or unethical or for any reason resists applying the shock, the
experimenter encourages them. A fixed scale of four experimenter responses is
set as actual subject resistance increases along with dummy subject distress.
These “prods” were in order as follows: “[p]lease continue, or [p]lease go on;
[t]he experiment requires that you continue; [i]t is absolutely essential that
you continue; [y]ou have no other choice, you must go on” (Milgram 1963, p.
374). We immediately believe here that no-one will comply.
The surprising results though were that: “[o]f the 40 [O’s], 26 obeyed
the orders of the experimenter to the end, proceeding to punish the victim
until they reached the most potent shock available on the shock generator”
(Milgram 1963, p. 376). At this juncture, Saxe already has her point: we are
amazed that any of the dummy subjects will go this far, and we are confident
that we ourselves would not.
Crucially for Saxe’s view though, there are a fourth group of players, who
will provide us with evidence of systematic failure of ToM of the too rosy sort
and indeed with hard numerical evidence thereof. Milgram later provides a
group of psychology undergraduates with a description of the set-up. Milgram
(1963, p. 375) writes: “[f]ourteen Yale seniors, all psychology majors, were
provided with a detailed description of the experimental situation. They were
asked to reflect carefully on it, and to predict the behaviour of 100 hypothetical
subjects. [...] All respondents predicted that only an insignificant minority
would go through to the end of the shock series. (The estimates ranged from
0 to 3%; i.e., the most ‘pessimistic’ member of the class predicted that of 100
persons, 3 would continue through to the most potent shock available on the
shock generator —450 volts.)” This provides Saxe with a valuable data point.
In the actual experiment, 26/40 = 65% of O’s set the dial to 450 Volts while
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the psychology undergraduate S’s estimated that that number would be 3%
at most.
Since there are now four groups of protagonists in the experiment, there
is room for confusion when we view it in our ToM framework. Recall that S
is the subject in our terms who is using ToM to predict the behaviour of the
object of ToM O. In this framework, the S’s are the psychology majors who
predicted the behaviour of the actual subjects or teachers, the O’s. So the
discrepancy between 3% and 65% represents the systematically too rosy ToM
error which Saxe requires.
5.3 The ‘Too Cynical’ Challenge
Saxe (2005a) also cites a class of experimental data that tend in the opposite
direction to those discussed in the previous section. While her challenge con-
tinues to be that there are systematic errors in ToM, the direction of those
errors is opposite under different circumstances, and systematically so. As
previously, defenders of ST must explain this directionality of error as well as
the mere possibility of error. Once again, Saxe will appeal to a wrong theoret-
ical generalisation being applied in the various cases, which gives TT an easy
response to the data.
Saxe (2005a) introduces this class of supporting data as below.
“[L]ay epistemology is not universally charitable. Most adults believe that
beliefs are sometimes false, that reasoning can sometimes be distorted —both
inevitably, by the limitations of the mind, and wilfully, as in wishful thinking
and self-deception —and that all of these are more likely to be true of other
people’s thinking than of their own (Pronin, Puccio, and Ross 2002, pp. 636-
665). As a consequence, [S’s] sometimes overestimate the prevalence of self-
serving reasoning in [O’s] (Kruger and Gilovich 1999), (Nisbett and Bellows
1977), (Miller and Ratner 1998).
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In one study, Kruger and Gilovich (1999) asked each member of a married
couple, separately, to rate how often he or she was responsible for common
desirable and undesirable events in the marriage. Then, each was asked to pre-
dict how their spouse would assign responsibility on the same scale. Although
everyone actually tended to take credit equally for good and bad events, each
predicted that their spouse would be self-serving, that is, take more responsi-
bility for good events, and less responsibility for bad ones. [...] Thus whereas
reasoning about reasoning is usually characterised by overly optimistic expec-
tations about people’s rationality, in specific circumstances (e.g. the cultur-
ally acknowledged self-serving bias) observers are overly pessimistic, an effect
dubbed ‘na¨ıve cynicism’ [Kruger and Gilovich (1999)]” (Saxe 2005a, p. 177).
Note that there is a possible confusion in the last sentence. There are
two ‘self-serving biases’ at play in this experiment. There is the self-serving
bias(O) of O which would involve O making unrealistically positive claims
about himself. The second self-serving bias(S) would be in S, where S predicts
even more self-serving bias(O) in O than O exhibits. The self-serving bias(S)
in S thus paradoxically allows S to predict that S is less self-serving than O
and thus more virtuous. It is important to keep these different biases separate.
As before, I will provide here just one example of the sort of experimental
data Saxe (2005a) appeals to in this class of too cynical data, while covering
many more of her examples in my detailed response on behalf of ST in Ch. 9.
Here, I will just expand on the marriage partners example.
Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 745) had married couples fill out a ques-
tionnaire about joint activities of either negative or positive relationship value.
Here, ‘joint activity’ means something that either partner might do, not some-
thing that they necessarily both do together. For example, a negative activity
would be “taking out frustrations on partner” while a positive one would
be “resolving conflicts that occur between the two of you.” Each partner was
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asked to allocate responsibility for such activities by percentage between them-
selves and their partner. The idea was that the partners should think on a
frequency basis. Imagine that there were 20 occurrences of an activity falling
under the given description “taking out frustrations [. . . ]” in the last month.
So the total number of such occurrences for which the husband was responsible
plus the total number of such occurrences for which the wife was responsible
sum to 20. The same pattern should be visible across the board, with 100%
of responsibility being allocated across partners and across activities.
The investigation of whether these allocations are biassed proceeds by com-
paring what partners say about themselves and comparing it with what their
partners said about themselves on each task. This can then be compared with
100%. If the husband is responsible for 60% of a particular activity, then his
wife can claim up to 40% of initiations of this activity for herself, and no bias
has been measured. If however the total is more than 100%, then both part-
ners have claimed more responsibility than is actually available and a positive
bias has been measured in relation to that activity. Both parties want to claim
credit for that activity. On the other hand, if the husband admits to only 30%
of responsibility for a given action, and the wife also admits to only 30%, then
a negative bias has been observed. Neither party wants to admit responsibility
for that activity. As the authors write, “suppose a wife believes she initiates
60% of the discussions about the relationship and her husband believes he is
responsible for 50%. Together, they have assigned 110% of the activity to
themselves, yielding a bias score of + 10%” (Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p.
745). Initiating discussions about the relationship was a positive activity in
the experimenters’ paradigm.
By allocating responsibility to himself, the husband naturally also allocates
the inverse responsibility to his wife. If he thinks he does 70% of the “spending
time on appearance to please the other” (Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p. 745),
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then he must also think his wife does 30%. The activities considered in the
experiment were such that no-one else could do them other than the two
spouses. Since the experimenters have the questionnaires from both spouses,
they are now in a position to compare the data, and to cross-reference it with
whether the activity is positive for the relationship or negative. But they took
a crucial further step in this experiment, which is why Saxe (2005a) cites this
particular experiment. Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 745) also asked each
partner what they thought the other would say. Note that this allows for a
sum greater than 100%. If the husband thinks that he does 70% of “spending
time on appearance to please the other,” he can consistently also think his
wife will claim 70%, while he believes she actually does 30%. The husband
can have a biased expectation of bias. Matching that in the other direction,
the husband can think that he causes 30% of the arguments, and that his wife
therefore actually causes 70% of the arguments, but that she will only admit
to causing 30%. If this is the case, then there is a systematic error in ToM in
a too cynical direction and Saxe has her data.
This is exactly what is observed; Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 745)
report that “couples expected their spouses to claim more than their share of
the credit for the desirable activities (M = +9.1%) —but less than their share
of the blame for the undesirable activities (M = -16.1%),” where ‘M’ stands
for mean bias. The systematic error in ToM here is then ‘biased expectations
of bias.’ The S’s expect their partner O’s to be biased. The O’s are indeed
biased. But they are less biased than the S’s predict; the quantum of how
self-serving they are is less than predicted. Saxe has indeed provided data
which help her in two ways. There is indeed a systematic error in ToM in that
S’s generally all make the same error. But secondly, these ToM errors are all
in the too cynical direction when the previous ToM errors were all in the too
rosy direction. Saxe may now demand that ST proponents explain this.
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We have now seen two classes of data where Saxe (2005a) has shown sys-
tematic error in ToM. These errors pose an as yet unanswered problem for
ST. That scenario has been a major factor leading to the consensus Strong
S/T Hybrid view allotting major roles to both theory and simulation. I will
therefore in the next chapter consider problems with Strong S/T Hybrid views.
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Chapter 6
Bias Mismatch Defence:
Background
6.1 Introduction
Given the drawbacks faced by Strong S/T Hybrid accounts outlined in Ch.
4, we should examine the feasibility of remaining close to a pure ST theory
with a Weak S/T Hybrid account. The first problem is that, as discussed in
Ch. 5, Saxe (2005a) has shown, pure ST (and so also Weak S/T Hybridism)
is vulnerable to the systematic error challenge. Recall that the challenge is
brought by TT proponents who note the existence of error in ToM perfor-
mance which is systematically slanted depending on the circumstances. In
some circumstances, S’s are systematically too positive in their expectations
of the rationality or morality of the behaviour of O’s; in other circumstances,
S’s are systematically too negative. There is no reason, according to oppo-
nents of ST, why ST should predict such systematic errors. ST should on the
contrary predict random errors, according to those same TT proponents.
Given the strong empirical backing for the existence of these errors, ST
proponents have little prospect of challenging the data. Even were they to
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succeed in doing so, the approach would resemble some kind of ad hoc patch-
work which would lack simplicity and parsimony. As I will explain in §6.2, two
previous attempts to defend ST against the systematic error challenge have
been essayed. The first of these was the wrong inputs defence, which urges
that simulation can produce errors if the simulation is fed with the wrong
inputs. Also attempted was a translation defence, which suggests that even if
the inputs are correct, simulation error can occur if O is not rationally trans-
lating the outputs of his practical decision making system into actions, while
S simulates O as translating those outputs rationally. I will conclude in §6.2
that these two prior defences of ST against the systematic error challenge have
proved inadequate; in dismissing the wrong inputs defence I am in accord with
Saxe (2005a, p. 178). This is why we need a new defence, providing which is
the central task of this thesis.
I will then go on in §6.3 to give an initial overview of my Bias Mismatch
Defence which can be stated roughly but succinctly in the slogan ‘simulation
may not accurately model bias.’ More precisely, cognitive biases are simulated;
but the biases to which S and O are subject may differ because of the factors
affect and system. If S and O are not is bias matched states, then there will be
simulation error. The details of how this defence works in action will emerge
more fully in discussion of its application to Saxe’s specific challenges in Chs.
8 and 9. In some scenarios, the S’s simulations failed because they failed to
include a bias of the O’s in their simulation of the O’s. In turn, they failed
to include that effect because they were not in the situation faced by the O’s,
who had an affective involvement resulting from being told something about
their competencies which may have been pleasing or displeasing. There was
an Affect Mismatch between S and O and a resulting Bias Mismatch leading
to systematic ToM error.
The formal structure of the Bias Mismatch Defence is as below.
6.1. INTRODUCTION 155
1. FACTOR X affects O but not S1
2. FACTOR X modulates the probability of being subject to BIAS
BIAS is a placeholder for any cognitive bias now known or discovered in
the future. Roughly speaking, one might talk of employing the Bias Mismatch
Defence in any scenario in which there has been a systematic ToM error as a
result of a failure to simulate the BIAS of O. Also, one might loosely apply
the defence when a BIAS in S which O does not have has caused the ToM
error. Strictly speaking, the defence should have the exact structure outlined
above, in which FACTOR has affected O but not S and FACTOR has caused
the BIAS in O which has led to S’s simulation error. Again, FACTOR is a
placeholder for any grounds for O to have a BIAS. I will make two auxiliary
hypotheses as to what FACTOR might be. FACTOR could be an affective
distinction between S and O, or it could be a reasoning system mismatch
between S and O; it could also be a combination of both. I would be happy to
see any further values for FACTOR which result in BIAS leading to systematic
ToM error being classified as an instance of the Bias Mismatch Defence.
I will then outline in §6.4 the various biases involved in Bias Mismatch.
I only list the ones I will be employing; there are many more2 which could
doubtless explain many other cases of simulation error. Any other occasions
of systematic error which can be explained by further applications of biases
constitute further evidence for my position, whether those biases are listed
here or not. Since many of these biases are familiar, I will not discuss them
in detail, restricting myself to providing a sketch and citing literature that
provides more detail.
1Here I am using capitals for emphasis, not as the names of concepts.
2I am aware of informal estimates of 150+ as to the number of biases to which S’s are
subject.
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6.2 Why We Need A New Defence
Simulation Theory has been charged with failure to predict the robust sys-
tematic errors that are observed in ToM. Two types of defence have been
suggested: a Translation Defence and a Wrong Inputs Defence. Greenwood
(1999, p. 35), writes that in ST “failure can only arise in one of two ways:
either the decision maker’s practical reasoning system is different from the
person whose behaviour is predicted, or the right pretend beliefs and desires
are not fed into the system.” This adds up to a concise statement of the
Translation Defence and the Wrong Inputs Defence together with a claim that
no other options are available.
I will explain these two defences, both of which are offered by Harris (1992).
I will spend less time on the Translation Defence for a number of reasons,
the most important of which is that in my judgement, it does not succeed
in providing a wide-ranging and non-ad hoc defence of ST, as I will outline
below. It is also true to say that the Translation Defence has not received much
attention in the literature; in fact, I have been unable to find any references to
it. In common then with other commentators, Saxe focusses her challenge on
the Wrong Inputs Defence. Saxe (2005a, pp. 177-178) sets out her challenge
to the Wrong Inputs Defence as follows.
“The pattern of errors described above is not consistent with this kind of
Simulation. And, as we shall now see, the most common defence of Simulation
Theory against the argument from error also fails: the claim that errors arise
from inaccurate inputs to the simulation”.
Here, Saxe uses the term “pattern of errors” to refer to the general problem
she raises for ST, that of explaining the systematic ToM errors. Saxe is correct
in saying that the Wrong Inputs Defence has been the one more frequently
resorted to by ST proponents to explain ToM errors. I will agree that Saxe is
right to claim that the Wrong Inputs Defence does not explain the systematic
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nature of the errors. This is why we need a new defence which I will offer in
the next chapters. I will now briefly outline in turn the Wrong Inputs Defence
and the Translation Defence.
6.2.1 Wrong Inputs Defence
The best statement of the defence is given by Harris (1992, p. 132), who is
responding to Stich and Nichols. He puts the Wrong Inputs Defence as follows:
“it is necessary for [S] to feed in pretend inputs that match in the relevant
particulars the situation facing the [O] whose actions are to be predicted or
explained. Predictive errors will occur if inappropriate pretend inputs are
fed in.” The Wrong Inputs Defence is the obvious one for ST proponents
to reach for when charged with failure to predict the observed systematic
ToM errors, since it is seems prima facie straightforward to argue that the
simulation failed because it was fed with the wrong inputs. This if successful
would allow ST proponents to claim that ST is still the correct account of
ToM. This unfortunately does not work, as has been shown by Saxe (2005a)
and as I concede, because there is too much data to be explained. The ST
account would be committed by its employment of the Wrong Inputs Defence
to a prediction of widespread error in ToM which is empirically false. To
be sure, there are plenty of errors, as the data show, but on many normal
occasions outside the psychology laboratory, everyday ToM use seems to work
pretty well. S’s often think they can predict and explain the behaviour of O’s,
and often those S’s are right about that. If their ToM were as error prone as it
would be if it was so easy for the simulations to be fed with wrong inputs, then
those S’s would not be right about their often successful abilities to predict
and explain the behaviour of O’s.
Moreover, wide application of the Wrong Inputs Defence would make the
ST account look rather ad hoc, because it would be postulating special sorts
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of wrong inputs in various different experimental circumstances. Recall as well
that those inputs would have to be wrong in that special way systematically ;
a particular experiment would have to involve the same sort of wrong inputs
every time in order to explain the observed systematic ToM errors. TT propo-
nents can rightly object that this is unwieldy and implausible; even if it works,
it will have a lot of moving parts. The problem can be observed in its nascent
state when Harris (1992) attempts to deal with three experiments that Stich
and Nichols correctly argue are problematic for ST. The three situations deal
with Suicide Note Assessors, Lottery Ticket Holders and Shoppers. The first
two groups are handled using the Wrong Inputs Defence and the Shoppers
are handled using the Translation Defence; I will postpone discussion of the
Shoppers until §6.2.2. The problem becomes much more severe later when
the basic approach of Saxe (2005a) is to introduce much more data. So the
charge of being ad hoc becomes much worse for ST proponents because now,
not just three experiments but dozens must be handled by postulating specific
sets of systematic wrong inputs. It will be seen later than one merit of the
Bias Mismatch Defence is that it handles all of those data without being ad
hoc.
Suicide Note Assessors
In this subsection, I will briefly cover four topics. I will first explain the
experiment in question. Then I will say why the experiment is held to be a
challenge to ST. After that, I will explain Harris’s response on behalf of ST.
Finally, I will outline the TT objections to the response, and say why I agree
that those objections are decisive. So I will conclude that ST is in need of a
defence to this particular challenge and does not at present have one.
I will term the experiment in question the ‘suicide note assessment task.’
Since the point of interest for us is ToM errors made by us as S’s in relation
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to how the O’s in the experiment perform, I will refer to the experimental
participants as ‘the O’s’ throughout. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975, p.
882) gave their O’s “25 cards, each containing one real and one fictitious
suicide note.” The task was for the O to assess which one of the two notes
was real and which one was fictitious. After each trial, “the experimenter said
only ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975, p. 882). On
completion of the 25 trials, O’s were given “feedback indicating that they had
correctly identified the actual suicide note on either 24 (success), 17 (average),
or 10 (failure) occasions” (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975, p. 882). After
receiving this feedback, the O “was then left alone for a period of either 5 (short
delay) or 25 (long delay) minutes” (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975, p. 883).
That period having elapsed, the O was then told that the success, average
or fail feedback had been false and that ‘the O’s “score had been determined
randomly” (Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard 1975, p. 883). The surprising result
is that O’s continue to harbour some beliefs that they were good or bad at the
suicide assessment note task. As Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975, p. 884)
summarise, “even after debriefing procedures that led [O’s] to say that they
understood the decisive invalidation of initial test results, the [O’s] continued
to assess their performances and abilities as if these test results still possessed
some validity.”
In sum, evidence was presented to suggest that beliefs are recalcitrant to
later evidence. This includes not just beliefs about the self but also about
others, because Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) also replicate the results
with observers i.e. they found that S’s also continue to attach some strength
to the belief that the O’s were good or bad at the task even after the evidence
therefor had been discounted. This point will prove interesting later when I
discuss this experiment again in the context of showing how the bias mismatch
defence can handle it (see §8.2.5).
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So much for the experiment. Why is this a problem for ST? The problem is
that the ‘belief persistence’ observed in the O’s by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard
(1975) is not predicted by S’s. S’s predict that immediately after O’s find out
that the evidence should be discounted, O’s will abandon the belief founded
on the now discounted evidence. The force of this may be illustrated by
considering the following question: if you believed X solely because of fact Y
and I show you that Y is not the case, would you continue to believe X? TT
proponents may now bring their standard challenge to ST viz.: if ST were
true, one would expect S’s to predict the correct outcome. S’s should avoid
the error by simply putting themselves in the situation of the O’s assessing the
suicide notes. So we have here a systematic ToM error that ST must explain.
How can Harris respond on behalf of ST? Harris (1992, pp. 132-133) re-
sponds to this challenge by essaying what we might term a ‘time-lag defence.’
He notes that “[an S] reading about such experiments and attempting to sim-
ulate their outcome is presented with a single, integrated account of both the
trait information and its disconfirmation [so S] will find it difficult to repro-
duce the naive, unsuspecting commitment to the initial information that is
entertained by [O].” Harris’s defence is then the Wrong Inputs Defence in
that S’s are held to be given both confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence
simultaneously, while the O’s have a delay of five or 25 minutes between pre-
sentation of the confirmatory evidence and the disconfirmatory evidence. As
Harris (1992, p. 133) remarks, S “feeds in the pretend inputs in a different
way from a naive [O].” The S’s wrong input results from the combination of
confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence, which may lead to no belief at all.
By contrast, the O’s hold the belief that they are good or bad at the task for
a longer period; even five minutes is a lot longer than no time at all.
This immediately leads us to the question as to what an input is. Does the
timing of an input change the content of that input, or is it that same input
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content which may be treated differently by the ToM processing depending on
its timing? I believe Harris is right to make the second assumption, that the
content of an input is not affected by its timing. We see that Harris makes this
assumption since he writes of “the inputs” being fed in in “a different way”
(Harris 1992, p. 133) i.e. they are the same inputs but the timing differences
allows them to be processed differently by S and O. A primary reason for
following Harris here is that not making this assumption is tantamount to
saying that all inputs are different; there would be few or no occasions when
we could say that S and O had ‘the same’ inputs and so the Wrong Inputs
Defence would over-generalise and predict almost complete ToM error.
This argument is not just restricted to temporal differences in context. So
in fact, I will assume, both on behalf of Harris and myself, that the content
of an input is unaffected by any of its contextual factors. This amounts to a
decision to articulate the Wrong Inputs Defence by building in the assumption
that inputs are context independent, so that S’s affective and other states
cannot change the nature and content of the inputs. It will still of course be
possible for S’s affective and other states to change the ToM processing; for
example, if S is under extreme stress, it would be strange for an account to
say that the stress will not affect the outputs of S’s ToM at all. This difference
will become crucial later, when I suggest that in fact it is just this possibility
of S’s affective state being systematically different to O’s that allows ST to
explain systematic ToM error without appealing to wrong inputs.
In any case, Stich and Nichols object to Harris’s time-lag defence. They
do not have additional properly conducted experimental data to cite, but they
have tried a non-controlled version of an experiment that would distinguish
between Harris’s view and their own. They focus on Harris’s point about the
time-lag between the receipt of the confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence,
and reasonably ascribe to Harris the prediction that “if we presented the in-
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formation in two distinct phases, separated by an hour or so, people would
make the correct prediction;” nevertheless, they find that “[m]ost of [the S’s]
still got the wrong answer” (Stich and Nichols 1995a, p. 101). This objection
is in my view fatal to the time-lag extension of the Wrong Inputs Defence.
I will not be raising methodological quibbles about Stich and Nichols not
having run a fully controlled experiment, because I am satisfied that such
an experiment would confirm their view that the time-lag is not the problem
for the S’s. I will though be suggesting that the difference is in affective
engagement between the S’s and the O’s —however well the experiment is
described to the S’s, it will not be the same as being there as a participating
subject. Being in the room with someone is more involving than reading about
what happens to them, but it is still nothing like as engaging as being that
someone.
Lottery Ticket Holders
This example relates to an experiment in which O’s are much more reluctant to
return some lottery tickets than they rationally should be. The O’s demanded
much more money to return tickets they had chosen than to return tickets
they were given, even though the tickets had the same chance of winning. The
two conditions were referred to as ‘choice’ and ‘no choice’ of tickets. S’s did
not predict this difference in the amount of money demanded by O’s. The
shape of the S’s predictions of the O’s behaviour and the reasons S’s give
make it look like people rely on simple belief/desire folk psychology, as seems
independently plausible. The S’s believe that the O’s desire to win the lottery
prize and believe that owning a ticket will make that a possibility. The S’s do
not believe however, is that the O’s will behave as though they believe that a
ticket they have chosen has more chance of winning than one they have not
chosen. Since the O’s all behave in this way and the S’s uniformly do not
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work on that basis, the S’s make a systematic ToM error. In response, Harris
(1992, p. 133) offers the defence that S “needs to simulate the vacillation and
eventual commitment of the [O’s]. Moreover, in making that simulation they
must also set aside the tacit reminder [...] that any Lottery ticket whether
selected or allocated, has the same likelihood of winning.”
The same results are obtained by Nichols, Stich, Leslie, and Klein (1996)
when they re-run the Lottery experiment. Nichols, Stich, Leslie, and Klein
(1996, p. 50) write that Harris complains that “it would hardly be surprising
if the [S’s] used the wrong pretend-inputs in making their prediction” if the
delay between buying the tickets and being asked to sell them back was several
days for the O’s and several minutes for the corresponding questions to the
S’s. So Harris is once again essaying a time-lag extension of the Wrong Inputs
Defence. The problem though is that Nichols, Stich, Leslie and Klein reduce
the viability of the time-lag defence offered by Harris by eliminating the time
lag: they show their new S’s a video of the actual lottery experiment. For our
purposes, the most important element of the Nichols, Stich, and Leslie (1995)
reply is to note that “simulation theory predicts that someone watching the
videotape of that part will correctly predict (simulate) the outcome” whatever
that outcome is. So the S’s should simulate the O’s more accurately since the
video represents a closer approximation to the actual experiment than merely
reading a description of it.
Stich and Nichols (1995b, p. 100) have again not employed the scien-
tific methodology of experimental psychologists; they admit their evidence is
“anecdotal.” This quibble must be raised this time, since Kuehberger et al.
(1995, p. 423) conducted a properly controlled experiment and “consistently
failed to replicate the original difference between choice and no-choice under
the conditions used by Nichols et al.” so “it is difficult to use it as a yardstick
against which the accuracy of simulation can be assessed.” A reply to these
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charges is offered by Nichols, Stich, and Leslie (1995, p. 437) who deny that
the failure to replicate of Kuehberger et al. (1995) is a problem for their ob-
jection to ST —they introduce further empirical evidence such that the sum
“still weighs heavily against simulation.” I will discuss this further evidence in
Ch. 8. It is a point in their favour that there is a great deal more experimental
data that ST must explain.
Harris has twice attempted to provide a time lag extension of the Wrong
Inputs Defence. In the first case, with the suicide note assessors, it looks as
though the time-lag defence is committed to a prediction of empirical results
not found by Stich and Nichols. It is not an appealing escape route here for
Harris to point to the experimental methods of Stich and Nichols being less
than rigorous because there is little doubt that a more rigorous experiment
would produce the same results. It is just implausible that anyone would ever
predict that there would be recalcitrant beliefs that survive the elimination of
the only evidence for them, whatever the time-lag between events in actuality
and in simulation was.
Similarly, the time-lag defence does not appear to help with the lottery
ticket holders, because having S’s watch a video of the experiment is a good
way of ensuring that the time sequence of events for S’s is the same as it is
for O’s. So Harris’s second attempt to introduce a time-lag defence seems to
have failed. The key distinction between S and O in the lottery ticket example
is not the time-ordering of events but rather the fact that O owns the ticket
and S does not. I conclude that the Wrong Inputs Defence, even with the
time-lag extension, does not deal with the experimentally-based objections
to ST raised by Nichols, Stich, Leslie, and Klein (1996) and by Stich and
Nichols. Also, Saxe (2005a) introduces a host of additional data which the
time-lag extension of the Wrong Inputs Defence would also have to deal with.
Therefore, ST needs a new defence, which is what I will be providing after I
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consider Harris’s second attempt at a defence, the Translation Defence.
6.2.2 Translation Defence
Harris (1992, p. 132) suggests a second defence beyond the Wrong Inputs
Defence when he writes that: “any simulation process assumes that [O’s]
behaviour is a faithful translation into action of a decision that is reached by
the practical reasoning system. If that assumption is incorrect, the simulation
will err.” The simulation could also be wrong even without wrong inputs
if there is an error in translation from decision to action. I have therefore
chosen to call the defence, which is clearly distinct from the Wrong Inputs
Defence, the Translation Defence. This seems to capture the essential element
of what it suggests has gone wrong, without I hope causing confusion. Nothing
necessarily linguistic is implied; there merely needs to be a translation of the
outputs from the practical decision making system into action, by whatever
mechanism that is accomplished.
Here, a translation error just means that the way S translates the decision
into an action prediction is different from the way that O translates the same
decision into actual action. S will therefore make a ToM error in relation
to the prediction of O’s action even if S had all the same inputs as O did.
Stone and Davies (1996, p. 135) give another description of the Translation
Defence when they note that “there may be purely mechanical influences on
decision taking that are not captured by mental simulation.” O’s may, as we
will see next in the shoppers example, bypass their decision-making system
altogether. If so, S will not be able to use his decision-making system to
simulate such an outcome. We can understand the Translation Defence more
clearly by seeing the use to which Harris (1992) puts it, which is to explain
the mysterious behaviour of some Shoppers. I turn to that experiment and
Harris’s explanation of what is happening next.
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Shoppers
This example relates to an experiment in which Shoppers chose without a ba-
sis when there were no rational bases for making a selection. Shoppers were
“asked to say which article of clothing was the best quality” (Nisbett and
Wilson 1977, p. 243) from a selection of four identical pairs of stockings. It
transpires that they choose the rightmost pair much more often than they
would if they chose randomly across the four pairs. One might expect them to
choose randomly across the four pairs since there were in fact no differences
between the pairs of stockings in quality or otherwise. The systematic ToM
error here is that S’s do not predict this rightmost pair bias in O’s. Har-
ris (1992, p. 133) responds: “the shopping-mall experiment [...] I suspect,
involves the second source of difficulty identified above: faulty assumptions
about what causes the [O’s] behaviour rather than an inappropriate choice of
pretend inputs.”
The mechanism that Harris proposes is as follows. He thinks that the
“[O’s] action of choosing the right-most item is not governed by the decision-
making system at all” (Harris 1992, p. 133) which would mean that S’s would
err in simulation because they simulate the operation of the decision-making
system which is not in this case operating. This does seem plausible because
if the decision-making system is operating, it is at least not operating ratio-
nally when it makes a choice on a non-rational basis, as here. Here, calling
the decision non-rational refers to the lack of a rational basis for making the
particular decision made, which does not exclude the possibility that it is ra-
tional to make some decision, and therefore rational to choose one of the pairs
of stockings even if there is no reason to choose a particular pair.
Harris’s argument for this bypassing of the decision-making system rests
on the post facto confabulation that is observed in the O’s in the shopping
experiment. They do not report having decided to take the right-most item
6.2. WHY WE NEED A NEW DEFENCE 167
for no particular reason; instead they fabricate a reason based on a false claim
about the distinctive qualities of the right-most item. This almost suggests
that the decision-making system is called upon subsequently to manufacture
a justification for the choice that was made. In any case, Harris seems not to
be on solid ground when he argues that had O’s used their decision-making
system in the normal way, they would not need to fabricate a reason; neither
would they have forgotten the reason they had if they had one, and so the
decision-making system is bypassed. Many, perhaps all, of his opponents on
the TT side would not accept that persons generally have good access to their
reasons for acting, because TT proponents often deny Introspectionism, as
described above.
We may be able to give Harris a possible response, involving an attempt
to claim that the TT account here over-generalises. This would seek to make
out the claim that the TT account basically involves a denial that there is a
decision-making system at all, in the way one would normally understand the
term. There is no decision-making system because we never or rarely have
access to our reasons for acting. If there is something we refer to with the
term ‘decision-making system,’ it might be more accurately named ‘post-hoc
decision justification system.’ Harris could simply bite the bullet and assert
Introspectionism; this would involve appealing to our phenomenology. People
are sure they know why they act; we feel it ‘from the inside’: we all naturally
talk in terms of belief/desire folk psychology. I think these approaches might
work out for Harris, but I think it would leave him open in the wider context
of Saxe’s data to a fatal charge of being ad hoc, which I will outline now.
A more serious and wider problem for Harris here is that Saxe has intro-
duced a great deal more data than just the suicide note assessors, the lottery
ticket holders and the shoppers to support the systematic ToM error chal-
lenge to ST. All of the data she introduces would need some kind of special
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treatment of this kind. There would be time-lag defences and shopping mall
defences. One might wonder whether any responses are available to Harris
here. Perhaps Harris can argue that the world is complicated and complicated
explanations are therefore needed. There are two problems with this potential
response. First, the complexity of the world, and the mind, both of which
must be conceded, do not entail that all explanations are complex. The Man-
delbrot set, while generated or explained by repeated application of a simple
equation, is enormously complicated. Secondly, following on from that point,
a complex explanation can only be the best route in the absence of a simpler
one. My explanation of the data will be such a simpler one: I will say that bias
mismatch between S and O is the simple common factor explaining ToM error
in a wide range of experimental cases. Can Harris’s position now be saved by
denying that my explanation is a simpler or less ad hoc one? I believe not, and
this will become clearer still once I have presented more of the experimental
evidence in the next two chapters. It will be shown there that bias mismatch
is an solution with a great deal of explanatory power across a wide range of
circumstances. For now we may merely note that bias mismatch between S
and O neatly explains the ToM errors seen in the three cases of the suicide
note assessors, the lottery ticket holders and the shoppers. My defence also
escapes the charge of being ad hoc in virtue of its auxiliary hypotheses that
affect mismatch and system mismatch will often play a role in generating bias
mismatch, as I will outline in Ch. 7, on motivating the bias mismatch defence.
What we have here is one version of the Translation Defence: S’s do not
simulate O’s bypassing their decision-making system. I have preferred to term
the account the Translation Defence rather than possible alternative names
such as a ‘bypass defence’ since the central idea of the defence is that the out-
put of the decision-making system of O is not accurately translated into action.
This may occur because the decision-making of O is bypassed or because of
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some other ‘mechanical’ influence. This approach means I am regarding a
bypassing of the decision-making system as a form of translation error, which
makes sense if we regard a bypassed output from the decision-making system
as one which has not been correctly translated into action. We might think
that simulating S’s specifically engage their decision-making system because
they have been asked, they believe, to simulate a decision. This could explain
ToM errors, if there is in fact a great deal of mistranslation going on in O’s.
But it does not seem as though we can make much progress by assuming that
O’s bypass their decision making machinery on a widespread basis: that would
entail an empirically false prediction of wholesale ToM failure.
It is interesting to note that all three of these examples relate to value
judgments. In the case of the suicide note assessors, the value judged by S
is the level of ability of O in assessing whether the suicide note is genuine or
fake. In the case of the lottery ticket holders, the value judged by S is what
economic value O will place on a chosen lottery ticket versus a non-chosen
one. In the case of the shoppers, the value judged by S is which pair of a
set of pairs of identical stockings O will say is the highest quality. It might
then appear at this stage as though the bias mismatch defence is only going
to apply for systematic ToM errors involving value judgements. While there
will be more examples of this type in Ch. 8 and Ch. 9, there will be plenty
of other types of data considered also. The bias mismatch defence will have
wider application than solely to value judgements.
In summary, I will agree that the time-lag extension does not save the
Wrong Inputs Defence; the Translation Defence lacks widespread applicability
and pursing this route in any case will result in an ad hoc set of approaches,
because of the wide array of data introduced to challenge ST. This necessitates
a new defence, which I will provide. I will also be proposing that the Bias
Mismatch Defence takes a unified perspective across the data and is thus not
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exposed to the charge of being ad hoc, which a set of extensions of Harris’s
defence would be.
6.3 Bias Mismatch Defence: Outline
The Bias Mismatch Defence is the claim that S’s simulation of O may fail
because S and O do not apply the same cognitive biases. Simulation may fail
because S operates with different cognitive biases to O, where the difference
could be that a different bias is applied by S than by O, or the same bias is
applied by S and by O but in different intensities, or the same bias is applied
by S and by O with the same intensities but about different items. All of those
eventualities would result in simulation error even absent wrong inputs.
I will defer the important motivation question – why should we expect
there to be bias mismatches? – to the dedicated Ch. 6.
The question also arises as to whether or not this new defence I offer is
a variant of one of the two previous defences or not. That is an important
question, because I am arguing that both of those defences fail. Therefore, my
position would become incoherent if I fail to show clear separation between
my account and those previous two defences. It would still be possible for me
to say that the efficacy of the defence is more important than its classification,
but dialectically, that looks best retained as a fall-back position. In fact, clear
separation is provided by making the assumption I outlined above on p. 161,
that the content of an input is unaffected by its contextual factors. S’s biases,
affective and other states cannot change the nature and content of the inputs
to S’s simulation, on this assumption. This distinguishes my account from
Wrong Inputs Defence since on my view, the inputs can be right and the
simulation still fail. This is how I will account for the systematic ToM errors
of which Saxe (2005a) complains without assuming wrong inputs.
The Translation Defence is also clearly distinct from the Wrong Inputs De-
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fence since the former postulates that the difference between S and O lies in
how the inputs are handled as opposed to what they are. Therefore I also need
to show that my new defence is not a form of the Translation Defence. For-
tunately this is straightforward. My defence is also clearly not to be classified
with the Translation Defence since my account does not and need not postu-
late errors in translation of outputs of O’s decision-making system into action;
it will instead be postulating biases in O applying while O makes decisions.
In fact, attempting to classify my account as one of the two previous de-
fences would involve saying where my account locates the source of the errors.
Since my account locates that source in bias mismatch between S and O, that
question devolves to ‘where are the biases?.’ And trying to decide where, for
example, the failure of S to model a bias of O takes place could be seen as
being an ill-formed question, since we cannot specify a location where some-
thing does not occur. If we had a specified functional location for where the
biases are applied in O, then we might be able to say that the difference be-
tween those bias-applying locations in O and the same, but not bias-applying,
locations in S are where the difference between S and O is found. However, it
is possible that these biases are wide-spread throughout the isomorphic pro-
cedure of simulation; or that the question has no answer: as Apperly (2008,
p. 281) writes, “there is no systematic basis for drawing a line between the
inputs to a particular reasoning episode and the start of the reasoning itself.”
Since I have shown that my account is clearly distinct from the previous ones
and therefore need not fail as they do, we may move on to the more press-
ing business of showing that my account can succeed in explaining systematic
ToM error.
The idea behind my defence may be illustrated by considering an example
from the book Asch (1952) cited by Saxe (2005a). Consider the following
questions, all related to a scenario in which you are given a list of personal
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characteristics and asked to assess the personality of the person to whom the
list applies.
• Would you assess the characteristics fairly?
• Would you assess them regardless of irrelevant features?
• Would you assess them regardless of the order in which they were pre-
sented?
I submit that you will answer all of these questions in the affirmative.
Moreover, if you were asked whether you would expect someone else to perform
in the same way, you would also affirm that, short of any specific information
suggesting malice or lack of competence in the other person.
Now look at the following two lists of characteristics from Asch (1952, p.
212).
A intelligent —industrious —impulsive —critical —stubborn —envious
B envious —stubborn —critical —impulsive —industrious —intelligent
Here I contend that, consistent with what Asch found, you will form a more
positive impression of the person with the characteristics described in list A
than in list B. In this, you will be representative of people generally. As Asch
(1952, p. 212) puts it, list A describes “an able person who possesses certain
shortcomings” while list B describes a “problem” person whose “abilities are
hampered by his serious difficulties” (Asch 1952, p. 212). This means in your
original assessment of yourself, you have committed a ToM error, because you
failed to forecast that either you or the experimental sample will make such
distinct judgements based on a list of characteristics which are the same in
each case but merely in reverse order.
It might be objected here that it is in fact rational to apply a heavier
weighting to the first-appearing characteristics, an approach equivalent to
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making the assumption that the characteristics have been presented in or-
der of significance or importance. I do not believe that the objection succeeds
however, for two reasons. Firstly, no statement in relation to the importance
of the ordering was given to the participants by the experimenters, so the
objection assumes without other motivation that all of the participants took
it upon themselves to accord importance to the ordering. This may not be
conclusive, since it could and might have happened that many participants
took the characteristics as having been ranked in order of importance, but
that would be an assumption which such an account would be making which
would be a theoretical cost and which would be empirically testable. Secondly,
and crucially, one of Asch’s more technical journal papers give us further ex-
amples. Asch (1946, p. 264) found that “a change in one character-quality
has produced a widespread change in the entire impression.” This means that
changing a single characteristic in a list of six completely alters the partic-
ipants’ general impression of the person described. The switch in question,
from ‘warm’ to ‘cold,’ is doubtless of some significance. However, it is not
rational to weight it much more heavily than all of the other five combined,
particularly since Asch (1946, pp. 267-268) also finds that changing the other
five characteristics can greatly reduce the influence of warm/cold. Indeed,
Asch (1946, p. 273) finds that the treatment of a characteristic can vary im-
mensely, between its being ignored completely if it does not fit the general
impression and outweighing all of the other characteristics. This is surprising.
One response here might be that adding or removing one characteristic might
rationally make a big difference to the overall perceived profile of a person-
ality. This seems true for very significant, perhaps dominant characteristics.
One might see ‘violent’ as being in a special category which can alone cause
a complete revision of assessment of someone. But putting ‘warm’ into that
category seems like a stretch. Since none of these character assessment data
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seem to be predicted by our own ToM, we have an illustration of the sort of
social psychology experiments which surprise us and indicate to Saxe (2005a)
the presence of systematic ToM errors.
Another question here is to ask whether this is really a problem for ST.
Naturally, if it is not a problem for ST, then my defence of ST need not
deal with the problem. One might in similar vein think that the Conjunction
Fallacy is not a problem for ST. That line would suggest that as soon as we
see how Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have phrased their famous ‘Linda’
question, we know how people will answer. There is an immediate pull to
answer the question wrongly and commit the fallacy. I nevertheless see value in
including discussion of such questions as those raised by the Linda experiment,
and the character assessment example above which is intended to illustrate
and introduce Asch’s work, because the data are consistent with the bias
mismatch defence for which I argue. So even if ST is not strictly speaking
caused problems by a particular experiment, it is still valuable to show that
bias mismatch explains the data, as I will also be arguing.
It is interesting to note here that participants seem in parts of this ex-
periment to succumb to the bias known as the Halo Effect, which outcome
prefigures the type of explanation I will be presenting of systematic ToM er-
ror. I might finally point out that even if the objection is successful, that
would just mean that this experiment does not illustrate a systematic ToM
error, so it drops out of the category of data that ST must explain.
Now we come to the shape of the defence. The reason O’s assess the char-
acteristics ‘unfairly’ is that they fail prey to Confirmation Bias. The term
Confirmation Bias refers to the “fundamental tendency to seek information
consistent with current [...] beliefs, theories or hypotheses and to avoid the
collection of potentially falsifying evidence” Evans (1990, p. 41). In other
words, O’s tend to look for data confirming what they already believe. Thus,
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information arriving earlier is given more weight in assessments; the later
information has to countervail the earlier information insofar as the later in-
formation goes against the earlier data. The reason S’s fail to predict this
is that simulation here does not model bias. The Bias Mismatch Defence is
just this: it is the claim that simulation by S of O can be systematically in-
accurate because there can be systematic bias in O which is not simulated
by S. Note also here the clear distinction between being asked dispassionate,
clinical, salient questions like the ones in the list about how you would do the
job and actually being in the situation of assessing the characteristics. We will
see this affective mismatch and its analogues on a great many occasions later.
6.4 Bias Mismatch Defence: Biases Involved
It is well-known that we exhibit many errors in our reasoning due to a large
number of cognitive biases. We often use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics
which are effectively biases, and as Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1125)
put it, “these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe
and systematic errors.” I set out below a sketch of the biases I will employ in
the mismatch defence. How they work will become clearer when I use them
later to explain data on systematic ToM error introduced by Saxe (2005a).
Naturally, any objections to the effect that I need to use further biases would
count as a friendly amendment: I aim to prove that some combination of Bias
Mismatches can explain the systematic ToM errors and that can be done using
a variety of biases.
6.4.1 Representativeness Heuristic
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1124) define the Representativeness Heuris-
tic as occurring when “probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A
is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B.” Intu-
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itively, we may regard this as stereotyping, because a typical application of the
heuristic will involve people deciding that someone is a librarian because they
fit the stereotype of a librarian. The error is also known as ‘base rate neglect.’
Subjects fail to take account of what should be a much more significant factor
in the probability estimate viz. the number of people in the population who
are librarians.
The Representativeness Heuristic was investigated by giving subjects de-
scriptions of the personalities of a group of persons. Tversky and Kahneman
(1974, p. 1124) write that “subjects were told that the group from which
the descriptions had been drawn consisted of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers”
or vice versa. The subjects were then asked to assess the probability that a
given person was an engineer or a lawyer. The descriptions were slanted to
be engineer-like or lawyer-like. For example, a stereotypical engineer will en-
joy fixing his car at weekends while a stereotypical lawyer will be tenaciously
argumentative in personal situations.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1125) found that subjects ignored the
population probability data. If given an engineer-like profile, they said the
person was probably an engineer, even when they had also been told that the
sample consisted of 70% lawyers.
6.4.2 Availability Heuristic
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 208) write that “[a] person is said to employ
the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by
the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind.” For
example, “one may assess the divorce rate in a given community by recalling
divorces among one’s acquaintances” (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, p. 208).
This is reasonable as a first approximation, but will be subject to inaccuracy
depending on the events of one’s life. If one happens to know many divorced
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people, one will likely over-estimate the prevalence of divorce in wider society.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) measured the Availability Heuristic by ask-
ing subjects to rate the probabilities of certain syllables occurring in words.
They found that subject’s responses were driven by the ease with which they
could think of examples, rather than the actual probabilities, even though
subjects obviously had a great deal of experience of words in their native
languages.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 212) found that subjects “erroneously
judged words beginning with re to be more frequent than words ending with
re.” This came about because it is easier to think of words beginning with
re than ending with re, because it is generally easier to think of words with
a specified beginning than with a specified ending. This means the words
beginning with re were much more available and this produced the faulty
probability estimate.
Two further factors feed into availability: salience and vividness.
Highly salient events will warp probability judgments via their increased
availability. Taleb (2008, p. 58) gives several examples including that of
someone who heard of someone’s relative who was mugged in Central Park.
This is likely to be much more salient for them than the statistics relating to
muggings in Central Park and therefore much more available. They will likely
greatly overestimate the probability of being mugged in Central Park. Such a
story is also highly vivid, which leads us to the second factor.
In outlining vividness, Evans (1990, p. 27) credits Nisbett and Ross with
the observation that in our reasoning, we “overweight vivid, concrete informa-
tion and underweight dull, pallid and abstract information.” This is intuitively
plausible, just from considering that we prefer the vivid to the dull. More vivid
information is more available. Evans (1990) again relies on Nisbett and Ross
to supply three characteristics of vividness, which are “(1) emotional interest;
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(2) concreteness and imageability and (3) temporal and spatial proximity.”
Salient and vivid items are more available and receive higher probability
estimates.
6.4.3 Conjunction Fallacy
The probability of two events A and B is given by multiplying the probability
of event A by event B. For example, if the chance of a coin toss coming up
tails is 50%, then the probability of getting two tails in a row is 25%. The
maximum probability of an event is 1, or 100%, for events which are certain to
occur. A consequence of this is a law of statistics called the conjunction rule
which holds that the probability of both events A and B occurring must be no
greater than the probability of event B occurring alone. This is because the
probability of A and B occurring will have a maximum value when A is certain
and that maximum value will be the same as the probability of B occurring
alone. As Tversky and Kahneman (1983, p. 298) state, “[t]he violation of the
conjunction rule in a direct comparison of B to A&B is called the conjunction
fallacy.” In other words, the Conjunction Fallacy occurs whenever we assess
the probability of two events as higher than one of them alone.
The canonical illustration of the Conjunction Fallacy is the famous ‘Linda’
experiment. Subjects are told that Linda majored in philosophy, is very bright
and as a student “was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice” (Tversky and Kahneman 1983, p. 297). Subjects are then
asked whether it is more likely that a) Linda works as a bank teller or b)
Linda works as a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. Subjects
consistently state that b) is more probable, even though it is impossible that
b) could be more probable than a) alone, since b) includes a).
The Conjunction Fallacy is closely related to the Representativeness and
Availability Heuristics, since what is happening is that a reduction in extension
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is being combined with an increase in representativeness and availability. Thus
it becomes easier to think of examples of a category even when the number of
members of that category has decreased. This is what leads us to make the
errors in probability estimation. There are also links to what Taleb (2008, Ch.
6) calls the Narrative Fallacy, which combines our tendencies to remember
facts linked by a story and over-attribute causation. It is much easier to
construct a story about Linda being a committed social activist at college and
continuing with those interests later. This is why Tversky and Kahneman
(1983, p. 299) found that 85% of subjects rated b) more likely than a).
6.4.4 Fundamental Attribution Error
The Fundamental Attribution Error is defined by Ross, Amabile, and Stein-
metz (1977, p. 491) as “the tendency to underestimate the role of situational
determinants and overestimate the degree to which social actions and out-
comes reflect the dispositions of relevant actors.”3 The error reflects our false
belief in stable personality: we ascribe the behaviour of others more to their
‘characteristics’ than to the situation they were in. Darley and Batson (1973,
p. 108) found that “personality variables were not useful in predicting whether
a person helped or not:” that was explained by whether or not the person was
in a hurry. Also, Kamtekar (2004, p. 465) reports on many experiments in-
cluding honesty studies which showed no “correlation across behaviour types”
e.g. that someone who cheats in a test is not more likely to take money from
a box. There seems to be nothing like a character trait of dishonesty. Overall,
we often commit the Fundamental Attribution Error, including whenever we
say something like ‘of course he would do that, that’s what he is like’ —but
there is little evidence supporting the existence of stable character traits and
3See Andrews (2008, [p. 13) for argument to the effect that “folk psychology includes
the notion that some behaviour is explained by personality traits,” as is consistent with the
Fundamental Attribution Error.
180 CHAPTER 6. BIAS MISMATCH DEFENCE: BACKGROUND
plenty against.
Saxe herself at one point employs the Fundamental Attribution Error in
a way that could be seen as a version of the Bias Mismatch Defence. Saxe
(2009, p. 263) suggests that “other people’s actions are ascribed to stable
traits, whereas one’s own actions are generally seen as variable and situation-
dependent” and this leads to ToM error.
6.4.5 Conformity Bias
I will term this particular bias Conformity Bias, following Plotkin (2011), who
does not however give a brief definition of the term.4 Although the pioneer,
Asch (1952, p. 467), does not use the term Conformity Bias, he writes that he
has observed “a great desire to be in agreement with the group;” the thwarting
of this desire leads to fear, longing and uncertainty. The reference group might
be those physically present or a group that the subject identifies with. The
bias is often called “the Asch effect” in the literature, but I would prefer a
more descriptive term.
The most significant chapter of Asch (1952, pp. 450-501) from the per-
spective of conformity is Ch. 16, on “Group Forces in the Modification and
Distortion of Judgements.” Asch describes experiments where small groups of
individuals are asked to judge which of three test lines are identical in length
to a given standard line. All participants call out their answers. A deception
is involved, because all but one of the participants are in fact in confederation
with the experimenter. They have been instructed to call out obviously false
answers. The key question is what will the non-confederated participant —the
‘critical subject’ —say in the face of such a perplexingly obtuse majority.
The results are that the error rate of the critical subject is 33.2% if the
majority is wrong but only 7.4% if the majority is correct. This means that
4Prentice (2007, p. 18) does use the term in the way I do: “conformity bias strongly
pushes people to conform their judgments to the judgments of their reference group.”
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the critical subject is induced to abandon his correct choice in favour of an ob-
viously false group choice with a much higher frequency than can be explained
by genuine error. This majority influence meant that “erroneous announce-
ments contaminated one-third of the estimates of the critical subjects” (Asch
1952, p. 457). This observation forms a clear illustration of the Asch Effect or
Conformity Bias. This bias is very strong; Prentice (2007, p. 18) notes that
“[m]ore than 60 percent of the subjects gave an obviously incorrect answer at
least once.”
6.4.6 False Consensus Effect
Ross, Greene, and House (1977, p. 279) define the False Consensus Effect
when they write that “social observers tend to perceive a ‘false consensus’
with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses,” where re-
sponses might be actions, choices or opinions. So, “raters estimated particular
responses to be relatively common” (Ross, Greene, and House 1977, p. 279)
—viz, the ones they had themselves made.
Ross, Greene, and House (1977, p. 279) conducted a number of experi-
ments: one of them was called the ‘supermarket story.’ Subjects are asked
to imagine that they are just leaving a supermarket, when they are asked
whether they like shopping there. They reply that they do, since that is in
fact the case. It is then revealed that the comments have been filmed, and
the subject is requested to sign a release allowing the film to be used in a TV
advertisement. The key question is then asked: the subject or ‘rater’ is asked
to estimate the percentage of people who will sign the release.
The results were that raters overestimate the percentages of others who
make the same choice they would. Ross, Greene, and House (1977, p. 294)
conclude that “raters’ perceptions of social consensus and their social infer-
ences about actors reflect the raters’ own behavioural choices.”
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6.4.7 Self-Presentation Bias
Igoe and Sullivan (1993, p. 18) give the definition when they write that
“[i]ndividuals show Self-Presentation Bias by projecting personal behaviours
that present themselves more positively than others.” The Self-Presentation
Bias is perhaps more of a natural psychological tendency than a cognitive bias,
though that will not concern us since the effects are the same. Put simply,
Self-Presentation Bias expresses the way that people generally wish to show
themselves in a positive light. They may do this by selective story-telling or
otherwise.
Igoe and Sullivan (1993) measure the rates at which individuals work at
hard tasks and find that they systematically over-report their own likelihood of
returning to a hard task. Thus, the individuals exhibit Self-Presentation Bias
in that they make it appear as though they are more likely to work hard than
they really are. Interestingly, the subjects also attributed a lower propensity
to return to the task to a fictional character, thus enhancing their own position
in relation to others.5
Kopcha and Sullivan (2006, p. 628) note that “self-report data often reflect
a phenomenon known as self-presentation bias or social desirability bias —that
is, a tendency of individuals to present themselves and their practices in a
favourable way.” They measure Self-Presentation Bias in a group of teachers,
who all said that they engaged in an array of positively perceived teaching
practices more than their colleagues. Similarly, Kopcha and Sullivan (2006, p.
629) cite Self-Presentation Bias as the cause in studies reporting that “medical
professionals often overestimated their level of adherence to the guidelines for
clinical practice.” More generally, we may agree with Pronin, Gilovich, and
Ross (2004, p. 788) who observe that there is “mounting evidence that people
5This assumes a continuity between how people assign properties to themselves and how
fictional objects obtain their properties. For more on these vexed questions, see Short (2014).
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are motivated to view themselves, their assessments, and their outcomes in a
positive light.”
6.4.8 Clustering Illusion
Gilovich (1993, p. 16) defines the Clustering Illusion as occurring when we
believe falsely that “random events such as coin flips should alternate between
heads and tails more than they do.” For example, in a sequence of 20 tosses
of a fair coin, there is a 25% chance of a sequence of six heads, which seems
to us far too ordered to be random. Alternatively, consider the probability of
the two sets of results of coin tosses: HHHTTT looks much more pattern-rich
and therefore improbable than HTHHTT but they actually have the same
probability. The Clustering Illusion is the tendency to see patterns in data
that are not really there. Gilovich (1993, p. 15) provides further examples
including a belief that the random pattern of bomb sites in London actually
shows a pattern; this effect is due to selecting the quadrant frame almost in
order to arrive at the view that some quadrants of London were more heavily
bombed. In general, our abilities to handle random noise are poor; we see
patterns everywhere and we even see faces in the side of cliffs.
6.4.9 Confirmation Bias
The remaining biases including Confirmation Bias have already been described
above, so I will be brief for the rest of this section. As mentioned in Ch. 6,
Evans (1990, p. 41) defines Confirmation Bias as the “fundamental tendency
to seek information consistent with current [...] beliefs, theories or hypotheses
and to avoid the collection of potentially falsifying evidence.”
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6.4.10 Belief Perseverance Bias
As Nestler (2010, p. 35) observes with copious references, “belief perseverance
has been observed in social perception [. . . ] and self-perception [. . . ] and it
is robustly shown that individuals cling to beliefs even when the evidential
basis for these beliefs is completely refuted.” The Belief Perseverance Bias
was illustrated above in the discussion of the suicide note assessors in Ch. 6.
6.4.11 Endowment Effect
Kuehberger et al. (1995, p. 432) write that the “endowment effect [. . . ] means
that simply being endowed with a good gives it added value.” It can be seen
when students are asked to estimate the price of a visible item such as a mug
with a university crest on it. They make an estimate and are then actually
given the mug and asked what they would sell it for. It turns out that they
demand a much higher price for the mug now that they own it than the figure
they gave previously for its value.
The Endowment Effect was in fact behind the results discussed above in
relation to the lottery ticket holders. They assigned a higher value to tickets
they had chosen than to ones they were given, although the economic value of
the tickets was identical irrespective of whether they had chosen them or not.
It seems as though their sense of ownership was more awakened by choice.
6.4.12 Position Effect
Nisbett and Wilson (1977, p. 243) give the definition when they write that
they measured “a pronounced left-to-right position effect, such that the right-
most object in the array was heavily over-chosen” in the experiment with the
shoppers. The shoppers had to say which of an array of identical pairs of
stockings was of superior quality. This Position Effect was discussed above in
Ch. 6.
Chapter 7
Bias Mismatch Defence:
Motivation
7.1 Introduction
One apparent problem for my Bias Mismatch Defence would result from the
possibility that biases might be thought to be in some way more systematic
rather than temporary disruptions. That would make the explanation look
a bit too much like ‘we make systematic errors because we make systematic
errors,’ which has no explanatory value because it is circular. I agree that
cognitive biases are a stable part of our cognition. So the motivational ques-
tion becomes important. An account must be given as to why these bias
mismatches occur. In the formulation of the structure of the Bias Mismatch
Defence given earlier on p. 155, we had FACTOR and BIAS. What I will
be suggesting in this chapter is that two candidates for FACTOR are affect
and system (or both). FACTOR is important for motivational reasons: my
account needs to give a reason why there is Bias Mismatch if it is to non-
circularly explain ToM error. ‘BIAS therefore BIAS’ is not explanatory. My
claim is not that bias is not simulated, it is that affective state and system
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affect which biases to which an individual is subject.
What motivation for my defence can be given beyond the fact that it ex-
plains all the data? I will outline below three routes on which bias mismatch
is a plausible outcome. It is important to note that all of these claimed routes
represent auxiliary hypotheses. All of them could be false but the bias mis-
match defence could remain intact.
The first auxiliary hypothesis postulates affect mismatch. This means that
Bias Mismatch may occur because S and O are in different affective states.
This would be likely in cases where it is known that affect makes biases more
likely to be applied, as is observed when people are put under stress. Anecdo-
tally, we would expect stressed or emotional people to apply cognitive biases
more than calm, rational people. The same is observed experimentally. As
Mineka and Sutton (1992, p. 65) observe, depression appears to be asso-
ciated both with “mood-congruent judgmental biases” and “a memory bias
for negative mood-congruent material.” Notably, the authors go as far as to
define cognitive biases as “any selective or non-veridical processing of emotion-
relevant information” (Mineka and Sutton 1992, p. 65) showing the close link
between affect and bias. I will discuss how affect mismatch can lead to bias
mismatch further in §7.2.
The second auxiliary hypothesis postulates system mismatch. Dual Pro-
cess Theory (Sloman 1996) suggests that there are two systems of reasoning,
the quick but inaccurate System 1 and the slower but more rational System
2. If S and O apply different systems, simulation is again likely to fail. If S
calmly and rationally simulates a panicked or depressed O, then S will likely
be using system 2 and O will likely be using system 1. This is a formalisation
of the intuition I have mentioned previously to the effect that thinking about
someone hanging off a cliff by their fingertips is not as emotionally involving
as actually hanging off a cliff by one’s fingertips. I will discuss more fully how
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system mismatch can lead to bias mismatch in §7.3.
It is apparent from the example above that there may be overlaps between
the two auxiliary hypotheses. It appears as though in the cliff-top scenario, we
have both affect mismatch and system mismatch. In other scenarios, we may
have system mismatch without affect mismatch and also conversely, affect
mismatch without system mismatch. I will discuss further how these other
scenarios may produce bias mismatches in §7.4.
Taken together, the two auxiliary hypotheses and their interactions an-
swer the motivational question. We expect bias mismatch to occur because
we expect affect and system mismatch to occur. This also deals with the cir-
cularity problem. The account does not make a prediction of the form ‘S’s
make systematic errors because S’s make systematic errors.’ It instead makes
predictions of the form ‘S’s make systematic ToM errors when S’s are in sys-
tematically different affective states to O’s,’ and ‘S’s make systematic ToM
errors when S’s are systematically using different reasoning systems to O’s.’
Now of course it becomes incumbent on the account to explain why that might
be, and that task will be conducted systematically by looking at the exper-
imental data, in Ch. 8 and Ch. 9. The idea will be that the experimental
situations systematically induce affect mismatch, for example.
7.2 Affect Mismatch
My response to Saxe’s challenge will be that Bias Mismatch between S and
O can supply the missing element to ST (and so Weak S/T Hybridism) to
allow it to explain the systematic ToM errors. Often, it will be the case that
this Bias Mismatch is in turn a result of Affect Mismatch between S and O.
It is acknowledged in the psychological literature that affect can lead to the
application of cognitive biases. As Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 636) ob-
serve, not only do humans add information to the world, but “perceptions are
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further biased by their hopes, fears, needs and immediate emotional state.”1
We do not accurately allow for the biases of others because we are not as
exposed as they are to the live situation. Even if we are present, it is much
less involving to observe someone hanging from a cliff top by their fingertips
than it is actually to be in that situation. S simply cannot feel or imagine the
affective position of that O to any significant extent. S is more remote still
if S merely hears a dry description of the situation given in a rather clinical
fashion. There can be different degrees of such affective detachment, which
will impede simulation, as Goldie (1999, p. 410) points out in a discussion of
imagining being attacked by a jellyfish. He notes the different affective import
of imagining the attack “whilst sitting at my desk in London, whilst swimming
in a pool, and whilst swimming off the coast of South Africa.” The fact that
we can so easily do this and so easily agree with Goldie is to my mind in itself
an argument for ST. As we will see, much of the empirical data on ToM errors
falls into this category: perforce, if it is properly collected data, it has been
collected in a scientific manner which excludes S feeling fully engaged in the
situation of O.
The same distinctions can apply when S considers the position of S himself.
As Goldie (2011, p. 129) notes in a discussion of S’s views of S in the past,
there are multiple ways in which the S now can differ from O as past S; the gap
between S now and then “can be triply ironic: it can be ironic epistemically
—I now know what I did not know then; it can be ironic evaluatively —I now
evaluate what happened in a way that I did not at the time; and it can be
ironic emotionally.” The irony referred to is the ‘dramatic irony’ that exists
in a theatre when the audience knows something that an observed character
does not —this can form an interesting parallel to our examination of S and O.
At least the last of these three forms of irony and probably the second as well
1Coplan (2011, p. 12) discusses how differences in affect may lead to simulation error.
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have a strong affective component. We may also agree that even information
asymmetry can have affective import, as suggested by the very term ‘dramatic
irony.’
Further evidence for this connection between affect and ToM may be de-
rived from Boucher, when she cites Kanner as including affect in the original
1943 definition of autism. Boucher (1996, p. 228) writes that Kanner “origi-
nally suggested that autism [. . . ] results from ‘an innate inability to form the
usual biologically provided affective contact with people’ .” Given the well-
known association of autism with ToM deficits, we can see that if Kanner’s
original definition is correct, lack of affective contact with others will impair
ToM capacities.
Arguing positively for the connection between affect matching and success-
ful mindreading, Biggs (2007) suggests that ‘phenomenal simulation’ —where
S’s phenomenal state resembles O’s —may be an aid to mindreading and in-
troduces claims that there is similar neurophysiology occurring in those who
experience and merely observe disgust, pain, etc. Some might object here that
‘phenomenal’ simulation might proceed just as well without qualia, so long as
the isomorphism of states and progress between them is the same in S and
O, because S will still arrive at a good prediction of O’s behaviour. I suspect
that this is possible, but it seems less plausible and efficient than an account
in which S simply matches O’s states affectively in an attenuated way as well,
unless one believes in zombies (Chalmers 1997).2
In the next two chapters, we will discuss a large number of cases of errors
made by S’s in assessing what O will do in certain, often stressful situations.
Even though there will be processing differences between S and O, there will
also be different inputs for S and O: namely, the affect actually felt by O in
2See also Mealey and Kinner (2002) for argument that psychopaths do not empathise as
much as controls because they have flattened affect; and Short (2015, Ch. 10) for argument
that the flattened affect of schizophrenic subjects causes their ToM impairments.
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the situation. If S were able to model the stress of O accurately, it might lead
to a reduction in ToM errors.
One objection will be to ask why this same bias does not apply when the
model is run. S suffers from the same types of cognitive bias as O does. We
need this to explain why there can be errors —if exactly the same system is
run by S as by O, and there were no wrong inputs, then S would generally not
be wrong about the mental state of O. The answer to this is that the specific
bias occurs only for O’s and not for S’s. Why this is so may be because it
is just not as engaging to be S as it is to be O —in any situation. Again, it
simply is nothing like as fear-inducing to imagine hanging from a cliff by one’s
fingertips as it is actually to be in that situation. The biases are triggered
more by the affect of the situation. While S will doubtless be experiencing
some affect, and it may even be sufficiently engaging to trigger some of S’s
own biases, the affects will not be the same ones as those experienced by O.
One type of Affect Mismatch might be fear differentials. Gordon (1986,
p. 161) picks up on the difficulty of adding really experienced fear to the
simulation in his early paper, indicating it with his italicisation. He writes:
“[i]f I pretend realistically that there is an intruder in the house I might find
myself surprisingly brave —or cowardly.” It might even be deleterious to
simulate the fear well; S’s might become unable to act when faced even with
the prospect of danger. It is only possible for S to be surprised about S’s
bravery if S has a different level of affect, and thus different biases applying,
in the simulated case and the real case. Gordon also notes here that self-
deception may corrupt the simulation effort. This is highly consistent with
the approach I propose here —perhaps S’s often deceive themselves about
the frequency with which S’s use biased thinking. Dennett (1979, p. 37)
notes that an affective involvement may lead to self-deception —which we
may understand as a failure of ToM —when he writes that if S lacks “any
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remarkable emotional stake in the proposition [p] [...] [then S] can quite safely
assume that his judgement is not a piece of self-deception.”
White (1988, p. 41) notes, “[S’s] do not have the same practical concerns
as [O’s], because the judgements they are making do not relate to their own
behaviours [...] there is less likelihood that accuracy will be low on their list
of priorities.” We can see that there will be more affective involvement for the
O’s who have after all been responsible for the behaviour in question than for
the S’s who are more dispassionately explaining it. Also, as Goldman (1989,
p. 167) observes: the ST “approach can certainly insist that most simulation
is semi-automatic, with relatively little salient phenomenology.” Goldman is
countering the objection that if ST is correct, then we should spend more
time than we do experiencing vividly what it is like to be in others’ shoes,
but his point also supports the line I propose here. It might be that one
of the conditions of making ST semi-automatic —which is needful given the
requirement for efficiency —is that some of the elements, like bias-modelling
or full affect simulation, not always be run. As D. M. Peterson and Riggs
(1999, p. 82) point out, on “evolutionary grounds, it is plausible to consider
strategies which involve minimum processing load.” So the S’s might need to
exhibit Affect Mismatch on occasions, purely on efficiency grounds.
The proposal is not that the correct bias cannot be added to the simulation;
merely that it often is not. As Gordon (1992, p. 20) writes, if you turn back
on a country trail because you see a grizzly bear, you may be puzzled by your
companion’s standing her ground and taking out her pencil and notebook,
unless you previously “ ‘prep’ yourself with the appropriate intrepid naturalist
attitudes and desires.” The reasons you do not generally do this may derive
simply from the additional cognitive load involved. As Gordon (1992, p. 25)
goes on to observe, it may be that “readiness for simulation is a prepackaged
‘module’ called upon automatically;” that would be consistent with evidence
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(Samson et al. 2010) suggesting that modelling just the perspectives of others is
mandatory, fast and effortless but more complex ToM tasks involve significant
cognitive load.
As Heal (2000, p. 16) notes, errors in simulation may be because S and O
differ in “the degree of stress they are under in thinking of the problem.” This
view leads to a testable prediction of the Bias Mismatch Defence, which is that
people with more active imaginations —who are perhaps more able to expe-
rience O’s affect vicariously —would be less susceptible to Saxe’s occasional
systematic errors in ToM than others. The view I propose also allows for the
relatively high success rate of our folk psychology: in the majority of everyday
situations, there is not that much affect involved for either S or O; the lack of
full bias modelling makes no difference to the outcome of the situation. This
also explains part of why we find unpredictable people disconcerting.
The condition known as Williams Syndrome (WS) provides further evi-
dence available for a link between affective nature and ToM ability. Segal
(1996, p. 154) notes the following characteristics of WS: “average IQ of around
50;” “general impairments [in...] acquisition of [...] theoretical knowledge;”
“high degree of social skills” combined with good ToM capacities. The social
skills are most notable in the syndrome: Bellugi et al. (2007, p. 99) note
that the “WS personality is characterised by hyper-sociability, including over-
friendliness and heightened approachability toward others.” This sociability
will be driven by heightened enjoyment of social situations by WS subjects.
They are therefore high affect individuals, when interacting socially. It is
suggested by Bellugi et al. (2007, p. 100) that social ability and affective in-
volvement go together when they note that WS children’s stories “contained
significantly more social and affective evaluative devices” than those of con-
trols. We can see then that empathetic abilities can compensate in ToM for
impaired intellectual capacities. The WS subjects are able to develop good
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Table 7.1: Simulation Error Probability By System Type Of S And O
S: System 1 S: System 2
O: System 1 Medium; S and O maybe
different biases; but per-
haps this covers much ‘good
enough’ everyday ToM
High; frequent source of er-
ror in many situations where
O is under more pressure
than S e.g. Shoppers
O: System 2 Very High; quick simulation
of slow reasoning; perhaps
this is infrequently applied
because ineffective
Low; any occasion where S
rationally follows O’s ratio-
nal processes
ToM capacity despite impairments in their theoretical abilities; which makes
it look like affect is more important than theory in ToM.
7.3 System Mismatch
A further illustration of occasions when the Bias Mismatch Defence may apply
can be given by considering Dual Process Theory (Sloman 1996). Dual Process
Theory postulates that there are two reasoning systems that persons use:
System 1 and System 2. System 1 is quick and dirty; System 2 is more
likely to produce the right answer but takes longer. It seems clear that if
a particular episode of reasoning by O is simulated by S and S simulates in
a different system to the one that O used, there will be ToM errors. Since
System 1 basically is just a set of heuristics and biases, then this approach is
another application of the Bias Mismatch Defence.
Table 7.1 shows rough estimates of how System Mismatch might allow for
different simulation error probabilities depending on which of System 1 and
System 2 are employed by S and O.
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Three objections present themselves. The first objection urges that it
is not plausible to claim that ToM can take place in different systems. The
second objection claims that there is no difference in biases obtaining in System
1 reasoning and System 2 reasoning. The third objection claims that this
approach over-generalises: it predicts too much ToM error. I will cover each
objection in turn.
Defeating the first objection involves showing that ToM use takes place in
both systems. Many commentators have described approaches to ToM which
include two levels of processing. These map easily on to the System 1/System 2
division. I will provide three examples. Butterfill and Apperly (2013, p. 609),
cite developmental and theoretical evidence to support the claim that “adults
may enjoy efficient but inflexible forms of theory of mind cognition in addition
to the full-blown form.” In a second example, Goldman (2006, Ch. 7) argues
for a division of simulation into low-level and high level forms. The quick and
automatic simulation in System 1 might include the ‘emotional contagion’ that
takes place when S observes O smiling. The more involved System 2 form of
simulation might be more complex and explicitly conscious, though it need not
be. As a third example, we may consider an episode of ToM implementation
in System 1. Kahneman (2011, p. 91) notes that people judge competence
by considering facial features such as “a strong chin with a slight confident
appearing smile.” Someone using their System 1 ToM will therefore predict
competent behaviour by a person with such features. Naturally, it is not the
case that facial features are a good predictor of competence. Someone using
System 2 ToM might be aware of that. So every time O makes a judgement
about competence using System 1 and S uses System 2 ToM to predict what
judgement O makes, we should expect ToM error.
Someone holding the second objection can admit that ToM takes place in
both systems, but deny that this will lead to bias mismatch and hence also
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deny that system mismatch can lead to ToM error. Defeating this objection
involves showing that different biases do indeed apply in the different systems.
Biases as a whole are more prevalent in the System 1 mode; indeed the preva-
lence of biases is definitional of System 1: Kahneman (2011, p. 81) writes
that “the confirmatory bias of System 1 favours uncritical acceptance of sug-
gestions” meaning that Confirmation Bias is a central method of System 1.
More broadly, we may regard Tversky and Kahneman’s entire research effort
as being a heuristics and biases programme.3 Further, experiment shows that
the application of various logical errors including the Conjunction Fallacy all
resulted from System 1 based processing (Sloman 1996, p. 15).
The existence of the two systems explains how a person can reach different
conclusions about the same question at different times, even if all the input
data is identical. The selection between the two systems is driven by the
difficulty of the question to be answered. Persons might use System 1 to decide
on lunch arrangements, and System 2 to perform a more complex decision, or
one that matters more. System 1 is adequate for the simple recall of when and
where one is meeting someone for lunch; nothing very important depends on it.
A more complicated task such as deciding how to get to the lunch engagement
might engage the more complicated and rational System 2, especially if some
selections have to be made between competing transport options involving
some view of the weather and traffic conditions. If one is simply walking to
the lunch, then again System 1 will likely be up to the task: many people
have experienced walking somewhere ‘on autopilot’ and then noticing that
they should have been walking to someone else’s office rather than to the
lunch venue, for example. This represents a phenomenological confirmation
that different systems of reasoning exist and that using one to predict the
output of the other will often fail.
3Cf. Nagel (2011, p. 8).
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Defeating the third objection involves showing that the system mismatch
account does not over-predict error. We can examine this by considering table
7.1. Making out the objection would involve showing that the cells in the table
that predict a high probability of ToM error obtain much more often than those
that do not. This cannot be done because calculating the relevant frequencies
requires a method of counting occasions of ToM use, which in turn requires
individuation criteria for separate episodes of ToM use. Such individuation
criteria cannot be provided. It is also true that on many occasions the two
systems will give the same answer. If that were not the case, then the error rate
of System 1 would outweigh the value of its speed and light use of resources.
So there will be some non-zero rate of system mismatch which does not result
in ToM error, which will presumably also be cases where there is no bias
mismatch.
A further prediction of this view is that the most accurate simulations
will take place when both S and O are employing System 2. So we have
another situation in which this account does not predict ToM error. This can
easily be seen to be the case by recalling the example of Harris (1992). If two
competent English speakers A and B are asked to decide which of a set of
sentences are grammatical and which are non-grammatical, a clear result will
become apparent. A will predict that B will make the same classification as
A of sentences into the grammatical and non-grammatical categories, and this
prediction of A’s will be correct. Both A and B are using the same system;
one can agree with this whether one believes that grammatical analysis is
done explicitly using System 2 or has been automated into System 1. Absent
reasons to think that S and O are employing different systems, the account
predicts no ToM error.
Even if S and O are using different systems, the account might still predict
an absence of error to the extent that both systems are good at producing
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correct grammar, as seems plausible. It is also the case that persons differ
significantly in various parameters that can affect ToM performance. For
example, any of S’s reasoning capacities, specialities, interests, and available
executive function may differ from that of O. Also, the example given above
may be a special case, because grammar is perhaps modular. All of these
questions appear open to empirical investigation; the results of which would
shape the resulting most plausible form of the Bias Mismatch Defence in its
system mismatch incarnation and I suspect also strengthen it.
I conclude that the three objections to the idea of system mismatch can
all be defeated and system mismatch leading to bias mismatch is a plausible
explanation of ToM error for simulationist accounts.4
7.4 Mismatch Interactions
At this point, it will be useful to set out how Affect Mismatches can interact
with System Mismatches to produce simulation errors. We will be interested
in different routes to simulation error; and in predicting when simulation error
is likely and when not. In Figure 7.1, the routes to systematic simulation error
are shown. At this stage, these are mere template routes for occasions when
Bias Mismatch could occur. How these templates work will become clearer in
the next chapters when I illustrate examples of these routes in use.
Note that the dashed line is dashed merely to assist with the comprehension
of the diagram rather than being a significant element of the argument. The
dashed line is the ‘yes’ line from box 4 to box 3. It is dashed to distinguish it
from the other two lines it crosses.
On the Bias Mismatch Defence I propose, whenever there is a Bias Mis-
4Other mechanisms producing bias mismatches that lead to systematic ToM errors can
be imagined. One example would be the different cultural pressures on males and females;
cf. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997).
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Figure 7.1: Systematic Simulation Error Routes
match between S and O there will be systematic simulation error. It can be
seen that there are three routes to Bias Mismatch and so three routes to sys-
tematic simulation error. There are two routes which do not pass through
Bias Mismatch and so do not result in systematic simulation error. I will out-
line these five routes through the diagram below. Each route is named by the
sequence of boxes through which it passes. In each case of simulation error, it
will be systematic because the Bias Mismatch will take place systematically.
These five paths exhaust all possible complete routes through the diagram.
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For each route, I state whether simulation error or no simulation error
will result. In each case, I refer only to whether the route itself has resulted
in error or not. It is also true however that different S’s can differ quite a
lot in their reasoning capacities, and specialisms, and interests, and available
executive function. So some S’s will be more likely to commit systematic errors
than others and also the same S may perform differently at different times. For
example, S may commit more errors when lacking available executive function.
These caveats do not affect the bias mismatch idea I am outlining though.
• 1/2/3/7
– There is an Affect Mismatch between S and O
– This mismatch is significant enough to cause a System Mismatch
between S and O
– The System Mismatch causes a Bias Mismatch between S and O
– This route results in systematic simulation error
• 1/2/5/3/7
– There is an Affect Mismatch between S and O
– This mismatch is not significant enough to cause a System Mis-
match between S and O
– There is nevertheless a Bias Mismatch between S and O, even
though they employ the same system
– This route results in systematic simulation error
• 1/4/3/7
– There is no Affect Mismatch between S and O
– There is nevertheless a System Mismatch between S and O, with
non-affective causes
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– This route results in systematic simulation error
• 1/4/6
– There is no Affect Mismatch between S and O
– There is no other reason for System Mismatch
– There is no System Mismatch
– There is no Bias Mismatch
– There is no simulation error
• 1/2/5/6
– There is an Affect Mismatch between S and O
– The Affect Mismatch does not suffice to cause System Mismatch
– There is no other reason for System Mismatch
– There is no System Mismatch
– There is no Bias Mismatch
– There is no simulation error
In the next two chapters, I will outline some of the situations where there
is systematic error in ToM and explain how Bias Mismatch between S and O
explains the errors in ToM. Saxe suggests a number of relevant circumstances.
In some situations, we are ‘too rosy’ about the reasoning capacities of others
and in other types of situation we are too cynical. I will cover both in turn.
Chapter 8
‘Too Rosy’ Evidence
8.1 Introduction
Saxe (2005a) cites Gilovich (1993) as one source of much of the data we will
consider in this chapter. It all points to scenarios in which S’s are systemati-
cally too rosy in their ToM. They predict that O’s in the situations described
will act more rationally, not to say ethically, than they do. These predictions
will not be borne out, as we will see. Gilovich (1993, pp. 9-10) explains that
the basic project of his book is to ask why “questionable and erroneous be-
liefs are learned, and how they are maintained.” The fact that the beliefs are
‘questionable’ tells us that there are ToM errors involved. If the beliefs were
not questionable, then they would presumably be predicted more often.
We will be interested in any biases that Gilovich cites as explanations of
the questionable beliefs, because my proposal is that absence of specifically
those biases in S at the time of simulation and as part of the simulation is
what accounts for the surprise or the failure of ToM. Naturally I do not claim
that S is free of the biases displayed by O; merely that the same biases are
not triggered in S or used as part of the simulation because S is not actually
in O’s situation. That means that the full affective import of O’s situation
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is not felt by S, or S and O may employ different systems of reasoning. So
there can be Affect Mismatch or System Mismatch between S and O, leading
to Bias Mismatch and systematic simulation error.
Even if O’s become motivated to remove their cognitive biases, this is very
difficult. Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 218) found that undergraduates
offered $1 —a significant amount in 1973 —to answer a mathematical problem
correctly by avoiding the Availability Heuristic, did not do so. They conclude
that: “[e]rroneous intuitions, apparently, are not easily rectified by the intro-
duction of monetary payoffs.” Failure of the S’s to simulate cognitive biases
in the O’s will be a hard-to-remove source of systematic ToM errors in the S’s,
even when the O’s might be expected to be trying hard to remove such biases.
The difficulty of removing such biases may sometimes cause ToM errors in the
other direction as well: S may apply his own biases. For these reasons, there
are many ways of arriving at a mismatch in bias status in S as compared to
O, and this will cause simulation errors.
A possible objection here derives from the fact that my account admits
that there is wide-spread error in human cognition. It may be asked how
this is possible, if our cognitive systems have evolved to help us survive. I
will not address this issue at length, but merely outline the directions of two
responses. Firstly, it is clear that we have the biases, and many of them. That
is not necessarily irrational, because they save time and we simply do not have
enough time or the inclination to consider every question that faces us on a
daily basis with the maximum possible cognitive effort. Often, it is better to
act on a ‘wrong’ decision and see what happens than agonise indefinitely. So
it is clear that our thinking is not supposed to be even aimed at being error-
free. Secondly, I might appeal to arguments of the sort raised in detail by
McKay and Dennett (2009, p. 493), to the effect that some “misbeliefs” are
“best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky
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falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past.”
They give as examples unrealistically positive false beliefs about the self, which
improve performance. Note that this could also suggest evolutionary grounds
for systematic ToM error, since S employs ToM about S as well as O.
On the other hand, there will be many occasions when ToM succeeds
because there is no Bias Mismatch, perhaps because there is no significant
affect in either S or O. Or if tasks are selected such that S and O use the
same system of reasoning, such as with the Harris (1992) grammar task, then
simulation may proceed without error. My account also predicts that there
should be occasions of successful simulation by bias matching, which should
be empirically testable. It will be important though to ensure that S and O
are not just employing the same bias. They would also need to be employing
the same bias about the same data. S and O could well both be applying
Confirmation Bias, for example, but unless they started with the same beliefs,
that would not lead them to seek erroneously to confirm the same prior belief.
Very careful experimental design will be needed here.
There can be two forms of evidence for ToM errors, which I will term ‘hard’
evidence and ‘soft’ evidence. Hard evidence will be constituted by statistical
data on the ToM errors, of the form ‘75% of S’s did not predict O’s decision.’
This will be the most important data. The softer form of evidence will be
where no percentages are given, but we are surprised by the questionable
beliefs. The surprise indicates that we have failed to predict the belief. This
softer evidence, while still valuable, may suffer from the twin defects that
surprise is both subjective and varies from mild to extreme. Moreover, many
of the people likely to read this thesis will have extensive knowledge of the
frailty of human reasoning and therefore be unsurprised by any revelations
concerning it. It is possible that such S’s are not using their ToM at all: they
are merely consulting their relevant experience. The hard evidence will be
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Group Studied Response
Shock Appliers (A): O exhibits Conformity Bias
Fake Prison Guards (A): O exhibits Conformity Bias
Repenters (B): S exhibits False Consensus Effect
Quiz Gamers (B): S: Fundamental Attribution Error
Suicide Note Assessors (A): O exhibits Belief Perseverance Bias
Lottery Ticket Holders (A): O exhibits Endowment Effect
Gamblers (A): O exhibits Confirmation Bias
Basketball Fans (A): O exhibits Clustering Illusion
Cancer Cure Assessors (B): S exhibits Confirmation Bias
Puzzle Solvers (A): S exhibits Availability Heuristic
Shoppers Redux (A): O exhibits Position Effect
Table 8.1: Response Type By Group Studied: Too Rosy
covered in the earlier sections with the soft evidence to follow.
Table 8.1 shows the Bias Mismatch response I will give in §8.2 to each
of 11 cases discussed in the works cited by Saxe (2005a). I label the cases
by the group of people studied. Some of the experiments have already been
touched on previously. The explanations fall into two broad categories, as set
out below.
• (A): O exhibits bias which is not simulated by S [eight entries]
• (B): S exhibits bias when simulating [three entries]
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8.2 ‘Too Rosy’ Data
8.2.1 Shock Appliers
The Milgram (1963) experiment was introduced in Ch. 5. The results include
valuable hard evidence because there are some numerical data concerning S’s
confounded expectations of the likely behaviour of O’s. Recall that 26/40 =
65% of O’s set the dial to 450 Volts while the psychology undergraduate S’s
predicted that that number would be 3% at most.
The Bias Mismatch Defence of ST that I propose must now explain this
failure to predict. I will do this by noting the significant Affect Mismatch
between S and O. The S’s, whether ourselves or Yale seniors, consider the
question as to how much they would be prepared to shock in a relatively calm,
reflective state —precisely one arranged for the seniors so that they could
“reflect carefully” (Milgram 1963, p. 375). The S’s are not this instant under
pressure from an authority figure in a lab coat, issuing stringent instructions.
This is what makes the difference, as is confirmed by the summary of Plotkin
(2011, p. 459), who writes that “Milgram repeatedly demonstrated how people
without any history of cruelty or violence would, when ordered to do so by
a figure of authority, inflict violent punishment upon others.” We may also
imagine that the effects of stress deriving from deference to authority would
be much less in modern times than in 1963. All of these factors imply that we
are unlikely to apply or to simulate the cognitive bias that tends to make us
more obedient than we should be. We as S’s fail to simulate the Conformity
Bias of the O’s, just as the carefully reflecting seniors of Milgram (1963) did.
Three questions may arise here. The Conformity Bias is often seen as being
about conforming judgements to a reference group. Is the Milgram effect really
about that? Is it driven by people judging that 450V is appropriate? And who
is in the reference group that makes this judgement? In response to the first
question, certainly the Milgram experiments are seen as part of the Conformity
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Bias literature. Plotkin (2011, p. 459) confirms this when he writes that
“the most powerful demonstration of what social psychologists call conformity,
obedience or group cohesiveness was reported in a series of papers in the 1960s,
summarized by Milgram.” Also note the usage of the term Conformity Bias
(Plotkin 2011, p. 459). Considering the facts of the experiment, one might also
wonder what, if not Conformity Bias, can cause the O’s to apply, as they think,
high voltages. What other motivations do they have? Turning to the second
question, the judgement that is conformed is not directly the one to the effect
that ‘450V is appropriate.’ It has that effect, but it is more appropriately
phrased as approximately ‘people in experiments will obey the instructions
of the experimenter’ perhaps combined with ‘experimenters will not make
unreasonable requests.’ We can see this because we can confidently expect
that similar results would be obtained in variants of the Milgram experiment
which, for example, have the O’s causing the hands of the dummy participants
placed in cold water. Finally, we might say that the reference group is an
imaginary one in the minds of the O’s. It is as it were a creation of the O to
represent ‘how people generally behave in this situation.’ This is distinct to
the more usual situations where the reference group is actually present. As I
will mention again below, this effect is outweighed when an actual reference
group is present, lending strength to the assumption that we are in fact dealing
with a reference group effect here.
In accordance with the framework set out previously, I will now explain why
a Bias Mismatch arises. On this occasion, there is extreme Affect Mismatch
between S and O. The S’s are undergraduates sitting calmly, observing in
a clinical fashion in the company of their distinguished professor. Nothing
much hangs upon what the S’s say or do in relation to the experiment; they are
expected to make useful psychological comments. Nothing about the calmness
and lack of involvement of the S’s is true of the O’s. As Milgram (1963, p.
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375) writes, many of the O’s exhibited extreme affect: “the degree of tension
reached extremes that are rarely seen in socio-psychological laboratory studies.
[...] Fourteen of the 40 [O’s] showed definite signs of nervous laughter and
smiling. [...] Full-blown, uncontrollable seizures were observed for 3 [O’s].”
There is a very clear affective mismatch between S and O; this explains the
absence of the appropriate bias in the simulation which explains this failure
of ToM. Milgram (1963, pp. 375-376) even makes remarks suggesting this in
interpreting the results he obtained from the Yale seniors: ‘it is possible that
the remoteness of the respondents from the actual situation, and the difficulty
of conveying to them the concrete details of the experiment, could account for
the serious underestimation of obedience.”
The hidden S’s watching the experiment “often uttered expressions of dis-
belief upon seeing a subject administer more powerful shocks to the victim”
even though the S’s “had a full acquaintance with the details of the situation”
(Milgram 1963, p. 377). Since these observer S’s were relatively sophisticated
associates of Milgram —‘senior psychology majors’ —we may presume that
they were much less subject to the bias towards obedience. Or they may have
been subject to a different strain of Conformity Bias in that they felt pressure
to side with Milgram in his capacity as dispassionate observer. In any case,
it is clear that the observers faced much less pressure than the O’s, and in
fact may have felt countervailing pressure to behave ‘clinically.’ So we are still
entitled to conclude that Affect Mismatch driving Bias Mismatch causes the
failure of ST here.
As the Editors (1992, p. 9)1 write in their Introduction to the special
double issue of Mind and Language, “I might conclude, after deliberating,
that I would not behave sadistically in the notorious Milgram experiments.
But, I might also be convinced, on the basis of scientific evidence, that the
1The Editors are not named but thank Tony Stone for his assistance.
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balance of probability is that I would, in fact, so behave. Here, I will be baﬄed
by the prospect of my action.” The Bias Mismatch Defence I propose in this
thesis eliminates this baﬄement. The calm and unhurried simulation of the
S’s will not reflect at all the various extreme affects O’s would face in the
Milgram (1963) experiment. The S’s would then not suffer from Conformity
Bias at all or in the same way as the O’s, and so S’s simulations would fail.
There is good reason to think that it is Conformity Bias that causes the un-
expected behaviour of the O’s, because if the behaviour around them changes,
so does theirs. In a variant of the standard experiment, known as ‘experiment
17’ or ‘two peers rebel’ (Milgram 1974, pp. 116–121) the role of teacher was
split into three with two of the other teachers also being confederates of the
experimenter. As the name suggests, two of the peers rebelled, which caused
92.5% of actual subjects to also rebel. It looks quite convincing then that what
has happened is that a new more vivid reference group has been created which
moreover gives the O’s ‘permission’ to follow their consciences and reject the
experimenter’s instructions.2
This line must account for the observations made in a re-enactment de-
scribed by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977, p. 492). They write that
“Bierbrauer (1973) [...] showed that even after personally participating in
a verbatim reenactment of the classic Milgram (1963) demonstration, raters
consistently and dramatically underestimated the extent to which Milgram’s
subjects would administer dangerous levels of electric shock in accord with
the situational forces compelling ‘obedience.”’ My response will be that a
‘verbatim reenactment’ is still not close enough to the real thing to make it
count, affectively, for the S’s. Stich and Nichols (1995a, p. 102) describe the
2Although note that Goldie (2002, p. 164) attributes the failure to predict behaviour
in the Milgram (1963) experiment to the Fundamental Attribution Error. If he is right, a
loose variant of the Bias Mismatch Defence still succeeds. (It is loose only because it would
strictly speaking also require a specification of FACTOR.)
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aim of the Bierbrauer reenactment as “to study the predictions that would
be made by non-participant observers.” Again, an observer S that is not a
participant will not exhibit Conformity Bias to the same extent and about the
same cognitions as participant O’s.
A difficulty is raised for my account when Stich and Nichols (1995a, p.
102) note that there were still failures of ToM by S’s when “they themselves
played the role of a subject in a vivid reenactment.” The force of this seems
to be that there should not be simulation errors when S and O are identical,
because S and O have the same mental machinery. However, two differences
are apparent. This objection might suggest that S’s should avoid simulation
error in relation to themselves as O. This may not be true; it depends on how
much ‘playing the role’ provides the full affective import of actually being in
the Milgram (1963) experiment. I suggest that ‘playing a role’ is very different
from ‘being’ the role. But in any case, the S’s were here asked to predict the
behaviour of other O’s. The idea was that placing them in a closer situation
to the one of the O’s would give them better insight into the behaviour of the
O’s. But this will not work at all if there is still scope for Affect Mismatch,
which I contend there very clearly is.
In general, many occasions of ToM error arise when S’s are given the salient
facts and asked to opine on them rationally. This differs dramatically from
the affective position of the O’s, who simply experience the world without the
important, salient or significant facts being given to them as such.
It will be useful here to reiterate the structure of my approach, as initially
set out on p. 155. I make two claims which may be approximately phrased as
follows.
1. FACTOR X affects O but not S
2. FACTOR X modulates the probability of being subject to BIAS
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One might think that early in this section it looks like FACTOR X is
pressure of some kind but be concerned that here it seems like FACTOR X is
merely being in the situation as opposed to observing it. I also therefore link
both of these two items i.e. being in the situation inevitably involves more
pressure than observing it. Also I aim here to avoid the less informative idea
that biases are not simulated. The Bias Mismatch Defence is better described
as being based on the claim that different factors can make O subject to a
bias or not, and that it is this that causes the simulation errors. Note that
it could also be that FACTOR affects S but not O; that could equally well
produce a bias mismatch and a simulation error. As I explained previously,
strictly speaking, the latter case would not be an exact instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence, since the formal structure above requires the FACTOR to
affect O but not S. Likewise, any situations in which FACTOR is not specified
are only loosely to be classified as instances of the Bias Mismatch Defence. I
nevertheless maintain that all of the loose and strict instances can be of value
in explaining ToM error.
This explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (affect: pressure from
being in the experiment) and BIAS in the O’s (Conformity Bias) leading to
systematic ToM error.
8.2.2 Fake Prison Guards
Although Saxe (2005a) does not cite the infamous Stanford prison experiment,
it is often considered together with Milgram (1963) as providing evidence of
unexpected behaviour which may result from excessive deference to deemed
authority. The prison experiment had a very simple design. A mock prison
was constructed, and the O’s were randomly assigned the role of guards and
prisoners. The O’s answered an “extensive questionnaire” designed to select
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those who were “most stable (physically and mentally), most mature, and
least involved in anti-social behaviour” (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973,
p. 73). The O’s were all male college students who were mostly middle class.
The guards were given the instruction to “maintain the reasonable degree of
order” needed for the “effective functioning” (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo
1973, p. 74) of the prison, without being giving further specific instructions
as to how this was to be achieved.
The results were that the guards were far more aggressive than expected.
As Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973, p. 69) write, “[a]t least a third of
the guards were judged to have become far more aggressive and dehumanis-
ing toward the prisoners than would ordinarily be predicted in a simulation
study.” This is the hard evidence of ToM error; the authors as S’s judged the
behaviour of the guards as O’s and were wrong about a third of them. Note
that the experiment was a simulated prison which had no legal authority to
hold persons; it was time-limited and yet dramatic and unexpected behaviours
were observed. S’s will generally fail to simulate O’s accurately here in that
they will expect that O’s in the situation will not display marked aggression
in the case of guards and marked passivity in the case of the prisoners.
Despite the apparent normality of the O’s and the lack of instructions
tending towards this outcome, “the characteristic nature of their encounters
tended to be negative, hostile, affrontive and dehumanising” (Haney, Banks,
and Zimbardo 1973, p. 80). A high proportion of the ten prisoners experi-
enced extreme affect: “five prisoners [...] had to be released early because
of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and acute anxiety” (Haney,
Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, p. 81). One prisoner even developed a “psycho-
somatic rash” (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, p. 81). The guards on the
other hand “enjoyed the extreme control and power they exercised” (Haney,
Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, p. 81) and “on several occasions [they] remained
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on duty voluntarily and uncomplaining for extra hours —without additional
pay” (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973, p. 81).
The completeness of the failure here of ToM may be gauged from Haney,
Banks, and Zimbardo (1973, p. 81) writing that these “differential reactions
to the experience of imprisonment were not suggested by or predictable from
the self-report measures of personality and attitude or the interviews taken
before the experiment began.” In fact, the study had to be terminated early
after six days because of the “unexpectedly intense reactions” (Haney, Banks,
and Zimbardo 1973, p. 88) generated. I will propose that the same explana-
tion may be applied to Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973) as was applied
previously to Milgram (1963).
There will be significant affective mismatches between persons outside the
experiment who are asked to use their ToM to predict the behaviour of O’s in
either role in the prison experiment. These mismatches permit the introduc-
tion of my proposed Bias Mismatch Defence, to the effect that such affective
mismatches cause failure of ToM through inadequate simulation of biases ex-
hibited by O’s. There will be different Affect Mismatches between S’s and
the two subsets of the O’s. The failure to simulate the guards accurately will
be due to not fully reflecting their enjoyment of power, because once again
actually enjoying that power is much more affectively engaging than merely
simulating it. The failure to simulate the prisoners accurately with be due to
not fully reflecting their depression and rage. The main bias active here in both
the prisoners and the guards is again Conformity Bias. The prisoners conform
with each other and defer to the guards. The guards also conform with each
other, or perhaps more accurately we might say that they conform with the
imagined group harshness. Although it is true that only a minority of guards
exhibit extreme harshness, this minority will be setting the group standards
in a vivid way, going against which would require significant courage, even if
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it is the majority opinion that the harshness is excessive (Prentice 2007). So
we have Affect Mismatch driving Bias Mismatch resulting in faulty simulation
and systematic ToM error.
This explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (affect: fear in the pris-
oners and enjoyment of power in the guards) and BIAS in the O’s (Conformity
Bias) leading to systematic ToM error.
8.2.3 ‘Repenters’
We might expect that people will generally believe that other people agree with
them only when there is some reason for that belief, for example testimony
to that effect or perhaps polling data. However, Gilovich (1993, pp. 112-113)
points out that there is in this respect a “systematic defect in our ability to
estimate the beliefs and attitudes of others” whereby we “often exaggerate the
extent to which other people hold the same beliefs that we do.” This is held
to be evidence for a failure in ToM because if people simulated accurately,
they would not predict the presence of this agreement where it is absent.
However, it can also be seen as positive for the ST or Weak S/T Hybrid
accounts since they predict such default belief attribution while TT accounts
do not, as discussed in Ch. 3.
In fact, Gilovich goes so far as to see the ‘imagined agreement’ problem as
underpinning the wide variety of false beliefs he discusses, since maintaining
the false beliefs without the imaginary agreement of others would be much
more difficult. On that line, almost all false beliefs would represent a failure
of ToM. However, as Gilovich (1993, p. 118) also points out, “we associate
primarily with those who share our own beliefs, values, and habits;” insofar
as that is true, we would not have a failure of ToM here at all.
Gilovich (1993, p. 114) cites Ross, Greene, and House (1977) to provide
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data where we can see this failure. An experiment was conducted in which
students were asked if they would be prepared to wear a large sign around
campus bearing the legend ‘REPENT.’ A “substantial percentage” agreed.
The critical question was then asked as to what percentage of their fellow
students did they think would also agree to do so. It transpires that student
S’s thought, roughly, that their peer O’s would decide as they had. Ross,
Greene, and House (1977, p. 292) report that S’s who agreed to wear the
sign thought that 63.5% of peer O’s would also agree while S’s who declined
to wear the sign thought that only 23.3% of peer O’s would agree to wear it.
This of course, is explained by the False Consensus Effect introduced in Ch. 6.
The simulation of the S’s is derailed by their exhibiting the False Consensus
Effect.
Care must be taken here to avoid my account merely saying the follow-
ing: – BECAUSE bias THEREFORE incorrect simulation – since the correct
structure is instead approximately: FACTOR X distinguishes S from O – and
– FACTOR X modulates the probability of being subject to BIAS. So what is
FACTOR X here? My general claim is that the underlying reason for this and
many cases of lack of simulation of cognitive bias is affective mismatch between
S and O. Of interest then is the explanation offered by Gilovich (1993, p. 114)
for the False Consensus Effect. There is a basic desire to “maintain a positive
assessment of our own judgement” which is particularly likely to play a part
when we “have an emotional investment in the belief.” So, S’s emotions can
promote the False Consensus Effect. If S’s believe particularly passionately
that there will be a woman supreme court judge in the next ten years —one of
the Ross, Greene, and House (1977) test questions —those S’s are more likely
to give a mistakenly high estimate of the number of O’s who share that view.
The effect is reduced or eliminated when the S’s do not particularly care about
the belief in question. When the test question was about the number of hours
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of TV watched a week, S’s were less likely to think O’s were like them. So the
False Consensus Effect is exacerbated in relation to beliefs that really matter
to the S’s. In other words, we have here once again Affect Mismatch driving
Bias Mismatch. In this particular experiment, S’s cared about the O’s being
like them, in that S’s who agreed and thought that O’s also would tended to
view the exploit of wearing the sign as amusing. On the other hand, S’s who
did not agree and tended to think that the O’s would also not agree tended
to view the exploit as instead one only liable to be agreed to by compliant
patsies.
Several experiments outlined by Pronin, Puccio and Ross may all be ex-
plained on the basis outlined above. Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 642)
report on a similar experiment, in which the difference was that the sign read
‘EAT AT JOE’S.’ S’s who agree to wear the sign believe that O’s will agree
more than they do, and those who do not agree think that O’s will agree
less than they do. The False Consensus Effect in S’s results in systematic
simulation error.
Similar results were obtained when S’s were asked “whether they preferred
music from the 1960s or the 1980s” (Pronin, Puccio, and Ross 2002, p. 642)
and what percentage of their peers would agree. S’s said that most people
would agree with whichever choice they made, even though there was in fact
more of an even split between the two choices. This further occurrence of the
False Consensus Effect in S’s results in systematic simulation error.
Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 643) discuss three further experiments
conducted in their own lab which they say all show the False Consensus Effect.
The first one was on “Encoding and Decoding Musical Tapping.” S tapped
out the rhythm of a well-known tune for a listening O who had to identify the
tune. S was then asked to estimate the probability that O would recognise the
tune. The results were that S’s vastly overestimated how easy this would be,
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because S can ‘hear’ the tune internally, and does not adjust for the fact that
O cannot. S’s thought that success rates would vary between 10% and 95%,
with an average of 50%, while the actual success rate was a mere 3%. This
experiment looks like a slightly unusual illustration of the False Consensus
Effect in that it might be best termed as the generalisation ‘everyone knows
what I know’ rather than ‘everyone believes what I believe.’ In some ways,
it seems to be an adult version of failing the False Belief Task. We might
explain the effects by appealing to the Availability Heuristic in its vividness
incarnation. S’s find the tune so vivid in their own mind that they are simply
unable to simulate the total lack of vividness the tune has in the minds of
the O’s, who just have some dull tapping to interpret. Thus, there is a Bias
Mismatch between S and O and so the Bias Mismatch Defence is available.
The bias in question is the Availability Heuristic applied by S which is not
applied by O for the obvious reason that the tune is not in fact highly available
to O since it is unknown.3
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (emotional investment in the
belief) leading to BIAS in the S’s (False Consensus Effect).
8.2.4 Quiz Gamers
Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) investigated the assessment of general
knowledge by persons participating in one-on-one quiz game scenarios. The
3Some observers may maintain that there is nothing for ST to explain here, since there is
just an information asymmetry between S and O, which on ST naturally causes S to make
errors about O. If that is true, then ST is not harmed but TT accounts, especially modular
ones like the versions of TT(Innate) so far described, need to explain how S’s belief set in
relation to the tune becomes available to ToM.
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idea being investigated was ‘social control,’ meaning inequalities of power in
social settings. For example, if one person works for another person, the lat-
ter person will have more social power. Another example discussed by Ross,
Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977, p. 493) is that of the dissertation viva at a
university. Here, the “candidate is required to field questions from the idiosyn-
cratic and occasionally esoteric areas of each examiner’s interest” while the
“candidate has relatively little time for reflections.” We might expect people
involved in such situations of social control to take account of it when making
ToM assessments. For example, if the candidate assesses the knowledge of the
examiner, he should do so including consideration of the advantages of ques-
tion selection, time and lack of pressure enjoyed by the examiner. Likewise, if
the examiner assesses the knowledge of the candidate, he should take account
of the corresponding disadvantages to which the candidate is exposed.
Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) proposed to investigate the extent
to which assessments of social control played a role in evaluation of others.
They arranged for participants to pair off; the questioner would set questions
and ask them of the contestant. The questioner set questions based on his
own esoteric knowledge. Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977, p. 486) claim
that this models many forms of social interaction, where they say that “[o]ne
participant defines the domain and controls the style of the interaction and
the other must respond within those limits.” The questioner, then, is in a
position of social control in relation to the contestant. The result, naturally
enough, was that the contestants were not very successful in answering the
questions, lacking the specialised knowledge of the questioner.
After the questions have been answered, the questioners and the contes-
tants both made general knowledge evaluations of each other and themselves.
It transpired that of 24 contestants, “20 contestants rated themselves inferior
to their questioners” (Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977, p. 489). So, the
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vast majority of contestants did not allow for the fact that it is much easier to
set questions than to answer them. The contestants as S’s made evaluations
of the general knowledge of the questioner O’s that completely failed to take
account of the one-sided nature of the data available to them. Ross, Amabile,
and Steinmetz (1977, p. 485) conclude that when “drawing inferences about
[O’s], [S’s] consistently fail to make adequate allowance for the biasing effects
of social roles upon performance.”
This experiment was re-run with observers, who form new S’s. The ob-
servers produced the same predictions as the participants viz. “[S’s] impres-
sions of the [O’s] in the quiz game showed the same bias that was evident in the
participants’ own perceptions. Overall, the questioner is seen as tremendously
knowledgeable” (Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977, p. 491).
What has happened is that the S’s of both types have committed the Fun-
damental Attribution Error. Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977, p. 491)
confirm this when they note that “the phenomenon we have described repre-
sents a special case of a more fundamental attribution error” meaning that S’s
attribute the underperformance of the O’s more to the character of the O’s
than to the actually more important situational variables viz. the difficulty
of the quiz questions. S “infers broad personal dispositions and anticipates
more cross-situational consistency in behaviour than actually occurs” (Ross,
Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977, p. 491).
The authors provide a further bias-related explanation for their data when
they suggest that “the various raters’ judgements were distorted precisely to
the extent that they depended upon biased data samples” (Ross, Amabile,
and Steinmetz 1977, p. 493) which would be an example of the Availability
Heuristic. This would be because the results of the question and answer session
would be highly available since salient yet inaccurate in assessing the general
knowledge abilities of participants. S’s do not take account of the obvious fact
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that they have very little data and it is highly selective. So there are two ways
of using biases in S to explain the systematic ToM errors made by S here.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS
in the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It may loosely speaking be an
instance though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affective effects of so-
cial power inequalities) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Fundamental Attribution
Error). It is also open to objectors to insist that FACTOR has not been
adequately explained here.
8.2.5 Suicide Note Assessors Redux
This experiment was discussed previously in §6.2.1. The experiment, by Ross,
Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) is described by Stich and Nichols (1995a). In this
experiment, O’s are given a test which “indicates that they are unusually good
(or unusually bad) at a certain task [;..] an hour later it is explained to them
that the test results were bogus” (Stich and Nichols 1995a, p. 100). (In fact,
the delays were either 5 minutes or 25 minutes.) The task in the experiment
was to assess whether a suicide note was fake or real. The odd result in the
experiment is that O’s continue to believe that they are unusually good or bad
at the task even when the evidence therefor has been dismissed.
Stich and Nichols (1995a, p. 100) formed a body of S’s from among their
students and asked them to predict the results of the test. They found that
“[t]he predictions the [S’s] offered were more often wrong than right” Thus
there is some quantification of failure of ToM here; more than half the S’s ex-
hibited such a failure. Stich and Nichols adduce this failure as evidence against
ST by noting that the students would have exhibited the Belief Perseverance
Bias had they taken the test as opposed to been asked to predict its outcome
—which we may concede. If so, then they could not have been simulating,
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according to Stich and Nichols, because they would not have made the error.
This is of course easily explained on the Bias Mismatch Defence I am
proposing. The S’s simulations failed because they failed to include the Belief
Perseverance Bias of the O’s in their simulation of the O’s. In turn, they failed
to include that effect because they were not in the situation faced by the O’s,
who had an affective involvement resulting from being told something about
their competencies which may have been pleasing or displeasing. There was
an Affect Mismatch between S and O and a resulting Bias Mismatch leading
to systematic ToM error.
The experimental task in the Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) experi-
ment is conducted while wired up to electrodes ostensibly intended to measure
physiological responses. We may observe immediately that this is not a low af-
fect scenario for the O’s. In addition, the O’s were randomly assigned to three
groups —success, fail, average —and at least two of these will have had some
influence on self-esteem which will in turn have had an affective component.
This is confirmed by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975, p. 883) who note that
“subjects in the success condition reported having felt more satisfaction than
subjects in the average condition” who in turn felt more satisfaction than the
subjects assigned to the fail condition.
I mentioned in §6.2.1 that the experimenters also had S’s observe the O’s
who performed the suicide note assessment task, and these S’s also exhibited
the same Belief Perseverance Bias to some extent. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard
(1975, p. 885) recruited additional experimental subjects who were engaged in
“observing and listening to an entire experiment through a one-way mirror.”
They also exhibit the Belief Perseverance Bias about the ability of the O’s
—they continue to believe that the ‘success’ O’s are better at the task even
after they also learn that the O’s did not really succeed. This needs to be
explained, because on my account so far, these new S’s should not have an
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affective involvement in the prowess of the O’s. A further bias-related explana-
tion is available here since the Belief Perseverance Bias can also be seen to be
a result of Confirmation Bias. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975, p. 880) note
that “once formed, impressions are remarkably perseverant and unresponsive
to new input.” That line is also suggested by Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross
(2004, p. 796). who write “biased assimilation of new information, in turn,
leads to unwarranted perseverance of beliefs.” The point here then is that the
observer S’s exhibited Confirmation Bias which introduced simulation error.
So we have a further Bias Mismatch explanation of the ToM performance of
the new S’s. Some observers may feel this may not be an example of the Bias
Mismatch Defence, strictly speaking. The important factor is just that S’s in
the new conditions were subject to Confirmation Bias. If so, there is no ap-
peal to mismatch of biases in explaining the result, although it is clearly still
important to consider biases when examining ToM data. But my line would
be that any bias in S or O which causes systematic ToM error can open up a
form of the Bias Mismatch Defence.
What I have done here is appeal to this Belief Perseverance Bias to ex-
plain the discrepancy between prediction and performance in the suicide note
assessors case (where people are first given incorrect feedback about their per-
formance, then told the feedback is random, but still persist in believing that
they are good/bad assessors of which the genuine suicide notes are). One
might be concerned whether this is really an explanation rather than merely a
restatement of the experiment. Again, for this reason, FACTOR is important
as a motivator, as I explained on p. 186. We have avoided the circularity of the
type ‘BIAS therefore BIAS’ which would indeed have little explanatory value.
‘BIAS therefore ToM error’ is of more use, but the key chain is ‘FACTOR
therefore BIAS therefore error.’ Here, FACTOR is the affective nature of the
competence information that O wishes to retain. This gives the account real
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explanatory value. Put another way, the question is, why do people perform
one way but predict a different performance if their prediction is based on
(something underpinning) their performance? The answer is that FACTOR
underpins the performance of O but not of S (in the strict formulation) and
FACTOR underpins the performance of S but not of O (in one of the loose
formulations).
This explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (affect: pleasure in
competence or displeasure in incompetence) and BIAS in the O’s (Belief Per-
severance Bias) leading to systematic ToM error.
The remaining subsections cover the soft evidence of ToM error.
8.2.6 Lottery Ticket Holders Redux
This experiment was described previously in Ch. 6. The Endowment Effect
is the bias of the O’s that the S’s do not simulate and this is why the S’s
simulation fails here.
The S’s will be uninterested in the outcome of the Lottery, giving them an
Affect Mismatch with the O’s. Moreover, the S’s have the question explained
to them in a dispassionate way with the salient points for rational analysis
prominent in that explanation. They could then have a System Mismatch
with the O’s as well. An Affect Mismatch between S and O is also suggested
by Kuehberger et al. (1995, p. 429) when they write that “resale values would
be lower when given in personal interaction with the experimenter rather than
anonymously, since [O’s] feel under more pressure of potentially having to
justify their price.” ‘Pressure’ means affect for the O’s which is not there
for the S’s. Note also that all of the S’s are in the presence of a different
experimenter, and will feel different pressures. Together, these factors mean
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that the Bias Mismatch Defence of ST which I propose predicts the actual
outcome —the S’s fail to simulate the O’s in that the S’s suggest lower, more
reasonable, resale prices for the Lottery tickets. The S’s feel pressure to be
reasonable while the O’s are in the grip of the Endowment Effect.
Nichols, Stich, and Leslie (1995, p. 443) respond to the Kuehberger et al.
(1995) methodological criticisms by introducing new data. This new data is
from an experiment showing that S’s failed to predict their own later suscep-
tibility to the Endowment Effect. This is of course exactly what my account
predicts, since simulation is the basis of ToM when used for all O’s, whether
the O is another person or the S at another time. There is a Bias Mismatch
between S and O at the later time, even though the O is the same person as
the S. It is just that the S is not engaged in the actual situation at the time
of simulation and so does not feel its affective import. So there can be an
Affect Mismatch between S and O even when O is S at the later time. The
objection that simulation cannot explain ToM in cases where S and O are
identical ignores the fact that additional distinctions are available between S
and O apart from their mental machinery, which we may concede is the same.
This idea is consistent with an observation of Kuehberger et al. (1995,
p. 425) who note that “even five minutes of belonging might be difficult to
simulate.” The elements of belonging that might be difficult to simulate might
be the affective elements and the biases that are triggered. This allows one
to avoid having my claim here imply that simulation cannot ever enable S
to identify the affective import of situations. That would be an unfortunate
consequence since S’s are often able to do so; earlier I gave examples such as
when S’s identify a situation as one in which O is likely to feel shame, or to
be under pressure. There might be something specific about ownership which
impairs affective forecasting, at which people are known to be poor (Sevdalis
and Harvey 2007). For instance, persons believe that a new car will make
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them very happy and a serious impairment such as becoming blind will make
them extremely unhappy. Both of these claims are empirically false, and even
repeated new car buying does not repair the ToM error that S makes about
S. Another possible escape route here for the Bias Mismatch Defence, should
one be required, will be to recall that simulated shame and simulated pressure
are but shadows of the real thing. Perhaps sometimes the shadow suffices to
match up the biases sufficiently to reduce ToM error and sometimes it does
not.
In their response to the criticisms of Ku¨hberger et al., Nichols, Stich, and
Leslie (1995, p. 440) claim that ST is in trouble even though Ku¨hberger et al.
cannot identify the factors driving the Endowment Effect because “whatever
subtle features of the situation triggered the difference in selling price, those
features were presumably there for the observer subjects to see.” Indeed, but
to see is not to feel. The O’s are affectively involved much more than the S’s.
Similarly, Nichols, Stich, and Leslie (1995, p. 441) note that to “suggest
that successful simulation requires more than the information that was avail-
able to our [S’s] is to admit that simulation is a marginal ability that would
fail in most real life situations.” This is an interesting objection to which my
account must respond. No plausible view of ToM can predict high error fre-
quencies across the board when people use their ToM capacities. My account
can respond by virtue of the analysis represented by Table 7.1 on p. 193 and
Figure 7.1 on p. 198. These allow that there can be scenarios in which the
following possibilities apply:
i there is no Affect Mismatch, no System Mismatch and no Bias Mismatch;
ii there is Affect Mismatch, but no System Mismatch and no Bias Mismatch;
iii there is no System Mismatch and there may be biases but not enough to
cause a simulation error;
8.2. ‘TOO ROSY’ DATA 225
iv there is a System Mismatch, but the O’s were not biassed and so there is
no Bias Mismatch.
All four of these routes are ones on which my account predicts no simulation
error, so my account can respond to the charge brought by Nichols, Stich, and
Leslie (1995) to the effect that it makes ToM too error-prone.
This explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (affect: pleasure in
ownership) and BIAS in the O’s (Endowment Effect) leading to systematic
ToM error.
8.2.7 Gamblers
Gilovich suggests we make inaccurate predictions of how unhelpful data are
evaluated by others, thus indicating a failure of ToM. The others in question
are gamblers, in one example. We know that betting shops are profitable which
means on average that gamblers are not. We might think then that gamblers
are in denial about their losses. They must somehow ignore or forget the data
relating to their losses. They must be ignoring data which disconfirms the
hypothesis they cling to: that they are successful gamblers.
The surprising element of this case is exactly how people dismiss discon-
firmatory data. We may expect that they will simply forget it; they will pay
it no attention. As Gilovich (1993, p. 62) says, “it is commonly believed that
people are more inclined to remember information that supports their beliefs
than information that contradicts them.” Gilovich has shown however that
disconfirmatory data are considered more, not less. He cites an experiment
he conducted showing that gamblers remember their losses more than their
wins —but they construct narratives in which the losses were actually ‘near
wins.’4 As Gilovich (1993, p. 62) writes: “people often resist the challenge of
4See also Taleb (2008) for discussion of the ‘narrative fallacy,’ whereby even constructing
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information that is inconsistent with their beliefs not by ignoring it, but by
subjecting it to particularly intense scrutiny.” We work hard to find flaws in
the disconfirmatory data so as to accord it a lower weight in our considerations
than the unquestioned confirmatory data. Note that this is subtly different
type of Confirmation Bias to the one discussed above in Ch. 6. There, peo-
ple seek the wrong sort of data, that which can only tend to confirm their
hypothesis. Here, O’s are presented with data tending both to confirm and
disconfirm their hypothesis, and deal with that scenario in a way that does
not optimise the potential value of the data.
The surprise is generated when the question is asked as to whether one
should question the quality of new data even-handedly, irrespective of whether
it is confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Everyone will answer that question in
the affirmative. That could indicate a System Mismatch between S and O,
because S is using System 2 to respond to questions about data handling while
O is just behaving using System 1. In any case, once again, S’s are affectively
too remote from the O’s situation, since it is known that gambling is highly
affectively involving and indeed addictively so. There is then a significant
Affect Mismatch between S and O here. As a result, the S’s do not simulate the
Confirmation Bias of the O’s and thus exhibit ToM errors in their simulations.
This explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance of the Bias
Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (system mismatch) and
BIAS in the O’s (Confirmation Bias) leading to systematic ToM error.
8.2.8 Basketball Fans
There is a belief among basketball fans in the ‘hot hand’ phenomenon. This
holds that players shoot in streaks: if they have just made a shot, they are
more likely to make the next shot, and if they have missed, they are more
stories based on the actual facts can be misleading.
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likely to miss. Gilovich (1993, p. 12) studies data relating to an actual team,
and finds that the hot hand phenomenon does not exist. On the contrary,
“there was a slight tendency for players to shoot better after missing their
last shot.” Since we may expect basketball fans to have a close acquaintance
with the relevant data because they spend a lot of time watching the reality
generating it unfold, their belief in the hot hand phenomenon is unexpected
and thus represents an error in our ToM.
It might be objected here that folk psychology is neutral as to what the
fans believe, but I suggest this is only the case before being asked the ques-
tion. Naturally, S cannot be asked the question as to what the O’s who are
fans will believe without being given the relevant facts. The idea then is that
if we started with S’s being told about Gilovich’s data, S would predict that
fans would not have this belief. It is, I concede, also possible that S’s would
simply not predict that the O’s do believe in the hot hand phenomenon. Ob-
viously this is an empirical question. In any case, even a failure to take a
view represents a ToM error, since the O’s hold the hot hand belief strongly.
I might again mention here the unavoidable disconnect between the O’s who
are always already in the affect-laden situation and the disinterested situation
of the S’s who are given a dry description of the relevant facts.
Moreover, for at least those of us calmly considering the phenomenon, the
fact that the data are random —or indeed, tending to show that there is an
‘anti-hot hand phenomenon’ if there is any effect at all —and do not sup-
port the phenomenon is made highly salient by its centrality in the discussion.
Thus, we are surprised by the first order error; we make a second order error in
our ToM because we are told dispassionately about the data. We would sim-
ulate better if we were able to place ourselves in the highly non-dispassionate
position of a basketball fan, thus reducing the Affect Mismatch between S and
O. One explanation of the situation here which is consistent with my account
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is that the bias mismatch in this experiment derives from the fact that the
O’s fall prey to the Clustering Illusion described in Ch. 6. Naturally, this
claim is speculative and could be supported (or refuted) independently of the
view for which I argue. The structure of the Bias Mismatch Defence requires
independent evidence for both FACTOR and BIAS, and for a link between
them. Empirical work would be decisive here.
Gilovich makes the data more comprehensible for the fans by presenting it
in numerical form: there is no statistical tendency for players’ hits to follow
hits more than misses. We might expect fans presented with this data to
accept it, and admit that their previous belief in the hot hand phenomenon
was mistaken. This does not happen: Gilovich (1993, p. 13) writes that most
people question the data, “[t]he hot hand exists, the argument goes, it just
did not show up in our sample of data.” This again we will not expect as S’s.
The difference of course is that we are not at all committed to the hot hand,
we are considering the matter dispassionately, and we will generally believe of
ourselves that we will respond to convincing empirical evidence of the falsity
of a belief by negating the relevant propositional attitude. That would give
us a System Mismatch.
O’s fall prey to one or other bias, but S’s would not, unless they were shown
the actual data. Thus, we could convert poor S’s to good ones by changing
the bias status of the S’s. If we ask them whether basketball fans will believe
in the hot hand in the face of contrary evidence, they will say no. If we ask
them whether they will believe in streaks of shooting based on a sequence of
six hits in 20 shots, and show them that sequence as a series of X’s and O’s,
the S’s will now be more closely tied in to the actual situation of the fans,
and will now model the fans better by matching their Clustering Illusion bias.
This would be another example of successful simulation by bias matching.
We may derive a further confirmation of this conclusion from Figure 2.2
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presented by Gilovich (1993, p. 20). This shows the pattern of V-1 bombs
falling in London during the war. There was a belief at the time that certain
parts of London were safe from the bombs and others were not. As Gilovich
(1993, p. 21) argues, this belief is created by dividing the map into quadrants,
and observing that there are clusters in some quadrants. He notes that if
the map were divided by diagonal lines, “there are no significant clusters.”
The point here is that shown the map, it appears to us that there are clus-
ters: we would correctly simulate the Londoners who falsely believed the safe
area/dangerous area hypothesis. But given the data dispassionately together
with Gilovich’s argument, we agree with him that randomness has fooled the
Londoners and we do not simulate them correctly. Our simulation misses out
the Clustering Illusion that leads O’s to see patterns where none exist, unless
we also see the same map. Then we would also exhibit the Clustering Illusion
and we would have another instance of successful simulation via bias matching.
Strictly speaking, this does not appear to be an instance of the Bias Mis-
match Defence because there is no mismatch of biases. That is, if S and O
get the same inputs, S’s prediction of O’s belief is correct; while if S and O
get different inputs, this is not guaranteed (even if the inputs carry basically
the same information but are presented differently). So this is not exactly
about mismatch in bias. It does though indirectly strengthen the Bias Mis-
match Defence, because it gives it more explanatory power. Normally it is
predicting ToM error associated with since caused by bias mismatch but here
it is predicting the absence of ToM error because one of its causes is missing.
Naturally this would only be a ceteris paribus prediction and would be subject
to empirical confirmation.
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8.2.9 Cancer Cure Assessors
Gilovich (1993, p. 30) cites data relating to whether people believe that cancer
patients who engage in ‘positive mental imagery’ benefit their health status.
He reports that people answering this question do not follow the scientifically
correct rule based on the fact that instances “of cancer remission in patients
who practice mental imagery do not constitute sufficient evidence that men-
tal imagery helps ameliorate cancer” because there must be a control group
i.e. the mental imagery practitioners might have improved anyway. What is
needed is not a cure, but a correlation between a change in the independent
variable —the practice of imagery —and a change in the dependent variable,
the cure rate. Moreover, the cure rate improvement must be reproducible and
not occur with changes in other independent variables.
This is an example of examining the wrong data. Gilovich’s central charge
is that people take evidence for a hypothesis as also confirmatory of that hy-
pothesis, when they should use one dataset to form hypotheses for testing and
further datasets to confirm them. He writes: “willingness to base conclusions
on incomplete or unrepresentative information is a common cause of people’s
questionable and erroneous beliefs” (Gilovich 1993, p. 30). Often, these situa-
tions will be instances of Confirmation Bias, where people tend only “to focus
on positive or confirming instances” (Gilovich 1993, p. 33) of a hypothesis
they are testing. Whether one is surprised or not by this prevalence of Confir-
mation Bias —with the surprise being the indication of a failure in ToM —will
depend on one’s general level of cynicism in relation to the frailty of human
reasoning. But one might be surprised at such a widespread lack of quality
in data handling. This is not expecting untrained O’s to be aware of correct
scientific method so much as expecting them not to form scientific conclusions
in unscientific ways. Even untrained O’s are aware of the idea that A has not
caused B if B would have happened anyway. Also note how uncongenial these
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data are to TT(Scientific), which holds that pre-fives are experts on hypoth-
esis selection and confirmation. What has happened to this expertise during
maturation?
There is an affect disparity between the O’s who are actually in situations
where they must make some decision based on whatever evidence is available
and the S’s who model that decision making. The S’s face little or no involve-
ment or stress related to the question that the O’s are considering. The S’s
are not exposed to the risk of failing to make a decision, where randomness in
the O’s may be beneficial in breaking a Buridan’s ass-type deadlock. The S’s
have time to employ System 2 reasoning to come up with a more considered
answer while the O’s may be under pressure and thus employ System 1. Al-
ternatively, the persons likely to assess non-standard cancer cure approaches
which are accessible without training, money or hospital equipment are likely
to be persons with cancer or persons who know someone with cancer. This
of course is an extremely affectively involving situation; we as S’s here have
no affective involvement at all. The result is that we as S’s do not simulate
Confirmation Bias in the O’s, thus leading to systematic simulation error.
On the latter line, this explanation represents even strictly speaking an
instance of the Bias Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s
(affect: fear of death) and BIAS in the O’s (Confirmation Bias) leading to
systematic ToM error.
8.2.10 Puzzle Solvers
Saxe (2005a) cites Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002) in her ‘too cynical’ cate-
gory, but it reports on one experiment which falls into the ‘too rosy’ category,
so we may consider it here. The experiment in question involves the type of
children’s game where something seems blindingly obvious to the participants
who are ‘in on it’ and yet extraordinarily opaque to those who are not. So the
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systematic ToM error is too rosy in that S’s overestimate how easy O’s will
find it to succeed at the game.
The experiment involved asking people to figure out what things existed
in ‘My World’ (Pronin, Puccio, and Ross 2002, p. 644) from a series of clues,
and then assessing how many clues would in general be needed by peers to
solve the puzzle. For example, one clue was ‘My world has trees and grass but
not flowers.’ The governing principle is that My World contains only things
that have double letters in their name. Once one knows this, this factor
seems to jump out of the page with extreme vividness, but before one sees the
principle, it is possible to stare blankly at an enormous array of clues, forming
and rejecting an immense number of baroque hypotheses. The results were,
as expected, that successful solvers vastly overestimated the proportion of the
class who would solve the puzzle —they thought that 78% of the class would
succeed, while only 21% did. By contrast, those who failed to solve the puzzle
gave quite an accurate assessment of how many would succeed —25%. This is
explained by noting the extreme vividness to the solvers of the principle once
seen and feeding that into the Availability Heuristic.5
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. There is BIAS in the S’s (Availability
Heuristic) but no obvious FACTOR, so critical observers may insist that there
is a gap in the Bias Mismatch Defence here.
5Similarly, Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 643) give further examples of scenarios
where the False Consensus Effect in S causes S to be too optimistic about O’s current mental
state. The examples are when S gives directions to O and where S asks O to decode musical
taps.
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8.2.11 Shoppers Redux
As discussed in Ch. 6, Shoppers were asked to consider which of a set of four
identical stockings was the highest quality. They chose the rightmost item
more often than chance, without reason to do so. The particular bias involved
here is dubbed the ‘Position Effect’ (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, p. 243). When
asked why they chose as they did, they confabulated reasons. The reasons
they gave involved spurious claims about the superior quality of the selected
pair. These claims could only be spurious since the pairs were identical. This
I think I can say is surprising without fear of contradiction.
There is an Affect Mismatch between us as S’s and the shoppers as O’s.
It is appropriate to make a quick decision in many low-impact, real-life cir-
cumstances. The Shopper O’s, we may easily imagine, are already somewhat
harried individuals who have moreover been unexpectedly approached to an-
swer unusual questions at a busy time. As Goldman (1992, p. 116) observes
in relation to the shopper case, “one is unlikely to replicate the uncertainties
of the live situation” when one simulates. The quickest way for the Shoppers
to be able to get on with shopping will be to make a choice. In addition,
they might disappoint the authoritative figure of the questioner if they fail to
respond, in a similar scenario to that seen in the Milgram (1963) experiments
discussed in Ch. 8. S’s are exposed to none of these affects and so they do
not apply the same biases when they run their simulation. Here, the Bias
Mismatch Defence makes empirical predictions that should be noted: (a) S
would predict correctly if made to rush; and (b) S would predict correctly if
O was given a lot of time to decide. My account also involves speculation
that the subjects were harried, whereas it might equally be speculated that
they were not because they had enough time to engage in a survey. Further
empirical work would be decisive here.
It might similarly be objected that the ‘harried O/relaxed S’ explanation
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does not obviously fit with the experiment, since as I will outline below, Nisbett
and Wilson (1977) are puzzled by the effect they observed. This in itself is of
course a good illustration of a systematic ToM error in need of a Bias Mismatch
Defence. I make two observations in response. Firstly, Nisbett and Wilson
(1977, p. 244) do note that on being asked to explain whether the position
of the article chosen had any influence on their selection of it, they denied
it “usually with a worried glance at the interviewer suggesting that they felt
either that they had misunderstood the question or were dealing with a mad-
man.” This development is more consistent with the shoppers being harried
than relaxed. Secondly, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) are unaware that they are
describing what will later be deemed a systematic error causing ST difficulties
as an account of ToM. So they are also unaware that a Bias Mismatch Defence.
might be needed. They can thus be forgiven for not investigating the affective
state of their O’s. Further empirical work would again be decisive here.
We may also have a System Mismatch here. The shopping O’s are under
pressure to make a decision and aware that it is not of the first importance
exactly which decision they make. It is often inaccurately reported that Nis-
bett and Wilson (1977) offered the O’s the pair of stockings they selected, in
which case they would care somewhat about which pair it was. However, note
the exact words of Nisbett and Wilson (1977, p. 243): shoppers “were asked
to say which article of clothing was the best quality;” no mention is made of
giving them the stockings. The harried O’s use a System 1 heuristic to make
a decision. This could be designed to avoid Buridan’s Ass-type paralysis in
decision making, where one does not know which of two equally good options
to choose.6 The point is that one should just pick one; it does not matter
which. The S’s are at leisure to simulate the O’s and therefore use the more
rational System 2. For one or both of these reasons, there is a bias mismatch
6Taleb (2007, Ch. 10) discusses such useful sorts of randomness that help us to avoid
Buridan paralysis.
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between S’s and O’s here, since the O’s are influenced by the Position Effect
and the S’s are not.
I have generally refrained from challenging experimental procedures on the
grounds that accepting it gives the opposing view its best case. I will make an
exception for the Shoppers case since it is heavily cited by TT proponents; it
is the one experiment of the many reported by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) that
is mostly selected for comment. The problem with the Shoppers experiment is
its lack of what experimental psychologists term ‘ecological validity.’ The ex-
perimental task should be sufficiently similar to everyday tasks that one may
reasonably expect to be measuring elements of everyday behaviour. The Shop-
pers experiment by contrast focusses on what Johansson et al. (2006, p. 689)
rightly term “a rather strange and contrived task” with much less ecological
validity than choosing between different stockings for a good reason.7
I suggest that this explanation represents even strictly speaking an instance
of the Bias Mismatch Defence since we have FACTOR in the O’s (affect:
harried) and BIAS in the O’s (Position Effect) leading to systematic ToM
error. It is open to objectors though to hold that FACTOR is inadequately
specified here.
7Part of a better approach is suggested by Heal (2003, p. 83) who notes that “the
rightward bias is irrational and hence not something we need expect simulation to cope
with.” This can be seen as suggesting an approach congenial to mine in which ‘irrational’
biases in O are not something that S can ‘rationally’ simulate.
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Chapter 9
‘Too Cynical’ Evidence
9.1 Introduction
I will consider three of the papers Saxe (2005a, p. 177) cites with the aim
of showing systematically too cynical errors in ToM, as discussed in Ch. 5.
These will be as follows: Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002), Kruger and Gilovich
(1999) and Miller and Ratner (1998).
I summarise the responses I give in §9.2 to the elements of this different
class of Saxe (2005a) data in table 9.1. The common link between all of the
data considered in this chapter is that S’s predict that O’s will perform less
rationally in their reasoning than they actually do. The Bias Mismatch re-
sponses to the remaining systematic ToM errors fall into three broad categories
as shown below
• (A): S and O exhibit various biases [one entry]
• (B): S or S and O exhibit Availability Heuristic [four entries]
• (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias [five entries]
I will conclude that the Bias Mismatch Defence does a reasonable job of
accommodating the ‘too rosy’ data and the ‘too cynical’ data.
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Group Studied Response
Conflict Parties (A): S and O exhibit various biases
Marriage Partners (B): S and O exhibit Availability Heuristic
Video Gamers (B): S exhibits Availability Heuristic
Debaters (B): S and O exhibit Availability Heuristic
Darts Players (B): S exhibits Availability Heuristic
Blood Donors (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias
Healthcare Consumers (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias
Campus Drinkers (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias
Smokers (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias
Statement Releasers (C): S exhibits Self-Presentation Bias
Table 9.1: Response Type By Group Studied: Too Cynical
9.2 ‘Too Cynical’ Data
9.2.1 Conflict Parties
Saxe (2005a, p. 177) writes that “[m]ost adults believe that reasoning can
sometimes be distorted —both inevitably, by the limitations of the mind, and
wilfully, as in wishful thinking and self-deception —and that this is more likely
to be true of other people’s thinking than of their own” and cites Pronin,
Puccio, and Ross (2002) in support. This gives us three key claims. The
first is that ToM predicts distortions in reasoning. The second is that these
distortions may be voluntary or involuntary. The third is that S’s predict
more such distortion in O’s than in S’s. The first claim is not an example of
ToM error, since it is true that there are many distortions in reasoning. The
third claim seems by contrast to be a clear example of ToM error, since there
is no justification across the board for S’s reasoning to be less distorted than
O’s. The second claim is complex and interesting. We can agree that it is
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true that there are some voluntary and some involuntary distortions, but the
truth of that claim would not suffice to make it the case that there is no ToM
error here. To avoid error, S’s would need not only to recognise that there
are voluntary and involuntary distortions of reasoning but also accurately to
identify occasions when each are occurring.
The particular focus of Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002) is on how predic-
tions of biased reasoning can bring parties into conflict so I use this as a title
for the section. We might also use the term ‘biased expectations of bias’ to
describe the focus of the authors. I will be arguing that the second claim is
at the heart of their position. Conflict is caused not because S predicts bias
in O, but because S wrongly sees O’s bias as voluntary.
Debates about political questions are often highly affectively involving and
so lead to conflict at some level. Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 637) give
as examples debates about “capital punishment, abortion policy [and] the
Middle East.” S’s considering the positions of O’s who oppose their particular
views on such topics will form negative views of the reasoning abilities of the
O’s. S’s make “harsh evaluations of [O’s] on the other side, whose perceptions
and arguments [. . . ] appear biased and self-serving” (Pronin, Puccio, and
Ross 2002, p. 637). This is systematically too cynical ToM. Pronin, Puccio,
and Ross (2002, p. 637) tell us that what fosters this is the way that partisans
“accept at face value arguments and evidence congruent with their interests
and beliefs” while subjecting opposing arguments to intense scrutiny. This of
course is a definition of Confirmation Bias.
So the ToM errors here result from S failing to simulate Confirmation Bias
in the O’s in the right way. The S’s are excessively cynical about the intentions
or genuineness of the O’s. The S’s expect in one sense that the O’s will exhibit
biased reasoning, but do not ascribe it to Confirmation Bias —which may be
an unavoidable aspect of human reasoning —but to a partisan and deliberate
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failure properly to examine the facts and arguments. If simulation modelled
bias in the right way, then we would expect the S’s to predict the reasoning
of the O’s more accurately and also ascribe it less to deliberate partiality of
the O’s, which might reduce conflict. The key point for the Bias Mismatch
Defence continues to be that the process is still well described as a simulation
failure due to inaccurate bias modelling in S.
This conflict situation will be exacerbated if the S’s also apply their own
Confirmation Bias to the subject matter, because this will open the gap wider
between S and O. This argument is intuitively compelling and empirical well-
supported by citations supplied by Pronin, Puccio and Ross. In one citation,
Edwards and Smith (1996) discuss a ‘disconfirmation bias;’ i.e. S’s tend to
apply a negative confirmation bias to the positions espoused by O’s. The ar-
guments of the O’s are subjected to more intense scrutiny. The effects are
worsened by Affect Mismatch: S’s and O’s may become passionately attached
to their positions. As Edwards and Smith (1996, p. 20) note, “affective
and motivational factors influence cognitive processes to produce biased con-
clusions.” In sum, the overly cynical ToM errors here can be explained by
S applying Confirmation Bias to S’s own positions, a negative Confirmation
Bias to O”s positions and then also failing to allow for O’s own Confirmation
Bias.1
Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 637) also note how the Availability
Heuristic, the Representativeness Heuristic and Cognitive Dissonance reduc-
tion can all lead to conflict. I suggest the same mechanism applies here as
described above. S’s see “self-serving or ideologically determined biases in
[O’s] views.” Again, if the S’s simulated correctly, they would be aware that
these biases are unavoidable. So we have the failed simulation of three more
1See also Kunda (1990) for discussion of selective memory access to bolster biased posi-
tions, and Short (2012) for arguments from Nietzsche to the effect that such memory selection
is a feature of active and strong individuals.
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types of bias generating systematically too cynical ToM error here.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS
in the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It may loosely speaking be an
instance though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotional im-
pact of conflict situations) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Availability Heuristic;
Representativeness Heuristic; Cognitive Dissonance).
Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 644) describe how the False Consensus
Effect may make teachers see students as “inattentive, unmotivated or even
stupid” because the teacher fails to set aside her own mastery of the subject.
Similarly, Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, pp. 644–646) discuss an ‘inadequate
allowance’ thesis in the context of a word game. S’s who know the answer over-
estimate how easy it is to find the answer due to the False Consensus Effect.
They then make “unwarranted negative inferences” about the O’s. So a bias
in S’s leads them to make systematically too cynical ToM predictions.
These explanations do not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS
in the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. There is BIAS in the S’s (False
Consensus Effect) but no obvious FACTOR, so critical observers may insist
that there is a gap in the Bias Mismatch Defence here.
9.2.2 Marriage Partners
As discussed previously in Ch. 5, the predictions of marriage partners of
one another’s assessments of contributions to various activities were studied
by Kruger and Gilovich (1999), being the second ‘too cynical’ citation of Saxe
(2005a). They considered an array of positive and negative marriage activities,
such as dog walking, or beginning arguments. They asked each S to rate
S’s own contribution to each activity, O’s contribution to each activity, and
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crucially, to state what S thought O would say that O’s contribution to each
activity was. The hypothesis was that S’s would predict that O’s would be
self-serving in their responses i.e. O’s would claim more responsibility than
justified for positive activities and admit less responsibility that justified for
negative activities.
The hypothesis was confirmed. Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 745) re-
ported that “couples expected their spouses to claim more than their share of
the credit for the desirable activities [. . . ] —but less than their share of the
blame for the undesirable activities.” The spouses did indeed claim more than
their share of the credit and accept less than their share of the blame. So the
S’s exhibited no systematic ToM errors in relation to the nature of credit and
blame claims by the O’s. The ToM errors were related to the amount of such
differential claims. The O’s engaged in making such differential claims to a
lesser extent than predicted by the S’s. The S’s were thus ‘too cynical’ here in
their ToM, in that they predicted more significantly differential claims to be
made by the O’s. These errors were symmetrical in that both spouses made
them in relation to each other.
The explanation here is that both S and O exhibit the Availability Heuris-
tic. The activities of each S are more available to that S than the activities
of O are available to that S. This means that S’s are likely to claim more re-
sponsibility for both positive and negative activities than is warranted. Then,
these S’s will make the opposite error in relation to O. As Kruger and Gilovich
(1999, p. 744) point out, S’s “may be surprised to find that others often claim
too much responsibility for [negative] activities as well.” This can be explained
on the Bias Mismatch Defence for which I have been arguing. There is a Bias
Mismatch between the S’s and the O’s. The S’s are failing to allow for the
application of the Availability Heuristic by the O’s.
We have a Bias Mismatch though in a special sense of that term. Both
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partners exhibit the Availability Heuristic, but they do so about different
topics. This is how they can both apply the same bias but still make simulation
errors. In each case, one partner as S employs the Availability Heuristic to
overstate S’s own contribution to the activities and understate the contribution
of the other partner as O. Since the mirror image of this process occurs in the
other partner when they are in the role of S, both of them come to overstate
their own contribution and understate that of the other partner. This has
the results seen: both partners predict that the other partner will be more
self-serving than they actually are, which can lead to problems. Kruger and
Gilovich (1999, p. 744) confirm this when they note the potential adverse
effects of not allowing for the biases of others when they write that: “[i]nstead
of attributing another person’s inflated assessment to the availability bias,
people are likely to see it as a motivated grab for excess credit.” That gives us
one affective distinction between S and O; it is also obvious that S will have
an emotional investment in exaggerating his own positive contributions.
One might wonder whether the claim here is that S and O are subject to
biases rather than an application of the Bias Mismatch Defence. Certainly,
that is the explanation of the data, but I think we could still see this as an
application of the Bias Mismatch Defence, judged solely on this parameter
because the ToM failure continues to result from the fact that S has a bias
of the same sort as O and about the same sort of activity, but about S’s
own activity rather than O’s. This also applies to O – or put differently but
equivalently, we obtain the same prediction if we switch S and O – so we obtain
a prediction of the way that S’s and O’s errors mirror each other. So we can
see that there are at least three aspects of bias that must match to avoid a
bias mismatch: a). type of bias; b). subject matter of bias and c). subject of
bias (meaning which person’s activity in this example).
This Availability Heuristic explanation of these data is also given by the
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original experimenters. Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 743) write of those orig-
inal experimenters having: “offered an information-processing interpretation
of this bias, one based on the differential availability of one’s own and another
person’s contributions. Simply put, people have an easier time remembering
their own input than someone else’s.” So, as Tversky and Kahneman (1973,
p. 207) point out, “reliance on the Availability Heuristic leads to systematic
biases” and we have explained exactly the systematic ToM errors which Saxe
(2005a) cites.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
exaggerating own positive contributions) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Avail-
ability Heuristic).
9.2.3 Video Gamers
The same explanation is available for a total of four studies reported by the
same authors. In the second of four studies reported in the paper Saxe cites,
Kruger and Gilovich (1999) examined assessments of bias in players of a two-
person video game. This was a co-operative game where both players had to
work together against a common enemy. There were two players and an ob-
server. After the game, all three assessed the contributions of both players on
eight parameters, evenly divided between negative contributions and positive
contributions. Also, the players estimated how much each player would claim
he contributed on each parameter, and what the observer would say.
As with the marriage partners, the video gamers expected more self-serving
bias than was actually the case. “Participants expected their teammates to
credit themselves with 23.0% more responsibility for the desirable game ele-
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ments” and “less than their share of the blame for the undesirable game out-
comes” but in “actuality, players took 8.3% more credit for the undesirable
outcomes of the game” (Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p. 751). These results can
be explained on the same grounds as the Marriage Partners case: S exhibited
the Availability Heuristic.
The players thought that the observer would say the same as they did —i.e.,
unsurprisingly, the players thought that their opinions were objectively valid.
This means they were unaware of the operation of the Availability Heuristic
so did not correct for it. Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 662) cite evidence
to the effect that “people are often unaware of their own unawareness” in the
context of bias.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
exaggerating own positive contributions) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Avail-
ability Heuristic).
9.2.4 Debaters
This study aimed to investigate a “more motivationally charged situation”
(Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p. 748) with the aim of examining whether moti-
vation affected ToM errors. Kruger and Gilovich (1999) did this by studying
undergraduates taking a debating course, who wanted to do well, since they
sought careers in law and politics and the like. Participants debated a political
topic in teams of two, and were subsequently asked anonymously to apportion
responsibility for positive and negative aspects of the debate between them-
selves, their team-mates and their opponents. They were also asked to predict
what apportionments the team-mates and opponents would make. There are
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two factors in play here. There is to some extent an objective fact of the
matter about who did what in the debate —or at least a less subjective reality
such as one might expect from an impartial observer. The second factor is a
subjective ‘overlay’ on the objective facts, reflecting the hypothesis that S’s
would give themselves more credit for positive aspects of the debate but also
expect O’s to do the same.
The results were consistent with the hypothesis that S’s would predict
more self-serving bias in the O’s than the O’s actually exhibited. Kruger
and Gilovich (1999, p. 749) found that “debaters expected their opponents
to claim 69.8% more of the credit for the desirable outcomes than for the
undesirable outcomes” but “this assumption was wildly exaggerated” since
“[d]ebaters in fact credited their own team with 21.0% more of the credit for
the desirable outcomes than for the undesirable outcomes.” This prediction
of biased estimation still appeared when S’s considered their team-mates, but
much less so, with S’s predicting team-mate O’s would claim “26.0% more
of the credit for the desirable outcomes than for the undesirable outcomes”
(Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p. 749).
These results can again be accounted for by assuming that the S’s ap-
plied the Availability Heuristic, with some extension from themselves to their
team-mates. In short, there is a hierarchy of availability which follows the
order S; team-mate O; opponent O. Thus we can explain why S’s predicted
that their team-mate O’s would take some more credit for desirable outcomes
than justified, and opponent O’s a lot more. It is because S’s own activities are
somewhat more available than those of team-mate O’s and much more avail-
able than those of opponent O’s. This line is suggested when Pronin, Puccio,
and Ross (2002, p. 637) summarise the literature in writing “[i]intergroup
enmity can arise from simple availability and representativeness biases.”
S’s “thought their opponents would claim [...] 32.7% less than their fair
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share of the undesirable debate elements” (Kruger and Gilovich 1999, p. 750).
In partial contrast, they thought their team-mate O’s would also admit less
than their full share of responsibility for undesirable debate elements, but
would not do so to the same extent as the opponent O’s. The reality was that
O’s of both types admitted to more responsibility than expected. This can be
explained by an extension of the ‘marriage partners’ account to allow for the
additional participants in this experiment. S exhibits the Availability Heuristic
such that S’s own actions loomed larger in the debate on both positive and
negative sides than those of the team-mate O’s. S also exhibits the same
heuristic in relation to the even less available actions of opponent O’s. These
biases explain the systematically too cynical ToM of S in this scenario together
with the different levels of cynicism in relation to team-mate O’s and opponent
O’s.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It also may not even loosely speaking
be an instance because the FACTOR in the S’s is difficult to disentangle; we
do at least have BIAS in the S’s (Availability Heuristic). Critical observers
may insist that there is a gap in the Bias Mismatch Defence here.
9.2.5 Darts Players
Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 751) found in the final study reported in the
paper Saxe cites that “darts players thought their opponents would be more
self-serving than their teammates and more self-serving than they actually
were.” These results are similar to the ones about the debaters and can be
explained in the same way using a hierarchy of availability.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
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the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It also may not even loosely speaking
be an instance because the FACTOR in the S’s is difficult to disentangle; we
do at least have BIAS in the S’s (Availability Heuristic). Critical observers
may insist that there is a gap in the Bias Mismatch Defence here.
9.2.6 Blood Donors
Five studies in Saxe’s final ‘too cynical’ citation, Miller and Ratner (1998), are
claimed to show evidence of systematic cynicism in ToM. I will be explaining
them all by appealing to Self-Presentation Bias in the S’s.2 In each case,
responses by participants are likely to be dominated by what they think they
should say —or what shows them in a positive light —rather than what they
actually think. Note that participants need not be aware of the operation of
Self-Presentation Bias.
The first Miller and Ratner study examined the number of S’s who would
donate blood with and without payment and compared this to the estimates
of the S’s as to how many O’s would donate blood with and without payment.
The results of the study are shown in Table 9.2. Miller and Ratner (1998,
p. 54) found that “(63%) indicated they would agree to give blood if not paid,
and [. . . ] (73%) said they would agree to give blood if paid $15.” So the
cash incentive had little effect because there were only an additional 10% of
participants whose minds were changed by the payment.
However, S’s “estimated that roughly twice as many [O’s] would agree
to donate blood for $15 as would agree to donate blood for free;” the S’s
estimated that 63% of O’s would donate for payment whereas only 32% would
donate without payment. This study then is an example of too cynical ToM,
because the S’s expected that more of the O’s would agree to donate only if
paid than was actually the case. So the challenge here for ST is that the S’s
2Pronin, Puccio, and Ross (2002, p. 665) also discuss the Self-Presentation Bias in terms
of a “holier than thou” effect.
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Volunteer Rate
Incentive Actual Estimated
Payment 73% 63%
No Payment 63% 32%
Table 9.2: Actual Versus Estimated Number Of Individuals Volunteering To
Give Blood For Payment Or No Payment
predicted that the O’s would be more motivated by payment than by altruism
than was in fact the case; and the S’s made this too cynical prediction even
though the S’s themselves were not in general more motivated by payment
than by altruism.
One way for S’s to promote a positive self-image in this experimental sce-
nario is to make it look as though they are uncommonly altruistic. This they
can do by saying that they would themselves volunteer to give blood for no
payment but also by saying that few others would do so. It is not sufficient
merely to volunteer if everyone else does as well. So the data are explained by
Self-Presentation Bias in the S’s.
The same objection can arise here as came up in §9.2.2 viz.: objecting that
the data are explained merely by S and O exhibiting biases rather than this
being a case where the Bias Mismatch Defence applies. However, the same
response that I set out on p. 243 is available; S and O do indeed both exhibit
Self-Presentation Bias and it is indeed about the same type of subject matter,
but, crucially, S’s Self-Presentation Bias relates to S and not to O.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
own self esteem) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Self-Presentation Bias).
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9.2.7 Healthcare Consumers
The second Miller and Ratner study examined the effect of sex on views of
a putative US government programme to make abortion available at public
expense.
A large majority of S’s agreed that such a programme would benefit women
more than men. They also thought that this would mean that women would
be more in favour of the programme than men. Miller and Ratner (1998, p.
56) write that the “majority of [S’s] in this study perceived women to have a
greater stake in, and to be more supportive of, a proposed health care plan
than men.” This was a systematically too cynical ToM error though, since in
fact “there was no difference in the degree of support expressed by men and
women” (Miller and Ratner 1998, p. 56).
One way for S’s to promote a positive self-image here as in the other
experiments in this class is to maintain that S is less subject to biased reasoning
than O’s. So both male and female S’s here thought that S’s own opinion was
free of bias but that O’s opinion would be heavily biased by self-interest. Self-
Presentation Bias in S explains this desire to predict that O is more prone to
bias than S, and in this case to predict wrongly that female O’s would favour
the programme more than male O’s.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
own self esteem) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Self-Presentation Bias).
9.2.8 Campus Drinkers
The third Miller and Ratner study related to attitudes to alcohol pricing on
campus. We learn that there was a ban on the sale of kegs of beer at Princeton
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which affected younger (‘sophomore’) undergraduates more than older (‘se-
nior’) ones, because the latter were members of dining fraternities untouched
by the ban. The experiment involved examining the interaction between three
items: age, condition and performance. The age parameter was binary be-
tween junior and senior; the condition was binary between favour or oppose;
the performance was binary between whether or not there was ToM error.
The results were similar to those seen in the two studies reported above:
the “majority of participants in this study perceived Princeton sophomores
to be more adversely affected by, and to be more opposed to, the keg ban
than Princeton seniors” but in fact “there was no difference in the opposition
expressed by sophomores and seniors” (Miller and Ratner 1998, p. 57). Again,
this is explained by the S’s ascribing more biased reasoning to O’s than to
themselves. It could also be that the sophomores wanted to think something
like ‘my peers are more addicted to alcohol than I am, so they will oppose the
ban, while I am health-conscious enough to favour it.’ Either way, the results
are driven by Self-Presentation Bias in the S’s.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
own self esteem) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Self-Presentation Bias).
9.2.9 Smokers
The fourth Miller and Ratner study looked at whether smokers and non-
smokers favoured smoking bans, and whether smokers and non-smokers were
expected to reason in their own interests. There was a change here to the
prior studies. The prior studies had shown predictions that there would be
a relationship between self-interest and reasoning in scenarios where no such
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relationship existed. The hypothesis in the smoking study was that there
would be such a relationship, but that its strength would be overestimated.
As Miller and Ratner (1998, p. 57) point out, they “do not claim that vested
interest never affects attitudes, only that it does not affect attitudes as much
as lay theories assume.” The hypothesis was borne out by the results. Over-
prediction by S’s of self-serving bias in O’s combined with S maintaining the
belief that S is himself free from such self-serving bias explains the data and
represents Self-Presentation Bias in S. This explains the systematic error in
S’s ToM in this scenario.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
own self esteem) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Self-Presentation Bias).
9.2.10 Statement Releasers
The fifth Miller and Ratner study looked at behaviour rather than attitudes.
Participants were told of a purported health threat that affected either only
men or only women, and a proposed cut in government funding of research
into it. The questions were whether participants would agree to release a
statement about the cut to a local political organisation; whether members of
the sex with a vested interest would agree more than members of the opposite
sex; and whether S’s would predict that O’s with a vested interest would
agree more. As before, S’s “predictions significantly overestimated the actual
impact of self-interest on behaviour” (Miller and Ratner 1998, p. 59) in that
S’s predicted that the affected group would release more than the unaffected
group, even though in reality both groups exhibited similar high release rates.
Over-prediction by S’s of self-serving bias in O’s combined with S maintaining
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the belief that S is himself free from such self-serving bias explains the data
and represents Self-Presentation Bias in S. This explains the systematic error
in S’s ToM in this scenario.
This explanation does not represent strictly speaking an instance of the
Bias Mismatch Defence since we do not have FACTOR in the O’s or BIAS in
the O’s leading to systematic ToM error. It is loosely speaking an instance
though because we have FACTOR in the S’s (affect: emotionally invested in
own self esteem) leading to BIAS in the S’s (Self-Presentation Bias).
Based on the discussion of data in this chapter and the previous one, I
conclude the following. While the Bias Mismatch Defence has not completely
covered all of the data, often because FACTOR is inadequately specified, over-
all it has done a very reasonable job of covering it. And even absent FACTOR,
it is still of value to note that BIAS has caused a systematic ToM error. In
conclusion, much of the ‘too cynical’ data from this chapter and the ‘too rosy’
data from the previous chapter can be explained by appealing to the Bias
Mismatch Defence, especially when one considers, as I contend is reasonable,
its looser formulation along with the very strict formulation. It is also worth
noting that the defence will be available for much other existing data showing
systematic ToM error and also future data of the same type.
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Chapter 10
TT: Inaccurate Generalisation
Defence
10.1 Introduction
As Saxe (2005a, p. 175) explains, if an experiment shows systematic error in
ToM, for example where a child systematically and wrongly attributes error
instead of ignorance, then “the actual result is best explained by an inaccu-
rate generalisation in the child’s developing theory of mind.” This Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence is the TT answer to all cases of such systematic ToM
error. Recall that I mentioned early on (cf. p. 28) that I would not be consid-
ering any putative forms of TT which are not based on generalisations. Any
such form of TT which was enable to avoid generalisations while remaining a
theory-theory view would have the same problem that Saxe (2005a) presses
against ST; viz. how can TT explain systematic ToM error? No generalisa-
tions means no Inaccurate Generalisation Defence. Recall also that there is a
‘body of folk psychological knowledge’ under TT accounts (cf. p. 36); upon
what is that based if not on generalisations? It remains the case though that
TT is not committed to any particular theory or any particular view of what
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a theory is; though I have suggested (cf. fn. on p. 85) that attempting to
base a theory on a structure like DNA without generalisations omits what is
useful about theories. It would be valuable to have these underlying views on
what constitutes a theory spelt out by TT proponents.
Saxe’s argument is that TT or Strong S/T Hybridism is to be preferred
to ST or Weak S/T Hybridism because TT can appeal to the Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence and ST has no response. I have already provided
a ‘weak’ defence of ST against this charge by showing that it can in fact
appeal to a Bias Mismatch Defence. In this chapter, I will not go further by
aiming to provide a strong defence of ST by showing that the Bias Mismatch
Defence forms with ST a more plausible account of the data than TT with
the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence. I will show however that the game
has changed and now TT must compete with ST on the aspect of explaining
systematic ToM error; I will also show that this does not look straightforward.
It might be thought that Saxe may have in mind something much less
ambitious than a fully general explanation of error: the kinds of errors we
observe could perhaps be explained by persons having, or lacking, certain
beliefs about minds. We should note though that Saxe (2005a, p. 175) writes
that “the argument from error suggests that aspects of the observer’s na¨ıve
theory of psychology (like over-attributing rationality, and na¨ıve cynicism)
play a pervasive role in reasoning about the mind.” However, Saxe (2005a,
p. 175) explicitly only appeals to the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence to
explain the systematic ToM errors seen in the Ruffman (1996) data on variants
of the False Belief Task. But I think in fact that since I have now provided
ST with a fully general account of systematic ToM error by adding the Bias
Mismatch Defence, the same is needed for TT if it is to compete with ST
on this figure of merit. It is unclear what defence TT will have beyond such
an appeal to inaccurate generalisations. Perhaps alternative defences could
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include, for example, a theory that omits certain facts, or which makes certain
predictions very expensive to compute. This seems possible, but is otherwise
unmotivated and will be less simple an explanation that ST combined with
the Bias Mismatch Defence. So this means that it is likely many inaccurate
generalisation scenarios will need to be constructed by TT proponents.1
I will examine the feasibility of this task in §10.2 by attempting to set out
what the inaccurate generalisation will in fact look like in the various experi-
mental situations. I have previously suggested that the reason TT proponents
have been extremely reluctant to attempt this is because it cannot be done, or
at least will prove enormously cumbersome. In what follows, I will neverthe-
less make the attempt, raising questions along the way as well as attempting
to construct the inaccurate generalisations. One such question will be why we
should accept that adults as well as young children continue to employ such
inaccurate generalisations when they have a wealth of disconfirmatory data.
I will address the majority of the experiments previously discussed, cover-
ing both the too rosy and the too cynical classes of data here. I will concede
that some do in fact comport well with the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence.
Overall though, we must judge the success of the Inaccurate Generalisation
Defence across the board. How parsimonious is it across the range of exper-
iments and how explanatorily powerful is it? I will conclude that in many
cases, plausible inaccurate generalisations cannot be constructed. For this
reason and because of the mysterious way in which these generalisations must
be maintained, I will conclude directly that the Inaccurate Generalisation De-
fence of TT does not succeed and indirectly that ST or Weak S/T Hybridism
augmented with the Bias Mismatch Defence is a far superior account of ToM.
1The best strategy for TT may depend on the earlier issue about whether TT needs to
hold that a theory is a body of generalisations.
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10.2 Constructing The Generalisations
The systematic ToM error in the Milgram (1963) data (§8.2.1) is seen in the
conflict between the prediction by S of the behaviour of O and the actual be-
haviour of O. Many of the O’s are prepared to set the dial to 450V while we as
S’s and the S’s in the experiment generally do not predict this. The inaccurate
generalisation seems to be ‘O will not harm others without adequate justifica-
tion.’ This appears reasonably promising as an explanation of the systematic
ToM error seen in this experiment, though we might pose questions as to the
amount of work that ‘justification’ is doing in the inaccurate generalisation.
It seems as though this is an inaccurate generalisation that adults could be
expected to use, even though a cynical observer might ask how it is main-
tained in the face of much of the behaviour observed around one and in the
media. Similarly, the same inaccurate generalisation will likely be successful
in explaining the ToM errors illustrated in the prison experiment (§8.2.2). I
will therefore concede that the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence succeeds in
giving TT an account of these two experiments, but note that in both cases,
the inaccurate generalisations include notions of justification. Introduction of
such a fraught ethical issue, part of a heavily discussed and controversial do-
main of philosophy, means that while the generalisation may be simply stated,
it cannot be called parsimonious2 in application.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence seems to have greater difficulties
in the case of the repenters (§8.2.3). There are two levels of ToM error here.
In the experiment, we have the repenters making ToM errors about other
participants in the experiment. The errors flow from the repenters inaccurately
predicting the behaviour of those others by over-attributing their own attitudes
to the others. This is a systematic ToM error which is readily explainable on
2Here, somewhat in contrast to the original definition of parsimony on p. 32, lack of
parsimony means a single generalisation will have to capture a very complex concept.
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the ST approach. However, Saxe (2005a) has cited this experiment and others
like it as an example of a ‘surprising’ result in social psychology. The idea is
that we as S’s would not be surprised by what the repenters as O’s do in this
experiment if ST were correct. If it were correct, we would not be surprised
because we would simply predict the result: we would predict the errors that
the repenter O’s make.
Since we have two levels of ToM error going on, we will need some new
terminology. I will introduce ‘T’ for ‘third person.’ The roles are as follows:
we are the S’s who make systematic ToM errors about the repenter O’s who
themselves make systematic ToM errors about other repenters, the T’s. The
error that we as S’s make is to fail to predict that the O’s will predict that the
T’s will agree with the O’s about whether to wear the sign or not much more
than the T’s actually do. So the O’s over-attribute the attitudes of the O’s to
the T’s. This new terminology is outlined in fig. 10.1 below, with the arrows
representing ToM use. S can use ToM in relation to O, S can use ToM in
relation to T, and O can use ToM in relation to T. All three of these occasions
of ToM use can result in ToM errors.
Saxe has cited our surprise at the results of experiments in social psy-
chology as an example of systematic ToM error. She presumably was mostly
thinking of the ToM errors made by S about O outside the experiment. The
Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT was then constructed to give TT
the resources to account for these particular errors. However, in my view
the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence must also account for the ToM errors
made within the experiment by O about T. After all, this is also a systematic
ToM error. If TT proponents employ a different defence here, then they are
admitting that some cases of systematic ToM error are accounted for by the
Inaccurate Generalisation Defence and some are not. That would be highly ad
hoc and unmotivated. Below I will suggest that there are difficulties in many
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outside
exper-
iment
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inside ex-
periment
Figure 10.1: S’s Inside And Outside Of Experiment
experiments in coming up with generalisations to describe the ToM errors
made by O about T.
It seems as though the inaccurate generalisation in this experiment will
be expressed as ‘T believes what O believes,’ together with the related ‘T
knows what O knows.’ While this will handily encapsulate the observed data,
it lacks parsimony in the same sense as I specified earlier in this chapter and
plausibility. It will be particularly difficult for a modular account of ToM such
as TT(Innate) to allow the entire belief set of O to be available within the
ToM for ascription to T, because informational encapsulation is definitional
of a (Fodorian) module. There are different problems with TT(Scientific),
which must explain why a child learns the inaccurate generalisation that O
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knows everything that S knows. So there seem to be difficulties for both
TT accounts in explaining why such an inaccurate generalisation could arise.
Moreover, TT proponents must explain why this inaccurate generalisation
continues to be used by adults. Perhaps adults do not need to accept exactly
this generalisation, but a replacement would need careful caveating to allow
for motivated exclusions which fit the data. The at least occasional use by
adults of the inaccurate generalisation ‘T believes what O believes’ seems to
occur despite a large amount of data that must be constantly available to all
S’s that confirms that T does not in fact know everything that O knows or
believe everything that O believes; or S for that matter. Indeed, the existence
of the latter inaccurate generalisation would prevent O from passing the False
Belief Task, which is not what is observed. Naturally, ST suffers from none
of these difficulties, since on the ST account, O starts from O’s belief set in
simulating T and then modifies that belief set as required.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT in the case of the quiz gamers
(§8.2.4), will include a generalisation of the sort ‘the level of general knowledge
of O is to be assessed solely on the basis of O’s ability to set specific ques-
tions.’ Let us call this generalisation one. In order to explain the data and
their perversity, there must be no modifying generalisations of the following
sorts: ‘generalisation one is to be adjusted to allow for O’s advantage in setting
the questions’ or ‘generalisation one does not apply across the whole range of
general knowledge but only to the specific field about which O set the ques-
tions,’ and especially not ‘O’s level of general knowledge is more accurately
assessed by O’s ability to answer questions rather than answer them.’ It is the
omission of modifying generalisations such as these that makes generalisation
one an inaccurate generalisation. This will work for TT as an explanation of
the data, but the same questions arise in relation to this experiment as in the
case of the repenters discussed above. We may ask why it would be the case
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that adults will employ such an inaccurate generalisation when they will have
plenty of opportunities to observe disconfirmatory data. In both this experi-
ment and the one relating to repenters, it also seems as though no-one would
affirm the inaccurate generalisation if asked. The modifying generalisations do
not seem to be greatly more complicated than the unmodified generalisation
one, and so one might wonder why ToM would include only the unmodified
version of generalisation one, since the modified one would be so much more
accurate. On ST of course, there are no similar issues around why the gener-
alisation set is so poor. S simply places himself in the position of O who has
just set a number of rather impressive specialist questions, concludes that S
has impressive abilities, and then ascribes those impressive abilities across the
board to O. S does not at any point need to affirm the generalisation explicitly
under ST, because ST does not include any generalisations.
The suicide note assessor data (§8.2.5 and §6.2.1) meet with mixed results
on the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT. The ToM error here is that
S does not predict that O will continue to believe he is good at assessing
suicide notes after the evidence therefor has been eliminated. The inaccurate
generalisation here is approximately ‘O’s beliefs will conform to O’s relevant
evidence.’ This represents a good explanation of this and many items of ‘too
rosy’ data and so to that considerable extent, the Inaccurate Generalisation
Defence of TT is here successful. Where there will continue to be questions
will be around how such a generalisation is acquired. It is certainly a good
starting point, which might be also a good argument for TT proponents. But
why has it never been improved? There are plenty of observational data around
suggesting that O will often in fact conform his beliefs to his evidence when
that suits him. Indeed, that must surely also be an inaccurate generalisation
of ToM, since it underlies much of the ‘too cynical’ data. So does not then TT
face a similar problem in explaining systematic ToM error as ST does, with
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the difference that the problem may be couched in ‘conflict of generalisation’
terms?
Prima facie, it seems as though the inaccurate generalisation in the case
of the lottery ticket holders (§8.2.6) is the negation of the Endowment Effect.
While stating a generalisation to achieve this is difficult, that may not be
a serious problem for TT proponents. They merely need to say that the
Endowment Effect is unknown so not part of ToM, whatever the form taken
by the underlying theory. This line may make a testable prediction: if one
tells S’s about the Endowment Effect, they might make different predictions
in future. One would certainly expect that if one told them about it and then
immediately asked them to describe the behaviour of O in exactly the same
circumstances. If this transpired to be the case, then this would appear to
be evidence for an element of TT beyond what Weak S/T Hybridism already
allows. Further empirical questions would then become pressing. To what
extent does the new information become part of ToM? If the S forgets the
data immediately, or even only after some time, it would be difficult to argue
that the improved generalisation had become part of ToM. On the other hand,
if TT avoids that difficulty, then it would be committing to a highly plastic
picture of ToM, whereby ToM development is a lifelong process. That too
might be fine, but it appears as though a further prediction of this line is
that academic psychologists, especially those focussing on biases, will make
many fewer systematic ToM errors than the general population, and their
ToM will continue to improve as their professional knowledge does. It would
be fascinating to see this prediction tested; I suspect that it might be found
that it is partially true: some ToM errors are eliminated by knowledge and
some cannot be shifted. If so, TT would owe an explanation.
There seems in fact to be a wider problem with economic generalisations
of the sort seen here. The generalisation above seems to be a special case of
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some broader scope generalisation like ‘O will consider only relevant economic
factors when making economic decisions.’ The problem here for the Inaccu-
rate Generalisation Defence seems to be that this is not merely a inaccurate
generalisation, it is an exceptionally poor one: a very large proportion of peo-
ple will fail to behave in accordance with such a generalisation on a very large
number of occasions. Indeed, the entire literature on behavioural economics
rests on exactly how often people fail to behave in such a way. One might
even think that the number of occasions on which an individual makes a pure
perfectly optimised economic choice is very limited. So ToM is here, on the
Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT, going to make errors not just on
a large number of occasions, but practically every time it is applied. There
is no reason to accept this. Why do sophisticated adults with a lifetime of
experience apply a ToM generalisation which fails on almost every occasion of
use? Here, we should again prefer the ST explanation which just has S place
himself in the lottery situation but fail to apply the Endowment Effect be-
cause a more intense affective involvement with the situation, one that might
come from touching the lottery tickets and owning them physically, is needed
to trigger such an application.
The initial proposal for the inaccurate generalisation in the gamblers exper-
iment (§8.2.7) will be something like ‘O will evaluate relevant data objectively.’
This will probably appear too strong given the points made above about how
often O’s rationality is suspect. It might be weakened and made more eco-
nomically relevant by focussing more narrowly on what exactly it is about this
experiment which is surprising. That is that O seems to handle relevant data
poorly even when the data matters crucially and economically to O. After all,
gamblers lose money when they gamble badly, so surely they should look very
closely at relevant data.
What seems to be going on in this experiment is a conflict of two general-
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isations. The first generalisation will be a version of the above generalisation
modified in the way suggested, viz. something like ‘O will evaluate relevant
data objectively when the question is of sufficient importance for O.’ The con-
flict seems to result in a tension between the behaviour called for from O were
this generalisation to be accurate, and O’s desire to continue to gamble. Such
a desire might result from O’s desire to maintain his self-image as a successful
gambler – which line of course fits neatly with the Bias Mismatch Defence –
or possibly O is a compulsive gambler, bypassing his decision making system
– which would open the possibility of employing the Harris (1992) Transla-
tion Defence of ST. In the former case, the second generalisation would be
something like ‘O wishes to maintain his self-image.’ Both of these generali-
sations seem to be sound in terms of applying ToM on relevant occasions, so
the problem seems to lie in combining the two. It seems that the Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence of TT must claim that the first generalisation is given
more weight than the second generalisation, when in this particular case, a
more accurate prediction of O’s behaviour would be given by applying more
weight to the second generalisation. As usual, this approach seems complex
and unmotivated.
The basketball fans experiment (§8.2.8) seems to require the Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence of TT once again to appeal to a bad combination
generalisation with the first one being a good data handling generalisation.
Generalisation one would be something like ‘O will make statistical judge-
ments using the available statistical data appropriately.’ TT defenders will
not want that generalisation to apply across the board, because people are
notoriously poor at making statistical judgements. Yet they might reasonably
expect something like generalisation one to apply in relation to the hot hand
phenomenon. After all, that is a pure statistical judgement which can be
made solely on the basis of hits following misses and that data is right in front
266 CHAPTER 10. TT: INACCURATE GENERALISATION DEFENCE
of the basketball fans. It is not clear what generalisation is in conflict with
generalisation one in this case. As I have suggested above, it looks as though
the fans wish to maintain their self-image as basketball experts. That might
explain why, once they have espoused the hot hand illusion, they continue to
maintain their belief in it. On this view, the conflicting generalisation two is
something like ‘O will maintain his belief in his own expertise.’ This looks
somewhat like a ‘bias mismatch defence’ of TT. That might acquire some ini-
tial appeal since it fits the data, but there would be a parsimony cost to pay
for the TT defender here. That cost arises because ST gets the biases for
free while TT must engineer them in through careful generalisation selection.
Moreover, this version of the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence still does not
explain why basketball fans acquire their belief in the hot hand phenomenon
to begin with. Perhaps TT defenders could suggest that the belief is culturally
acquired, but they would have then move beyond the purview of a Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence and into ad hoc territory.
It would be uncharitable in relation to the cancer cure assessor experiment
(§8.2.9) to saddle the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT with a general-
isation that predicts that O will employ sound scientific reasoning in arriving
at medical conclusions. A generalisation insisting that O constructs hypothe-
ses based on one data set and tests them by examining their predictions on
another data set would generate almost total ToM error. Weakening that, TT
defenders might retreat to an expectation that O will often follow a dictum
to the effect that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (Hume
1993, p. 73). This still seems much too strong to be a plausible candidate
generalisation of ToM, because if people generally behaved that way, we would
see it and there would have been no point in Hume arguing for his dictum.
The claim that mental imagery can have physiological effects including cur-
ing a very severe disease seems to fall into the extraordinary claim category,
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though, so proponents of the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence will need to
construct a generalisation that refers to it. An escape route suggests itself:
TT defenders can appeal to what seems to be going on here, which is that O’s
with a vested interest in believing the proposition will find a way to believe
it, despite the lack of evidence. So the generalisation could be something like
‘O will require extraordinary evidence before believing extraordinary claims
unless O has a vested interest in the claim in question.’ This now looks like a
good ToM generalisation in that it begins to describe what O actually does.
And yet here is a problem for proponents of the Inaccurate Generalisation
Defence of TT because this generalisation does not predict ToM error. The
ToM error may in fact not exist. O believes, roughly, ‘positive imagery cures
cancer’ absent a control experiment showing that. If S predicts this, then
there is no ToM error and TT has nothing to explain – and neither does ST,
so this experiment drops out of the frame as far as the ST vs TT debate is
concerned. If S does not predict this, then it will be because S has applied
the alternate generalisation discussed above: ‘O will conform his beliefs to
his evidence.’ We may then ask again why this generalisation has not been
improved. Again, all of these questions appear amenable to empirical work.
The explanation of the ToM error in the puzzle solvers experiment (§8.2.10)
seems again to require wholesale belief attribution as in the case of the repen-
ters discussed above. We take the role of S here, and the O is the person in
the experiment who is setting the ‘My World’ task. There is a third person
involved, who is the T that the O asks to solve the ‘My World’ puzzle. It is
again important to keep our levels of ToM error separate here. There seems
to be a systematic ToM error made by O about the solver. This is interest-
ing, because it is explicable on the ST account, but Saxe (2005a) again cites
these data as examples of ‘surprising’ results in social psychology. The idea is
again that if our ToM were not subject to systematic error, we would not be
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surprised by the results of such experiments because we would simply use our
ToM to predict them. So that is the level of ToM error on which we should
focus.
The problem here is that O wrongly attributes to T the entirety of the
knowledge base of O. As discussed above in the case of the repenters, this is
hard to achieve for the TT defenders while it is an immediate consequence of
ST. The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT could initially postulate a
generalisation like ‘T knows what O knows.’ This is a start, but it will need
modification to allow for obvious errors that will result from scenarios where
O knows that T does not know a fact of key relevance. It is being able to
account for such lacunae in the knowledge base of T that allows O to pass the
False Belief Task when O is a typically-developing individual older than five.
So the generalisation needs to be modified to ‘T knows all facts that O knows
less those facts that T clearly does not know.’ This will basically allow the
Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT to explain the False Belief Task data.
Now there is a problem for the defence though, because it is clear to O in the
‘My World’ experiment that T does not know the rule. Precisely that is the
point of the game, together with O’s remarkable difficulty in working out just
how difficult the task is for the T’s, and our difficulty as S’s in understanding
why O makes such a remarkable ToM error. So the Inaccurate Generalisation
Defence of TT needs to explain why the modified generalisation which explains
the data in the False Belief Task does not apply here to allow O to make more
accurate predictions of the likelihood of solving the puzzle when O himself
solved it.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT will claim in the shoppers
experiment (§8.2.11) that the problem derives from S employing an inaccurate
generalisation like ‘O will make a quality selection based on relevant quality
factors’ unmodified by a strange generalisation to the effect that ‘O will often
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make a quality selection based on irrelevant quality factors like position.’ Here,
the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence succeeds, though there is some risk
for TT defenders that the quality selection generalisation risks being far too
optimistic about human behaviour.
I will now move on to the ‘too cynical’ data from Ch. 9.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT will explain the data on
conflict parties (§9.2.1) by including a inaccurate generalisation to the effect
that ‘T will make self-serving judgements when T is vitally interested in the
outcome of the judgement.’ (As previously, I will use the tripartite labels
such that we are the S’s who make the ToM error of interest about what the
O’s in the experiment say about the third party T’s also in the experiment.)
This generalisation seems useful for TT defenders, since it explains the data.
The major problem for TT though is that ST defenders can bring the mirror-
image of the charge of Saxe (2005a) here, demanding to know exactly why this
‘cynical’ generalisation will come to the fore in this experiment when previously
generalisations like ‘T will evaluate the relevant data dispassionately in making
an important judgement’ were more to the fore. These two generalisations are
in direct conflict with one another and both must form part of ToM, because
both are appropriate in some circumstances. It seems otherwise unmotivated
to claim that this particular inaccurate generalisation will systematically be
employed in all similar circumstances. Further, in the case of the teachers, it
seems that they have misapplied the generalisation ‘T knows what O knows’ in
the very face of the obvious fact that their job is to teach facts to their student
T’s that those students do not know. This opens up another difficult question
for the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT, which asks to what extent
will inaccurate generalisations be modified, improved or deleted as a result of
germane experience. Neither of the possible answers – no improvement versus
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some improvement – appear promising.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence will in the marriage partners ex-
periment (§9.2.2) again be postulating a ‘cynical’ generalisation, to the effect
that ‘T will take credit or admit responsibility for positive and negative actions
in self-serving ways.’ Then, O’s ToM predicts that T will admit less respon-
sibility for negative actions than is actually the case. Here, as with much of
the ‘too cynical’ data we will be examining, the ToM errors in the experiment
seem to all derive from O expecting more self-serving bias in various forms
than is actually exhibited by T. The ToM errors made by us as S’s outside the
experiment relate to the fact that we do not predict what O will say about the
T’s. T does indeed exhibit some self-serving bias, but less than O predicts.
Now we are entitled to demand why in the experiment there is such a system-
atic mismatch between the quantum of self-serving bias predicted by O and
that exhibited by T. If TT(Scientific) is correct, then it might seem that O
has learned the miscalibrated generalisation from experience which does not
support it. Learning from experience should precisely have the function of
improving the calibration of such a generalisation. TT proponents here may
object that this is too crude, generalisations are indeed learned, but maybe
the inaccurate generalisations are a side-effect of learning otherwise reliable
heuristics. That line might work, but would need some specification. Other-
wise, TT defenders might want to appeal to TT(Innate) and argue that the
miscalibrated generalisation is part of an inherited module. On this picture,
everyone inherits an inaccurate generalisation because the all inherit the same
otherwise reliable heuristics. This line predicts that everyone will operate with
the same inaccurate generalisation that is in all S’s similarly miscalibrated.
Why does no-one ever calibrate it correctly? This is particularly a problem
for TT(Scientific), when according to major proponents Slaughter and Gopnik
(1996, p. 2969) “another important feature of intuitive theories is that they
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may be revised as a result of new evidence [which] differentiates theories from
other types of cognitive structures, such as modules” found in TT(Innate).
Since much of the data in this section falls into the category described
above, this ‘Miscalibration Objection’ will apply as well in many cases below.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT must explain not just the ToM
errors made by us as S’s about the experiment but the ToM errors made within
the experiment by the O’s. In my view, TT defenders have no response to this
objection.
TT defenders will again claim in the video gamers experiment (§9.2.3)
that the inaccurate generalisation within the experiment is ‘T will take credit
or admit responsibility for positive and negative actions in self-serving ways.’
However, the Miscalibration Objection will apply again here. Further, we may
ask why the miscalibration is different in this scenario than in the Marriage
Partners experiment. Also, Kruger and Gilovich (1999, p. 747) note evidence
that cooperative video games such as the one they employed often engender
“other-serving judgements of responsibility.” So the Inaccurate Generalisa-
tion Defence needs to modify the generalisation here to include a term like
‘[. . . ] with the quantum of self-serving depending on whether the activity in
question is cooperative or not.’ That appears to be an unlikely generalisation
modification. Again, we may step outside the experiment and ask why we as
S’s do not predict the errors that the O’s make about the T’s. ST can suggest
instead here that the reduction in ToM error within the experiment comes
about because of an improvement in simulation accuracy engendered by the
closer relation involved in a cooperative scenario. As Kruger and Gilovich
(1999, p. 747) observe, “intergroup rivalries tend to increase in-group cohe-
sion.” ST can continue to predict ToM error by S’s outside the experiment
though by noting that the external S’s are non-participants and so immune to
group cohesion effects.
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Similarly, TT defenders will claim in the case of the debaters experiment
(§9.2.4) that the inaccurate generalisation within the experiment is ‘T will
take credit or admit responsibility for positive and negative actions in self-
serving ways.’ The Miscalibration Objection will apply again here. There are
now multiple levels of miscalibration in O’s ToM relation to team-mate T’s
and opponent T’s. The inaccurate generalisation needs to have O’s predicting
that T’s who are opponents will make even more self-serving allocations of
responsibility than team-mate T’s who will be more self-serving than the O’s
take themselves to be. So the inaccurate generalisation within the experiment
will need to make some reference to the status of the T as opponent or team-
mate which seems implausible. And as usual, we as S’s outside the experiment
predict none of this.
TT defenders will again claim in the case of the darts players (§9.2.5) that
the inaccurate generalisation is ‘O will take credit or admit responsibility for
positive and negative actions in self-serving ways.’ The Miscalibration Ob-
jection will apply again here. The inaccurate generalisation needs to explain
why in this experiment O’s expected opponent T’s to over-claim 14.6% of the
credit for desirable outcomes than their team-mate T’s and why O’s expected
opponent T’s to admit 13.9% less of the responsibility for undesirable out-
comes than team-mate T’s. And outside the experiment, we as S’s will it
appears need to have an inaccurate generalisation that results in differences
expressible in percentages.
The ToM error in the blood donors experiment (§9.2.6) is that O’s pre-
dicted that T’s would be motivated by money much more than they actually
were. The inaccurate generalisation must be something like ‘T’s will agree to
perform an unpleasant duty that benefits others more often if paid than not
paid.’ This is shown by the experiment to be true, but not to anything like
the extent predicted by O’s. Here, the Miscalibration Objection will ask why
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the generalisation within the experiment is off by the amount it is; the ‘more
often’ here is 32% when it should be 10%. It is not a good response here for TT
defenders to suggest that ST also cannot explain these percentages, because
ST, employing no generalisations, does not need to plug in any percentages
into any generalisations. Since these are the percentages measured, these must
be the amount by which Self-Presentation Bias affects reported judgements.
The Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT in the case of the healthcare
consumers experiment (§9.2.7) will not presumably be specific to the level of
healthcare, but will have O’s predicting that T’s act to their own advantage.
The generalisation within the experiment will be something like ‘T will be
more likely to favour public expenditure which benefits T.’ There seem to be
a number of difficulties with this generalisation. Firstly, the generalisation will
need to key off O’s view of what benefits T, because O does not have access
to either T’s view of what will benefit T or what may be very different, what
will actually benefit T. This then raises the problem that the generalisation
will indeed be systematically bad if O’s views of what benefits T are adrift
from T’s views, but that that systematic ToM error does not seem apt to
match the systematic error required to explain the data in this experiment.
The data show that the generalisation canvassed above is totally false in that
T is apparently not more likely to favour public expenditure which benefits
T. Secondly, it also appears overly specified and implausible in what is after
all an evolved ToM that it includes generalisations about public expenditure.
On the other hand, if this is avoided by changing the generalisation to ‘T
will favour decisions that benefit T’ it seems to be too weak to have sufficient
predictive power. The situation will not become simpler when extended to us
as S’s outside the experiment.
The campus drinkers experiment (§9.2.8) appears similar to the previous
one, but in the reverse direction. The inaccurate generalisation would appear
274 CHAPTER 10. TT: INACCURATE GENERALISATION DEFENCE
to be something like ‘T will disfavour policy decisions that adversely affect T.’
This generalisation is open to both of the objections set out previously; viz.
systematic mismatch between what O believes will adversely affect T and what
T believes will adversely affect T will not predict the data seen. This again
shows that in this case, T does not disfavour policy decisions that adversely
affect T. The generalisation similarly makes reference to policy decisions which
seems implausible. Perhaps TT defenders can say that this inaccurate gen-
eralisation is not triggered in this case because T believes that in fact the
policy decision will not adversely affect T: T may consider the longer-term
health benefits of drinking less. Taking that way out though means that TT
defenders will need to specify axiomatically when the inaccurate generalisa-
tion applies and when it does not. They will need a large number of further
generalisations to do that. Again, there seem to be sufficient difficulties for
the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence of TT within the experiment before we
step outside to us as S’s making ToM errors about the O’s in the experiment.
The smokers experiment (§9.2.9) introduces yet another complication for
TT defenders to add to the previous two. The previous two experiments
showed the absence of self-serving bias in decisions made by T in different
directions: firstly there was contrary to O’s predictions no bias in favour of
decisions seen as favouring T and secondly there was no bias against deci-
sions seen as disfavouring T. Here we have a weaker variant of the first effect
in that there was a bias towards decisions favouring T, but not as much as
the O’s predicted. This might allow TT defenders to avoid the problems de-
scribed in the previous two sections, but here they will again have to face the
Miscalibration Objection. Why is the generalisation not calibrated better to
the quantum of bias actually observed? We might also note that when an
experiment is conducted and an average result over a population given, that
is generally not the answer all of the experimental subjects gave. They gave
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a range of answers which were averaged to arrive at the answer given. So
the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence now has to explain why there is such a
range of miscalibrations. And as ever, we may ask what the account says that
S’s outside the experiment will predict about the O’s.
The statement releasers experiment (§9.2.10) showed a similar miscalibra-
tion to the one described in the experiment discussed in the previous section.
There was a self-serving bias in the responses given, but it was not as strong
an effect as the S’s predicted. All of the objections mentioned in the previous
section apply. We may add to the problem about the range of answers given
one as to what distinguishes this experiment from the previous one in terms
of which inaccurate generalisations apply. If TT defenders wish to apply the
same generalisation to this experiment and the previous one, they will have to
explain why different percentage errors are found. If they wish to apply differ-
ent generalisations to the experiment and the previous one, they will have to
specify the new generalisations and provide a third generalisation which de-
cides which of the first two generalisations will apply in which case. They will
have to repeat that process for all possible current and future experiments.
10.3 Conclusions
Let us review progress made across the board. In table 10.1, I give in summary
my assessment of the extent to which the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence
of TT has been seen to be successful.
The results show a mixed picture. Bear in mind that the game has now
changed, since ST combined with the Bias Mismatch Defence now has a par-
simonious and comprehensive explanation of all these data, together with a
great deal more where there are surprising data in social psychology resulting
from biases. This data set will continue to expand over time, compounding
the problem for TT.
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Experiment Success? Issues
Shock Appliers ! ‘Justification’ in generalisations
Fake Prison Guards ! ‘Justification’ in generalisations
Repenters ! Requires full belief set of S
Quiz Gamers ? Why does S have this generalisation?
Suicide Note Assessors ? Conflict of generalisations?
Lottery Ticket Holders ! ToM static or dynamic?
Gamblers ! Conflict of generalisations?
Basketball Fans ! TT needs to add in biases
Cancer Cure Assessors ! Conflict of generalisations?
Puzzle Solvers # test
Shoppers Redux ! Conflict of generalisations?
Conflict Parties # ToM static or dynamic?
Marriage Partners ? Miscalibration
Video Gamers ? Miscalibration
Debaters ? Miscalibration
Darts Players ? Miscalibration
Blood Donors ? Miscalibration
Healthcare Consumers # Who benefits?
Campus Drinkers # Opposite of above
Smokers # Miscalibration
Statement Releasers # Miscalibration
Table 10.1: Inaccurate Generalisation Defence: Data Issues
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Observers might disagree with my assessment in a number of cases, and
argue that in fact, the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence has been successful
in more cases than I allow. So be it: it remains the case that the Inaccurate
Generalisation Defence needs to explain all of the data in order to reach parity
with augmented ST. And we may enquire as to the parsimony cost. I have
several times asked about conflicts of generalisations. Remember that all TT
has in such cases is more generalisations, which risks exacerbating the very
problem the extra generalisations were introduced to address. There will be
a need for a great number of generalisations, all of which will be wrong in all
cases of systematic ToM error. The overall account, if fully specified as I insist
it ought to be, will be severely lacking in parsimony if it can be produced at
all.
Three issues came up several times. There is a major problem of how to
resolve conflicts of generalisations; there is another one as to whether ToM
is static or dynamic in adults and there is the problem of a wide array of
miscalibrated generalisations. I conclude that while this set of problems does
not do enough to terminate the viability of TT, it certainly poses a very
difficult set of questions which must be dealt with if TT is to reach parity of
plausibility with ST or Weak S/T Hybrids.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
I began in Ch. 1 by setting out the central task. This was to defend ST
and Weak S/T Hybridism against a serious challenge from TT and Strong
S/T Hybrid theorists. The challenge was that ST alone could not account for
the observed systematic errors in ToM performance of different kinds under
different types of scenario. No response had been provided by the ST side to
this challenge, and therefore it could be seen that there was an urgent need
for ST proponents to provide a response. Such a response is now in place,
and it may now be seen that the response is comprehensive, parsimonious and
convincing. I therefore conclude that Weak S/T Hybridism is a better account
of ToM than had been thought. It is in a much stronger position than its close
relation pure ST had been thought to be in.
The story began in earnest in Ch. 2 with a consideration of the possible
logical variety of accounts of ToM. I examined both the scientific and Modular
versions of TT, and the transformation and replication variants of ST. I spent
some time considering further possible variants of ST, all of which appeared
worthy of further consideration. I did not select a champion; the purpose of
this thesis was to defend all versions of ST. The debate as to which version
if any is superior may be deferred. The more serious problem of whether ST
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was in fact separate to TT was considered; it was seen that the ‘collapse risk’
of ST entailing TT was in fact avoidable. Avoiding the error of ‘setting the
bar too low’ was crucial here. With that in hand, one could be confident that
there was a version of ST which would be separate from TT and could succeed
without needing to decide which exact one it was.
In the next two chapters I examined difficulties with accounts that I aimed
to challenge in this thesis. In Ch. 3, I considered some objections to pure TT
accounts already proposed. I concluded that there were difficult objections to
both of the types of TT that have received widespread support in the literature.
I then moved on in Ch. 4 to consider whether the mainstream Strong S/T
Hybrid approach could deal with these problems. Although mixing in some of
TT(Innate) to a TT(Scientific) account does mean that some of the objections
can be addressed, some of them still remain. The next idea was to add in some
simulation also to the mix. Strong S/T Hybrid approaches must be the right
answer, on this sort of view, because the challenge set out above to TT must
mean that some ST is needed in response. It was seen though that there were
two sorts of difficulty for Strong S/T Hybrid positions. One sort was that
such Strong S/T Hybrid positions involve TT and therefore inherit all of the
objections to TT (though we also saw that if Strong S/T Hybrids accept the
lack of parsimony involved in including TT(Scientific), TT(Innate) as well as
ST, they could solve three of the six objections). But a further unique sort
of difficulty arises from trying to make TT and ST work together. These
problems around resolving questions such as whether and how TT and ST
interact and how that works led to difficulties for the mainstream Strong S/T
Hybrid position.
I then, in Ch. 5, gave the TT opposition, ably represented by Saxe, their
best case. I agreed that there was a serious problem for ST in explaining
the systematic errors in ToM. I did not attempt to deny that these errors
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occurred or that they were systematic. I agreed that TT could explain them
parsimoniously by assuming the employment of a false ToM generalisation. I
agreed that ST needed a response. I conceded that the difficulty for ST was
sharpened by Saxe’s astute observation that the errors were systematically
different in different scenarios. Why would ToM errors be like that if ST were
correct? After all, one of the ST claims is that we use our own minds to
simulate our own minds in different circumstances, so how could be be wrong?
I considered two different types of data introduced by Saxe: the ‘too rosy’
ToM error cases and the ‘too cynical’ cases. The conclusion at this stage was
that the TT opposition to ST had a very strong case which needed answering.
The stage was then set for a new approach. I introduced the Bias Mismatch
Defence in Ch. 6, suggesting that there were new resources available to ST to
allow it to respond to the various forms of the systematic error challenge by
allowing that S and O may apply different cognitive biases. As I suggested
in Ch. 7, they may do so systematically because either they are differently
involved affectively speaking in the particular scenario, or because they use
different systems of reasoning. I outlined the various biases that would later
be employed to explain a large array of data that TT proponents use to show
systematic ToM error.
The next two chapters, Ch. 8 and Ch. 9, were the data-driven heart
of the argument. I showed how different biases being applied by S and O
could explain dozens of experiments in both the ‘too rosy’ and ‘too cynical’
directions of ToM error. Naturally, if some commentators suggest different
combinations of biases to explain the data, that would constitute a ‘friendly
amendment,’ remaining entirely consistent with the Bias Mismatch Defence.
In Ch. 10, I showed that constructing the inaccurate generalisations needed
for various experiments was sometimes difficult. Given that the defence, to be
deemed successful, needs to account for all or at least a wide variety of data,
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this made it look as though the Inaccurate Generalisation Defence would not
be a panacea for TT proponents. There were three major problems involving
conflicts of generalisations, whether ToM is static or dynamic in adults and
miscalibration of generalisations. Significantly more working out of the defence
would be needed for TT proponents to be able to answer the mirror image of
the question Saxe posed to simulationists: ‘how can TT account for systematic
ToM errors?’ I concluded that TT must now handle a difficult set of questions
which must be dealt with if TT is to reach parity of plausibility with ST or
Weak S/T Hybrids.
In sum: we have seen that ST can not only respond to the systematic
error challenge but it appears to do so more parsimoniously than the alter-
natives. We may therefore conclude that the current mainstream Strong S/T
Hybrid/TT consensus is now in need of further support on the systematic er-
ror question while Weak S/T Hybridism, which is very close to pure ST, can
now be seen as, pending that work, a better account of ToM.
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